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This thesis is a collection of essays on the problem of overfishing in multi-
firm fisheries with a common property fish stock. We focus on the case of marine
industrial fisheries, where the costs of preventing free riding tend to preclude
cooperative harvesting. We study the overfishing problem by analysing harvesting
incentives that stem from variations in (i) technological (cost, production and
biological growth) functions, (ii) institutional factors (access schemes, regulatory
agencies' instruments and their monitoring and enforcement powers, harvesting
competition), and (iii) objective functions (private firms' planning horizons, welfare
functions).
Chapter 2 discusses conditions under which a fishing collapse can occur and
examines the commonly held argument that fishing collapse is a public bad. Chapter
3 studies Chilean fishing regulations over the last five decades. The regulator's
persistent inability to enforce annual quotas is analysed. Distributive disputes and
triggered lobbying powers are examined. The late 1980s controversies over a new
Chilean fishing law are analysed in-depth from this perspective. Chapter 4 explains
the main motivations and key assumptions leading us to the oligopoly harvesting
models of chapters 5 (static setting) and 6 (dynamic setting). These models focus on
a deterministic single fish species and a single sector harvesting fishery composed of
profit maximizing and price taking private firms that compete with each other by
following non-cooperative harvesting strategies. These models examine the
overfishing rankings that result from comparing Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg
equilibria. First best and second best welfare benchmarks are considered. The
Cournot-Nash setting is intended to illustrate a large number oligopolistic fishery,
while the Stackelberg equilibrium is meant to be a first approximation to analyse the
implications of harvesting fisheries subject to industrial concentration. Empirical
evidence suggesting the presence of industrial concentration in a series of important
marine industrial fisheries is described in chapters 3 and 4.
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This thesis is a collection of essays on the problem of overfishing in multi-firm
fisheries with a common property fish stock. The objective is enlarging our
understanding of the incentive structures, and underlying technological and
institutional restrictions, that condition individual firms' harvesting decisions and their
effects on the overfishing of common property fish populations. Although policy
oriented prescriptions are not a central part to this thesis, some efforts are devoted
to this aspect.
This thesis focuses on the case of marine industrial fisheries, where the costs
of preventing free riding tend to preclude the possibility of self-enforced or credible
cooperative harvesting strategies. Non-cooperative harvesting implies that firms'
fishing strategies fail to fully internalize the externality brought about by common
property. The analysis concentrates on the case of a deterministic single fish species
and a single sector harvesting fishery composed of profit maximizing and price taking
private firms that compete with each other by following non-cooperative harvesting
strategies.
Commonality leads to several different allocative inefficiencies, each of which
is associated with an inefficient dissipation of the Ricardian rents in the common
property fish stock. Rent dissipation can arise from an excessive accumulation of
productive capacity, possibly as a strategy to justify and acquire user rights upon the
common pool resource (i.e., Munro, 1982; Eggertsson, 1990). Sometimes,
inefficiencies can arise as the result of inefficient input use. For instance, in cases
where only one productive input, within a multi-input technology allowing for
substitution effects, faces binding regulatory controls aimed to control total harvesting
(i.e., Gould, 1972; Munro and Scott, 1985). Rent dissipation may stem from rent
15
seeking efforts, originating from distributive disputes among rival interest groups
competing for fish stocks' rents (Wise, 1984; Miles, 1989). Rent dissipation may also
arise from excessive harvesting competition among multiple non-cooperative
harvesters (Clark, 1980; Levhari and Mirman, 1980). The latter is the rent
dissipation process which is the main focus of this thesis. Rent seeking strategies
related to fishing regulation, and underlying distributive disputes, are also discussed.
Excessive harvesting or overflshing can be analysed from different
perspectives. The emphasis depends on the priority assigned to different aspects of
this problem. On occasions the emphasis is on issues of long run sustainability.
Marine biologists are prompt to emphasize this aspect (i.e., Idyll, 1973; Gulland,
1988). This profession has traditionally cautioned against the risk of extinction of the
fish species under common property. Economists have been increasingly involved in
this debate since the mid 1970s (i.e., Clark, 1973; Berck, 1979; Hartwick, 1982;
Clemhout and Wan, 1986; Weitzman, 1992; Swanson, 1993). They have usually
considered wider aspects of sustainability, for example, by analysing the problem of
economic collapse (i.e., Lewis and Schmalensee, 1979, 1982). Specificity of capital
stocks and irreversibility effects play a key role in the discussion of economic fishing
collapse (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Weitzman, 1992). Chapter 2 surveys and
addresses the latter issues.
We study the problem of excessive harvesting competition by analysing the
changes in harvesting incentives and their effects upon overfishing outcomes arising
from variations in: (i) technological (cost, production and biological growth)
functions, (ii) institutional factors (access schemes, regulatory agencies' instruments
and their monitoring and enforcement powers, harvesting competition), and (iii)
objective functions (private firms' planning horizons, welfare functions). More
specific questions related to these issues are explained in what follows.
16
(1.B) Specific objectives.
This thesis examines two closely related groups of issues: regulation and market
structure in common pool marine fisheries.
(a) Regulation.
First, we analyse some aspects of the regulation of common pool fisheries.
We discuss how different emphasis on different aspects of the commonality issue
imply different regulatory objectives. Chapter 2 discusses long run sustainability
objectives. This chapter analyses technological and institutional factors affecting the
occurrence of fishing collapse. Technological factors (cost, harvesting, and biological
growth functions) are discussed in some detail. It is argued that under some
conditions a fishing collapse could be welfare optimal.
In chapter 3 we study the case of Chilean fishing regulations, particularly
those related to access restrictions and catch quotas. We analyse fishing regulators'
persistent inability to enforce annual catch quotas. Different restrictions faced by
regulatory agencies, and the impact on regulatory outcomes, are studied. We discuss
the possibility of regulatory capture by private interest groups and analyse
distributional conificts and related lobbying strategies. We also analyse policy
priorities and their changes over the last five decades and give a detailed analysis of
the enactment of the Chilean 1991 Fishing Law.
In chapters 5 and 6 we develop models to illustrate how changes in the
regulator's powers can change the assessment of overfishing inefficiencies. We do
this in the context of oligopolistic harvesting games in static and dynamic settings.
We make explicit comparisons between first best and second best welfare solutions.
The latter are defined by welfare optimization problems where a social planner has
control only upon one firm among n ^ 1 remaining rival harvesting firms. This
exercise is a simplified illustration of a fishing regulator who has limited control and
enforcement powers upon the regulated firms' actions. By contrast, the first best
17
welfare yardstick assumes that the social planner has full control upon all harvesting
firms that exploit the common pool fish stock. The use of second best welfare
solutions allows us to illustrate arguments of constrained optimality. The use of
constrained optimality benchmarks tends to reduce the parameter ranges in which
oligopolistic private firms harvest inefficiently. The explicit modelling of these ideas
within multi-firm harvesting games is one of the contributions of this thesis.
(b) Market structure
The second set of questions concerns overfishing incentives within the context
of multi-firm harvesting competition games. This thesis offers a contribution to the
literature on fishery economics by considering common pool marine fisheries subject
to industrial concentration in harvesting sectors; that is, fisheries with a few relatively
large harvesting firms competing with numerous smaller rival harvesters. Chapters
3 and 4 provide empirical evidence that supports the relevance of studying harvesting
incentives in this type of fishery setting. The case of Chilean marine pelagic fisheries
is examined in detail. Other examples considered are the Peruvian anchovy fishery
of the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, and the US tuna fishery during the
1970s.
The study of marine fisheries subject to industrial concentration has
traditionally focused on processing firms with monopsonistic or oligopsonistic powers
with respect to harvesting firms (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969; Clark and
Munro, 1980; Munro, 1982; Schworm, 1983; Stollery, 1987). Chapter 4 provides
a brief summary of these ideas. In this thesis we pursue a different approach. By
excluding processing firms with mono(oligo)psonistic powers from the analysis, we
can pursue a more detailed analysis of harvesting competition strategies at fisheries
with concentration amongst harvesting firms.
This allows us to explore in greater detail the changes in harvesting incentives
and in overfishing outcomes that arise from different assumptions about (i) the type
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of strategic interactions among harvesting firms, distinguishing between different
sources of strategic interaction and between different types of conjectures about
rivals' strategic reactions; (ii) the optimization rules pursued by different types of
harvesting firms (smallllarge size), contrasting static with dynamic optimization rules;
and (iii) technological (cost, production, and biological growth) functions.
Chapters 5 and 6 develop models of multi-firm harvesting competition games
in static and dynamic optimizing settings. They model industrial concentration by
assuming the existence of a harvesting firm that is a Stackelberg leader which may
have a productivity advantage over the numerous followers. The leader-followers
setting is one of the simplest ways to represent more active features of strategic
interaction, relative to the passive strategic conjectures of Cournot-Nash settings. We
use the concept of hierarchical Stackelberg equilibrium as a first approximation to
analyse the implications of common pool harvesting fisheries subject to industrial
concentration.
By contrast Cournot-Nash equilibria are the modelling settings in which the
tragedy of the commons has been more frequently analysed since the early 1980s
(Clark, 1980; Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Comes and Sandier, 1983; Conies, Mason
and Sandler, 1986; Plourde and Yeung, 1989). Conjectural variations equilibria have
also been used in common pool fishery models (i.e., Comes and Sandier, 1983;
Mason, Sandier and Comes, 1988).
The studies cited above attempted to generalize results with respect to the
predominant view, during the 1950s-1970s, of the overfishing problem. In this period
strategic considerations were neither discussed nor mentioned as factors affecting
harvesting actions (i.e., Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Smith, 1968 and 1970; Quirk and
Smith, 1970; Brown, 1974). Open access was a predominant assumption in these
earlier studies. Most of them also assumed that firms competing for the common pool
resource's rents would necessarily behave as static profit optimizing agents. No
attempt to endogeneize the latter feature was considered.
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In this thesis we aim to contribute to the existing literature on multi-firm
harvesting competition in a number of ways. First, we aim to complement the
existing studies on oligopolistic harvesting games by offering consistent comparisons
between Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg harvesting equilibria and the resulting
overfishing outcomes. Chapter 5 does this within a static setting. Chapter 6 considers
the existence of harvesting agents (private firms as well as the case of a social
planner) which use dynamic optimizing decision rules. Very few papers have
previously considered the modelling of hierarchical Stackelberg equilibria within the
context of multi-firm harvesting competition games. For example, Levhari and
Mirman (1980) and Dockner et a!. (1989) consider a dynamic duopoly fishery which
is analysed under Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
In chapters 5 and 6 we contribute to the latter type of analysis by considering
closed entry oligopoly harvesting models, in static and dynamic settings, which allow
us to examine how increasing numbers of rival firms affect the harvesting incentives,
and the resulting overfishing, of firms competing under Cournot-Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria. In each case we assess the overfishing outcome in terms of
first best and second best welfare benchmarks. In each case we also consider the
possibility of a leading firm with productivity advantages over her rivals and we
examine the effects upon overfishing.
Cournot-Nash settings can be understood as a reasonable modelling
approximation for harvesting fisheries where each firm tends to perceive its own
production as negligible relative to the industry's total production. In these cases, the
Nash assumption of rivals' passive strategic reaction to marginal changes in
individual firms' actions seems to be reasonable. By contrast our leader-followers
setting is intended to illustrate harvesting fisheries subject to industrial concentration.
A second contribution is the development of harvesting models in which we
explicitly defme and analyse, via survey oriented discussion and new models, how
different types of externality affect the firms' harvesting incentives that underlie
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overflshing outcomes. Multi-firm harvesting models usually do not refer clearly to
these different options for modelling externality effects within common pool fisheries.
Oligopoly models traditionally consider strategic interactions that stem from
pecuniary effects. For example, oligopolistic firms with price setting powers in the
product or input markets. Some oligopolistic harvesting models share this feature
(i.e., Kamien, Levhari and Mirrnan, 1985; Comes, Mason and Sandier, 1986;
Mason, Sandier and Comes, 1988; Dockner et al., 1989). In this thesis we exclude
this source of strategic interactions. We partly do so based on an empirical
motivation. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the latter. However, another important
motivation has consisted in analysing and isolating the effects upon harvesting
incentives of technological externalities directly associated with the common property
of fish stocks.
The oligopoly harvesting models in chapter 5 and 6 help us to explore this
issue. Chapter 5 considers a static congestion externality effect built dnto each finn's
harvesting function. This modelling strategy differs from the standard treatment of
congestion effects as an aggregate effect within the industry's production function.
Our modelling allows us to analyse how different congestion levels affect the
resulting overfishing under different oligopoly harvesting equilibrium concepts.
Congestion effects introduce rival consumption among harvesting firms. This allows
us to study the parameter ranges in which harvesting preemption corresponds to
individual firms' optimal strategy. Harvesting preemption implies that a given firm
increases her fishing effort in order to discourage rival firms' harvesting, via the
effect of increasing the congestion problem. The cost of pursuing harvesting
preemption is that it reduces each firm's harvesting productivity, the preemptive
firm's productivity included.
Chapter 6 analyses oligopolistic firms' harvesting incentives that stem from
a stock or dynamic externality effect. This corresponds to the impact that rival firms'
current harvesting has on the future fish stock. This effect introduces intertemporal
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rival consumption among independent harvesting firms. Assuming the existence of
private firms which dynamically optimize their individual intertemporal profits, we
compare Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg harvesting stationary equilibria against
welfare benchmarks (considering first best and second best solutions) that
dynamically optimize the industry's aggregate intertemporal profits.
Our third contribution to the existing literature on oigopolistic harvesting
games is related to the analyses performed within the dynamic optimizing setting of
chapter 6. First, we model overfishing outcomes as the result of endogenous
differences between the social scarcity value of the common pool fish stock and the
marginal value assigned to it by non-cooperative, though dynamic profit optimizing,
oligopolistic harvesting firms. This has not always been clearly brought out in
previous dynamic oligopoly harvesting models (i.e., Clark, 1980; Levhari and
Mirman, 1980; Dockner et al., 1989). Our approach allows an explicit discussion of
the meaning of myopic decision rules and we are able to make a distinction between
the concepts of static profit optimization and inefficient harvesting myopia.
Second, using the assumption of closed entry to the common pool fishery, we
examine how exogenous increases in the number of rival firms affect the degree of
inefficient harvesting myopia that is traditionally assumed for the case of non-
cooperative individual harvesting firms. We develop this analysis for dynamic profit
optimizing Coumot-Nash firms, and also for the case of a dynamic profit optimizing
Stackelberg leading firm which competes in harvesting with numerous smaller
followers, each of the latter behaving as a static profit optimizing agent. This type
of analysis is absent from previous dynamic harvesting models that have considered
Cournot-Nash as well as Stackelberg duopoly equilibria (i.e., Clark, 1980; Levhari
and Mirman, 1980; Dockner et al., 1989; Plourde and Yeung, 1989).
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(1.C) Modelling assumptions.
The models developed in chapters 5 and 6 are not aimed at explaining any
specific fishing industry, even though some of their assumptions are prompted by the
Chilean experience. The main objective of these modelling efforts is a better
understanding of non-cooperative individual firms' harvesting incentives under
different types of strategic interactions, due to different externality effects or to
different types of conjectures about rivals' reaction, or to static versus dynamic
intertemporal optimization rules.
For instance, we consider closed-entry harvesting models partly because
restricted entry has been a predominant feature at national marine industrial fisheries,
particularly since the late 1970s (Scott, 1988; Wilen, 1988). Our case study of
Chilean pelagic fisheries shows that from the mid 1980s a de facto closed entry
regulation has prevailed at the most heavily exploited marine industrial fisheries.
Besides its empirical relevance, the closed entry assumption also helps us to study
how exogenous increases in the number of firms with access to the common pool
resource modify the harvesting incentives faced by different types (leader/follower;
static/dynamic profit optimizer) of non-cooperative oligopolistic harvesting firms.
This is an interesting question because it is related to the traditional intuition
(Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955) that numerous and relatively small harvesting finns will
tend to behave as inefficient static profit optimizing agents when they compete in a
non-cooperative fashion for the common pool fish stock's Ricardian rents.
The models in chapters 5 and 6 also consider harvesting firms subject to price
taking behaviour, in input and output markets. This assumption is again partly
justified by empirical motivation stemming from the case study of the Chilean (fish
meal) pelagic fishing industry in Chapter 3. Moreover, there is also a theoretical
justification for this assumption. Firms' price taking behaviour excludes the
possibility of pecuniary externalities arising from the common property of fish stocks.
This helps us to separately analyse the differences in individual firms' harvesting
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incentives that stem from different types of technological externalities, either in static
or dynamic optimization settings. This analysis is a contribution to the prevailing
economic literature on common pool fisheries subject to multi-firm harvesting
competition1.
(1.D) Thesis structure.
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapters 2 discusses long run
sustainability issues related to objectives of fishing regulation. This chapter surveys
and analyses the problem of fishing collapse. Fishing collapse is interpreted as either
implying species biological extinction or the economic closure of fishing industries.
Two main questions are explored in this chapter. First, which type of technological
conditions (biological growth, cost, and harvesting functions) contribute to the
occurrence of fishing collapses? Second, under what combination of welfare function
and technological conditions can a fishing collapse be the welfare optimal solution?
Chapter 3 analyses the history of Chilean fishing regulations over the last five
decades. The evolution of access restrictions and catch quota objectives is
emphasized. Chile's most important marine industrial fisheries are examined, using
newly collected data and analysis on the industrial structure of these fisheries. The
main objective of this chapter is to understand important institutional factors that
condition the results from fishing regulation. The historical and institutional analysis
considers: policy priorities; the institutional organization of different regulatory
'A series of other assumptions, used in the static and dynamic multi-firm harvesting models in
chapters 5 and 6, are essentially motivated by simplicity and tractability objectives. Among these
assumptions we highlight: the use of a strictly concave biological growth function for the single
common pooi fish stock of chapter 6; the analysis of steady state solutions for the differential
harvesting games in the same chapter, the focus on detenninisric and single sector common pool
fisheries; the assumption of a harvesting technology with a single variable fishing input; the analysis,
in chapter 6, of a differential hierarchical Stackelberg harvesting game with a single dynamic profit
opt mi7Jng firm (the leader) which competes with numerous static profit optimizing smaller follower
firms. More specific descriptions of these and other minor assumptions are offered in the
corresponding chapters.
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agencies' tasks; the fishing regulator's informational restrictions; the main private
interest groups affected by regulatory decisions and these interest groups' lobbying
efforts to capture regulatory outcomes. A detailed account of the legislative process,
to the Chilean (1991) fishing law and the distributional conificts underlying it, is also
provided.
Chapter 4 explains the main motivations leading us to develop the oligopoly
harvesting models of chapters 5 and 6. Common basic assumptions are described and
justified in this chapter. Empirical evidence suggesting the presence of industrial
concentration at some important marine industrial fisheries is described. This
information complements the previous description (chapter 3) of industrial
concentration at the most important Chilean marine industrial (pelagic) fisheries. The
evidence mentioned above motivates the type of oligopoly harvesting models
developed in chapters 5 and 6. These models consider hierarchical Stackelberg
equilibria as a first approximation to explore the implications of common pool
fisheries subject to industrial concentration.
Chapter 5 develops and analyses a static oligopolistic harvesting competition
model that incorporates the commonality problem by building a congestion externality
effect in each firm's harvesting function. Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are
compared, contrasting the resulting overfishing in each case. First best and second
best welfare benchmarks are used to analyse the overfishing result. The robustness
of the overfishing ranking between Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg solutions is
analysed with respect to changes in: (i) the relative magnitude of the congestion
problem (versus a traditional effect of decreasing marginal productivity for the
variable fishing input), (ii) the exogenous number of rival harvesting firms, and (iii)
the productivity differences between the leading firm and the remaining smaller rival
firms.
Chapter 6 also analyses the resulting overfishing ranking between Cournot-
Nash and Stackelberg harvesting equilibria. In this case, however, overfishing is
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studied within a dynamic optimization setting. The commonality problem is
incorporated via a stock or dynamic externality effect. First best and also second best
welfare benchmarks are defined and used to assess the inefficiencies related to
overfishing. The latter is endogenously deduced as the result of inefficient lmrvesting
myopia; that is, the positive difference between the shadow scarcity value of the
common pool resource and the marginal valuation assigned to it by non-cooperative
independent harvesting firms. The dynamic model in chapter 6 allows us to study the
impact of an increasing number of rival firms upon the degree of inefficient




ON LONG-RUN SUSTAINABILITY AND COLLAPSE.
(2.A) Introduction.
Two major sets of problems have attended the academic discussions and policy
implementation of fishing regulations. On the one hand, the issue of inefficient rent
dissipation arising from the common property of fish stocks. On the other hand,
sustainability concerns about the long-run survival of the dynamic system (fish
population) subject to economic depletion. This chapter focuses on the latter: it
discusses the issue offishing collapse, which is interpreted as either implying species
biological extinction or the economic closure of fishing industries.
Two basic questions are addressed. First, when does non-collapse correspond
to the welfare maximization solution? It is commonly held that fishing collapse is a
public bad (Berck, 1979). We argue that a clear answer requires an explicit
discussion of the welfare model under evaluation. This chapter discusses welfare
functions and technological factors (cost, production, and biological growth functions)
which condition the answer to this question. Under some particular conditions,
fishing collapse can correspond to the welfare optimal solution.
Second, when does fishing collapse occur in actual fisheries? Economic
collapse of industrial marine fisheries is not a so uncommon phenomenon. We cite
several historical examples. In order to understand the origins and likelihood of this
problem, we discuss the necessity and/or sufficiency of different conditions that the
fishery literature has traditionally associated with the occurrence of fishing collapses.
Institutional factors (access schemes, firms' harvesting competition strategies) and
technological conditions (cost, production, and biological growth functions) are
considered from a survey oriented perspective.
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The technological side of the problem is analysed with greater detaiF. We
analyse harvesting incentives stemming from: (i) increasing biological growth returns
for low population levels, and (ii) indivisible and highly specific harvesting capacity
which presumably reinforces (according to 'folk' propositions) private incentives to
allow for a fishing collapse. Both factors are commonly held to be important
triggering forces leading to collapse.
We first argue that factor (i) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for fishing collapse. This implies that the possibility of a fishing collapse is more
widely ranged than otherwise expected. In terms of factor (ii), we argue that the
'folk' proposition must be conditioned by the nature of the fixed costs which emerge
from the indivisibilities in harvesting capacity. A key aspect is how costly it is for
individual firms to reduce fishing efforts, even when low harvesting performances,
at overdepleted fisk stock levels, create incentives to do so. The discussion
differentiates between quasi fixed costs which can be avoided if harvesting stops, and
re-entry fixed costs which are triggered by the decision to stop harvesting operations
with the intention to resume them later.
Quasi-fixed costs are expected to create incentives for intensive harvesting,
given their impact in terms of decreasing average unit harvesting costs as harvest
levels increase. The relative importance of re-entry costs determines whether these
incentives for intensive harvesting result in sustained depletion, and hence in the
promotion of a fishing collapse, or in cyclical harvesting strategies which can avoid
collapse. As re-entry costs increase, harvesting indivisibilities (created by quasi-fixed
factors) will tend to increase the likelihood of attaining a fishing collapse as the
dominant outcome.
The discussion in this chapter is divided as follows. Section (2.B) briefly
compares the economic and biological approaches to the long-run sustainability issue.
Section (2.C) discusses basic concepts. Section (2.D) develops a welfare model used
'Institutional factors are explored with more details in the following chapters.
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as a yardstick in the analysis that follows. Section (2.E) discusses the necessity
and/or sufficiency of different conditions that the literature on fisheries has
traditionally associated with the occurrence of fishing collapses. Section (2.F) offers
concluding remarks.
(2.B) Economists versus marine biologists.
Although sustainability ideas are deeply rooted in the economic profession2 and
currently enjoy a fashionable renewed popularity among economists, in the field of
fishing regulation these ideas have been traditionally defended by marine biologists.
Different emphasis and priorities, on sources of distortion and policy objectives, are
likely to be found between economists and marine biologists when they consider
fishing regulations.
Economists' analysis tends to concentrate on the incentive issues underlying
the possibility of an inefficient dissipation of Ricardian rents. The traditional analysis
focuses on the nonexistence of private property rights for fish stocks. After Coase
(1960) the focus has been redirected to either the costs of using these property rights
or the costs of transacting for their creation and enforcement. Then the analyst
embraces propositions on harvesting firms' strategic interactions and the industry
equilibria that can best describe the fishery under analysis.
In the economist's methodological view, there is usually a minor concern for
instability and multiple equilibria issues. The emphasis and policy priorities are
directed to the creation of property rights systems or substitutes for them. We then
find propositions in favour of Pigouvian taxes or catch quotas devices. The
corresponding methodological devices, enabling us to focus the analysis on these
issues, are consistent with modelling definitions that usually consider strictly convex
choice spaces; that is, the use of strictly concave preference functions and biological
growth rules, along with the assumption of strictly convex cost functions (see Clark,
2 F example, think of the influences of Maithusian and Ricardian theories.
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1976; Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Munro and Scott, 1985). This modelling
framework allows us to rule out unwanted complications related to multiple equilibria
issues and stability problems.
Marine biologists center their attention on long-run equilibrium issues, usually
emphasizing the possibility of multiple equilibria and the related risks of achieving
a collapse outcome, denoting at times an extinction concern and on occasions an
economic closure concern (Idyll, 1973; Gulland, 1988). The modelling framework
is specified to minimize complications related to the incentive structures that
determine the choice options. We then encounter modelling definitions that consider
very simple rules of firms' competition and industry equilibrium; for example, ad
hoc assumptions on entry or investment functions and harvesting competition rules
without strategic considerations (e.g., Smith, 1968; Beddington, Watts and Wright,
1975; Hoel, 1978; Berck, 1979; Hartwick, 1982).
The resulting emphasis from the biological perspective, though it considers
incentive arguments due to the existence of common property, tends to focus on
defining minimum population levels below which a fishing collapse can occur. The
corresponding policy priorities concentrate on prescribing maximum permissible
harvesting levels aimed at preventing overfishing outcomes. In this case the definition
of overfishing is strongly biased towards biologically defined population targets.
It is easy to realize that these different visions and priorities can lead to
different regulatory frameworks as optimal solutions. Marine biologists will
emphasize long run sustainability objectives, demanding biologically oriented
restrictions on catches. Economists will probably condition the previous demand on
more exacting efficiency tests. These different professional perspectives, and the
multiple potential sources of distortion and justification for fishing regulations, have
produced ambiguities in concept definitions and causality arguments that underlie the
justifications for regulatory actions. In order to improve the scientific contribution to
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the debate on fishing regulations, additional efforts are required in terms of refining
the related concept definitions and causality arguments.
(2.C) Basic concepts.
Since the early 1950s there has been a tendency in favour of regulating industrial
fisheries. This was mainly based on the proposition that fish stocks would not only
be inefficiently depleted, given the absence of enforceable property rights, but also
face risks of economic collapse or even of biological extinction.
We already know, from accumulated empirical evidence, that these concerns
correctly anticipated the economic collapse of several marine industrial fisheries
during the second half of XXth century. We can cite several historical examples of
the economic collapse of pelagic fisheries3 : the collapse of the Japanese sardine
industry in the early 1940s; of the Californian sardine fishery in the early 1950s; of
the North Sea herring stocks in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the collapse of
the Peruvian anchovy fishery in 1972-73g.
This evidence, however, does not imply a definite justification for regulation
of industrial fisheries. A rigorous defense of fishing regulations should: (i) identify
the conditions under which the undesired outcomes occur, (ii) differentiate between
the necessity and sufficiency of those conditions, and (iii) argue why the undesired
outcome represents a net welfare worsening result.
A non-trivial part of these requirements is to specify as precisely as possible
what is meant by the different concepts used in arguments and propositions for
3 Most of the XX century collapsed fisheries correspond to pelagic fish species which are used by
fish meal industries. Pelagic fish species (such as sardines, anchovies and herrings) tend to be stocks
highly variable and difficult to assess and manage. This is related to the fact that pelagic species are
usually shorter lived and faster growing in comparison to other important fish species (e.g., demersal).
Therefore, they are more exposed to recruitment fluctuations. And recruits in these fish populatixis
tend to show high variability due to environmental shocks (Gulland, 1988, ch. 11).
See Idyll (1973) for the specific case of the Peruvian anchovy; also see Gulland (1988) and
Cushing (1988) for comparative historical analyses of different marine fisheries.
31
regulation. In what follows we discuss three important concepts: (1) long run
sustainability and fishing collapse, (2) equilibrium and stability definitions, and (3)
related welfare prescriptions.
(2.C.1) Long-run sustainability.
Let us use the term system to denote the fish population that is subject to economic




where x(t) denotes the state-variable vector at continuous time t of this dynamic
system, x its time derivative, x0 the initial state, and a a parameter vector that can
affect the rule of dynamic motion for x. For instance, in a simple case state x can
represent the population level of a homogeneous single fish species, whereas a may
represents its exogenous rate of natural growth.
By abstracting from details and concentrating on essentials, we can think of
the sustainability argument as a defense for regulation based on the aim of preserving
the economic or biological survival of the system. In the first case, the argument
refers to preventing the economic collapse (closure) of the fishing industry that
exploits the fish population x. In the second, it refers to preventing the extinction of
the biological population. By economic collapse we mean a long run industry
equilibrium with a sufficiently low fish stock level such that the industry's average
variable costs are high enough to make it unprofitable, for a sufficiently high
percentage of firms in the industry, to continue with positive harvesting operations
in that fishery. A case with no catches from the fishing grounds can obviously be
considered as a fishery under economic collapse. However, our interpretation of
economic collapse also includes cases of fishing grounds with positive but sufficiently
low aggregate harvesting outputs such that undesired welfare effects are triggered by
those output levels; for example, undesired regional unemployment effects.
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Clearly extinction implies collapse, but not vice versa. Accordingly, these two
concepts can have quite different welfare consequences. Moreover, the definition of
each of them is not a trivial task. Each of them can represent a complex set of
circumstances. For instance, when we talk about extinction what do we really refer
to? Is it the full biological disappearance of a species? What definition of
geographical space is considered by this disappearance proposition? Is it within a
given region? Within a country or the whole world? How do these different
geographical defmitions affect the welfare consequences of identifying local versus
global species extinction? Which technological set conditions the disappearance
proposition? It would not be difficult to add new questions and doubts. A similar
process would occur if we start thinking more carefully about the definition of
economic closure. Nonetheless, we will not pursue this type of analysis.
Our discussion makes no distinction between economic closure and biological
extinction. It suffices for our purposes to define a minimum x-level x1,, below which
the regulator aims not to be. Call this unwanted x range a fishing collapse outcome;
where fishing collapse can be understood either as economic closure or biological
extinction.
To make the definition of x. 1, more precise it would be necessary to make
explicit the welfare optimization model under analysis. At this stage we are not going
to pursue this exercise. Instead, by a sustainability target we mean the regulator's
desire to prevent a fishing collapse outcome.
(2.C.2) Multiple equilibria.
The sustainability argument is based on the proposition that industrial fisheries can
be best described by a function i=S(x(t)) that represents a dynamic system with
multiple equilibria. The simplest case is where x =S(x(t)) has three stationary
equilibria with two of them locally stable for a given neighbourhood. We illustrate
this in Figure 2.1. The vertical axis measures the derivative of x with respect to t and
33
the horizontal axis the level of x. Points E1 and E3 represent two locally stable fixed
points. In this case, the collapse outcome is represented by the lowest stationary
equilibrium E1 . However, for a regulator that aims to avoid outcome E 1 the unwanted
x-range is defined by x levels below the minimum point x=E2.
Figure 2.1
The dynamic nature of the system could be better characterized by more
complex long-run equilibrium concepts than the traditional stationary points or long-
run steady states. It would suffice to increase the degree of non-linearity in the
dynamic rule of motion of system S(x), even ruling out completely the existence of
random shocks, in order to obtain increasingly more complex types of long-run
temporal trajectories for x5. This would make it necessary to refine the definition for
equilibrium state. A relatively close concept to stationary equilibria is the idea of
dynamic systems which are better characterized by different types of bounded and
periodic temporal trajectories. The (two period) limit cycle solution for the Lotka-
See footnote 7 for reference sources.
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Volterra model of a predator-prey species fishery is a classic example of a periodic
solution set which is an equilibrium for a dynamic system (Clark, 1976).
Periodicily in the observation of alternating states allows us to use a concept
of equilibrium whereby bounded fluctuations allow us to rescue a concept of stability
for these periodic trajectories6. As we move away from the stationary idea of
equilibrium, local stability for specific fixed points loses ground. However, bounded
periodicity allows us to define different concepts of structural stability for dynamic
systems. As we move away from the relevance of stationary equilibria, the concept
of equilibrium redirects its focus towards convergence processes to some well-defined
set of points within the feasible x-space7.
The concept of structural stability weakens as the temporal trajectories of S(x)
become aperiodic and also more and more dependent on the starting position of the
system. In the limit, the trajectories may become completely chaotic5.
The key issue is that sustainability arguments usually presuppose dynamic
systems with multiple equilibria. Therefore, the analyst should be careful to clarify
the type of dynamic equilibria that he is referring to. That definition is crucial in
'The idea of using 'bounded periodicity' to define different equilibrium concepts has a well-
established tradition within the mathematics of non-linear dynamic systems (see, for example,
AzarIades, 1993).
In fact, non-linear dynamics conceptualizes long-run equilibria by the general concept of
attractor. Intuitively defined, it refers to the set of points to which the dynamic path of x converges
as the time horizon tends to infinite. The simplest type of an attractor is a stationary fixed point. Then
bounded periodic temporal solutions come. They are usually denoted by 'orbits'. As the nature of the
dynamic trajectories becomes more complex, we think of moving from one type of attractor to another.
The system will move from one attractor to another when the qualitative nature of the dynamic
solutions change. The theory denotes these stages of qualitative changes by 'bifurcation' processes.
In the limit case of 'chaotic' trajectories we speak of 'strange attractors'. For more details and original
references see Azariades(1993), Benhabib (1992), Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Scheinkman (1990)
and Bullard and Butler (1993). Also the book by Goodwin (1990).
$ That is, when the system shows u infinitely many periodic orbits of arbitrary long period as well
as completely aperiodic trajectories that never return to any point visited previously (Azariades, 1993,
p.106).
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order to understand and analyse the dynamic properties (alternative equilibria,
convergent processes, relevant neighbourhoods) of the system under evaluation.
(2.C.3) Welfare prescriptions.
Sustainability targets, proposing fishing regulations to prevent a fishing
collapse, must argue that the collapse outcome represents a net welfare worsening
result. If collapse is meant to imply extinction, the 'folk' basic argument is that we
will be permanently losing some valuable9 genetic biological information. A key
aspect of this argument is the idea of pennanent losses. Underlying it, we encounter
the concept of irreversibility costs.
Arrow (1968) was one of the first to define irreversibility in a precise manner.
Within a deterministic capital accumulation problem, he defined this concept as
implying a non-negative investment constraint. More recent discussions tend to model
this concept by the more general device of introducing cost asymmetries between
upward and downward capital adjustment decisions (Pindyck, 1991). The concept of
sunk costs belongs to this line of thought10. The intuition behind irreversibility costs
is clear: it refers to dynamic (investment) decisions that involve highly specific
capital assets such that, once investment resources are committed to them, their
opportunity cost decreases significantly with respect to their replacement value.
The idea of irreversible investment decisions, along with the proposition of
uncertain future values for the corresponding capital stocks, have triggered since the
mid 1970s an increasing literature on environmental preservation issues and the
9 The concept of valuable can represent an 'option value'. Weisbrod (1964) was a pioneering paper
arguing the option value of current consumption when there exists uncertainty with respect to its future
value. Extensions of this idea to the topics of 'environmental preservation' can be found in Fisher,
Krutilla and Cicchetti (1972), Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), and more recently Weitzman
(1992). Similar applications to the problem of uncertain and irreversible investment decisions are found
in Bernanke (1983), Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Pmdyck (1991).
'°Sunk costs imply a positive difference between the replacement cost and the resale price of a
given capital stock.
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opportunity costs represented by the possibility of losing option values' 1 . It is this
interpretation of irreversibility effects that underlies the 'folk' extinction proposition
referring to permanent losses. This proposition argues that once an extinction
outcome is achieved, society loses the option to backtrack, if it wanted to, to any &
post desired previous position.
However, to propose the existence of irreversibility costs, due to the
occurrence of a fishing collapse, is not a suffident condition to prove the optimality
of preventing that outcome through regulation. The irreversibility argument only
corresponds to an opportunity cost. That means that we, as a society, lose 'something
valuable' if the irreversible outcome occurs. However, there surely are private
benefits from the actions leading to that outcome. Where then must the net balance
be placed by the welfare yardstick? We need an explicit welfare model to provide an
answer. This exercise does not seem to have an a priori answer.
Would our previous analysis have changed if we had defined the collapse
outcome as economic closure, instead of biological extinction? Yes, in some of the
details and definitions that we have made, but not in the essentials.
Loosely defined, economic closure is meant to imply that a 'sufficiently high'
percentage of firms in the industry have to shutdown for a 'sufficiently long' period.
The relevant welfare model should clarify what is understood by 'sufficiently high'
and 'sufficiently long'. This is not relevant to our purposes here. What really matters
is that again we have a proposition arguing for some type of 'exit cost' function.
For example, some informal ('folk') arguments propose that the economic
closure of fishing industries is a welfare worsening outcome because once fish stocks
"This literature considers the basic 'learning option' proposition that it may be better (in a welfare
sense) 'to wait when we are unsure about future values" [Arrow and Fisher(1974 1. However, it is
far from clear that the combination of uncertain future values and current irreversible investment
decisions lead to unambiguous welfare prescriptions in the sense of 'better to it' or 'better to
postpone current production'. Sequential investment models can yield the opposite prescription:
Roberts and Weib'man(1981) is an example where the investment process yields information about the
uncertain future values (for instance, think of the discovery and value assessment processes in the oil
extraction industry).
37
achieve a high level of overdepletion and firms shutdown, the high specificity of
remaining capital stocks will be an obstacle to profitable substitution and factor
movements to other production processes, dooming that geographical location to
languish through prolonged inactivity. Whether or not this is true, is indeed, an
empirical issue. This means that we need to compare costs and benefits for different
people, at different times, and then argue for a 'net balance' or welfare answer. This
is precisely our previous point.
(2.D) A welfare model for optimal harvesting.
This section presents a simple welfare model for the optimal depletion of a renewable
natural resource. The modeffing structure summarizes the essentials of the traditional
(texthook) model that is used in discussing the optimal depletion of fish stocks. The
point to be highlighted will be that this modelling strategy assigns a minor concern
to the analysis of fishing collapse outcomes. Instead, it concentrates on the analysis
of an intertemporal arbitrage condition describing a positive long-run stationary
steady state for fish stocks. We will use this welfare model as a yardstick to examine
the arguments that follow.
Suppose at this stage that there is a single decision maker, say a social
planner, who is the sole owner of resource x and whose objective function is the
maximization of the total discounted net economic benefits derived from depleting x.
Suppose that this optimization program considers an infinite time horizon. Assume
that the only choice variable corresponds to the harvesting rate h(t) indexed for time
t. Imagine that the choice problem occurs in a fully deterministic setting.
The sole owner assumption is meant to imply that the planner's problem is
defined independently from the ownership of the natural resource. We assume that
the planner has full control over the harvesting of the fish stock. Therefore, the









G(x, Ii) =	 = F(x)-h(t)
x(t)^O, h(t)^O, x(0)=x0
where V is the present value of the current and future net benefit streams that accrue
from the resource depletion; with fl(x,h) as the flow of net economic benefits, x(t)
as the resource stock, h(t) as the harvest rate and ô the relevant social discount rate.
The social planner's benefit function II may represent the social utility accruing from
the resource consumption flows, or a profit function if we think of the social planner
as a sole owner firm'2. In our analysis we consider the latter option. Therefore,
fl(x,h) denotes the Ricardian rents that accrue from the depletion rate h(t) of natural
resource x(t).
The constraint for the problem arises from the net biological growth of x
which is denoted by G(x,h), where F(x) represents the natural growth rate of x, such
that x(t)^O and h(t)^ O'.
The solution to problem (2)-(3) can be found by maximizing, for all t, the
following current-valued Hamiltonian:
max H=11(x,h) +X[F(x) -h]
	 (4)
h
where X is the current valued scarcity value of x.
12 The profit function can be a measure of welfare if we assume inter alia that prices are taken as
given.
Note that we have excluded capacity constraints on the choice of h(t). This rules out a possible
source of non-convexities in the choice problem (if the capacity constraint is binding at the optimal






By imposing the assumption of strict convexity on this problem's choice
space, i.e., when both functions G(x,h) and rI(x,h) are (jointly) strictly concave in
the state variable x(t) and the control variable h(t), we know that the following first-
order conditions suffice to identify a trajectory pair (h, x') which maximize function
V subject to (3):'
=0 ; for h * >0, then [.]=0 =L=X
with H=H(h) such that.t=F(x)-h
-____ =	 an (h ) -XF' ()
ôx	 ox
Lrn [X(r) e'] x(t)=0
The simultaneous fulfilment of (i) the previous (joint) strict concavity
condition, and (ii) the transversality condition in (8), ensures that the optimal
trajectories will converge to a steady state in which the harvest rate and the fish stock
are constant (Chiang, 1992, p.124). This implies i=0, X=0; hence, by introducing
(5) into (7) and then combining it with (6), we obtain the following equation that
characterizes the steady state solution pair (f,h'):
Strict joint concavity requires that [HthH, - H lU >0. The uniqueness of the maximum
solution (h*, x) is assured if G(x,h) and fl(x,h) axe (jointly) stricüy concave everywhere in the feasible




where F'(x) denotes the derivative of function F with respect to stock x.
This result is known in the literature as "the fundamental rule of renewable
resource depletion" (Pearce and Turner, 1990, ch. 16). This condition describes the
long-run stationary equilibrium for system (2)-(3), which is represented by the
stationary state x", such that F(x') =h*, at which net capital gains are zero. In order
to assure that x" is positive, it must be true that the left-hand side of equation (9),
when the partial derivatives are evaluated at x =0, is greater than the discount rate
&. We will take up this issue again in the next section (2.E).
The left-hand side of equation (9) is the marginal sustainable resource rent that
results from an additional unit of investment in x(t), divided by the cost of that
investment which is the foregone rent from current harvesting h' 5 . This gives a rate
of return for investments in x, which has to be equal to ö in equilibrium in order to
have zero capital gains in terms of present value.
This rate of return is composed of two factors: first, the "instantaneous
marginal product" of the resource, F'(x). This is a direct productivity effect from
marginal changes in x over the profit function. Second, in fishery models it is usually
assumed that 811(x,.)/äx >0, presumably because the unit cost of harvesting
decreases, the higher the stock level x is. In this case, to postpone harvests today and
hence make the resource more abundant and less costly to exploit, adds a marginal
benefit to the marginal growth F'(x). This additional effect has been traditionally
called the 'marginal stock' or 'user cost' effect in the literature on fisheries.
'5 To illustrate this reading, let us suppose that function IT is linear in h, with a margin per unit
of harvest equal to (p- c(x)), with c(x) as the unit cost of harvesting. In this case, we can see that
equation (9) corresponds to:
8[Q- c(x"))F(x")] /8X =	 (10)
p- c(')
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How is the long-run optimal steady state f arrived at in this model? Suppose
that the profit function fl(x,h) were linear in the harvest rate h(t), as the (texthook)
fishery models normally assume. Due to this linearity assumption, the optimal
approaching path to x 1S a very simple one: the Most Rapid Approaching Path
(MRAP) or 'bang-bang' solution; that is, whenever 8H/8h <0 then set h =0 (where
H is the Haruiltonian function described by equation (4)); otherwise, if öH/h >0
then set h=h such that the fish stock is instantaneously driven to its equilibrium
steady state level x'.
Owing to the linearity assumption, the decision maker always obtains a
constant unit margin per additional unit of h. Consequently, the optimizing agent has
no 'scale sensitive' penalties for rapid resource investment or disinvestment decisions.
Therefore, the control variable h(t) fully adjusts to accommodate the desired state x.
We can incorporate scale related harvesting costs into the analysis by
assuming that the benefit function is strictly concave in h, that is ôfl/ôh >0 and
ô2IVäh2 <0.16 In this case, the optimal approaching path is no longer the MRAP.
Instead, the optimal path becomes now an a.symptotic approaching path to the long-
run equilibrium vector (he,x*); with this approaching path increasing or decreasing
depending on the initial state x(0) (see Wilen, 1985).
Therefore, the analysis for the management of a renewable resource within
a convex choice world seems to be clear: we set the conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of a long-run optimal stationary equilibrium for the fish stock, and then
16 This is consistent with the presence of decreasing returns in h or the effect of strictly convex
harvesting costs. The introduction of stnct convexity into the (investment) cost function is the
traditional device that neoclassical investment theory has used to model asymptotic adjustment paths
to the desired long-nm capital stocks. (Takayama, 1985, ch. 8.E). Non-convex adjustment costs, for
example due to irreversible investments, make it possible to model more complicated dynamic
adjustment paths.
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we prove its stability properties (hopefully, global stability)' 7. In this stationary
solution, the stock x is held constant by continuously harvesting the resource's
natural growth (h=F(x)). As a consequence, along with this steady state x we
obtain a stable (sustainable) harvest rate h. Whenever the initial stock is greater than
the optimal stationary level, the stock is harvested at a rate greater than its natural
rate of growth, and vice versa, in order to attain the desired long-run stationary stock
level.
This standard methodology has had a strong appeal on the way we think of
resource (or, in general, dynamic optimization) problems as choices between stable
long-run equilibria, with corresponding stable (sustainable) control variables, such as
the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) that we frequently encounter in
fishery management discussions (see chapter 3). This thinking style undoubtedly
acquires more life and self-convincing power as we move closer to discussions on
policy implementation issues, given the costs of implementing state adjustable
harvesting controls. As a consequence, explicit analyses of dynamic approaching
paths remain as peripheral issues'8.
There are clear methodological advantages in the tendency to rely on convex
or strictly convex choice spaces when we want to analyse dynamic optimization
problems. We can focus on conditions that describe unique, stable and positive long-
run equilibrium states. However, this modelling strategy neglects some important
By imposing the required curvature conditions we can develop comparative dynamic analyses,
comparing the resulting equilibria for different parametric configurations. The origin of this method
comes from Samuelson (1947) whose 'correspondence principle' argues that comparative static means
nothing without a corresponding statement for the stability properties of the nxxlel.
It must be said, however, that since the early 1980s methodological advances have taken place
in the analysis of dynamic optimization programs. These advances have been originating more general
frameworks and more powerful tools for dynamic analyses. Resource economics has contributed to
this result, as has the revival of (endogenons) growth theories. The reshaping that h taken place, and
is still taking place, in the field of dynamic macroeconomics, triggered by the works of Lucas, Sargent
and Wallace, has also contributed, probably with greater importance, to the above mentioned
methodological progress. It is illuminating to read the perception of Lucas himself on this process. See
the introduction to his lectures on business cycles (Lucas, 1987).
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features of the fishery management problem. First, it puts only minor emphasis on
multiple equilibria analyses and the corresponding discussions on instability issues,
among them the risk of fishing collapse. Second, in 'unique and stationary
equilibrium' models we encounter either no dynamic considerations at all (i.e., bang
bang solutions) or, if they are not completely absent, the models capture them by
simple asymptotic solution paths. Both alternatives imply neglecting the analysis of
economically meaningful dynamic trade-offs (for instance, cyclical versus more stable
harvesting) for the choice variable(s) under evaluation.
As a consequence, this modelling strategy has promoted a 'folk' or 'policy
oriented' wisdom that conceptualizes desired equilibrium states as stable stationary
solutions which define stable 'long-run sustainable' harvesting policies. Despite the
fact that industrial fisheries tend to show a quite different situation (cyclical
harvesting), this folk wisdom has tended to promote regulatory actions that help to
obtain more stable harvesting temporal performances. 'Unstable' (cyclical) harvesting
paths are then usually perceived as undesired, inefficient and disequilibrium
phenomena'9.
As far as we have seen in this section, instability issues have not come yet
into scene. Harvests, stocks and economic rents2° are all modelled as positive and
constant, all of them being consistent with the unique and stable long-run steady state
equilibrium which arises from the assumptions that ensure strict convexity for the
choice space. This is what we called, in the introduction to this section, a 'minor
concern' in the analysis of fishing collapses. Let us turn back to the latter issue.
"We took the inspiration for this interpretation from Lucas's writings on business cycles (see, for
example, Lucas, 1981, in particular papers No. 11, 1977 and No. 15, 1980).
The latter feature is derived from the sole ownership assumption.
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(2.E) On the possibifity of fishing collapse.
This section analyses conditions under which a fishing collapse can occur. It focuses
on discussing the necessity and/or sufficiency of alternative conditions that the fishery
literature has traditionally associated with the occurrence of collapse outcomes. This
analysis excludes welfare considerations.
Three important limitations in our analysis must be clarified from the outset.
Each of them refers to factors that can affect the triggering and propagating incentive
mechanisms that promote the occurrence of fishing collapses. First, we do not
analyse strategic interactions, between harvesting firms, that can arise from the
existence of common property. Hence, we bypass a formal analysis of the harvesting
equilibria which emerge from alternative hypotheses for the solution to the non-
cooperative harvesting game arising from commonality21 . The latter issue is studied
in chapters 5 and 6.
Second, we exclude formal arguments related to the issue of uncertain fish
stock levels and their composition. Hence, we abstract from collapse explanations
based on the costly monitoring of fish stocks and the effects from persisteiu random
shocks. Both elements can be used to justify the occurrence of a locally stable
collapse outcome. For both of them there exists some support from empirical
evidence.
Third, we will abstract from species interactions among different fish stock
populations. Instead, we concentrate on discussing a single-species fishery23.
Clemhout, Wan (1985a; 1986) are two papers that attempt to link the analysis of fishing
collapses (understood as extinction in both cases) with basic hypotheses for Nash non-cooperative
harvesting. While the 1985 paper does so within a deterministic setting, the 1986 paper considers a
random hazard of extinction whose probability of occurrence can be affected by the solution to the
non-cooperative harvesting game.
Reference sources on fisheries and uncertainty can be found in Clark, Munro and Charles(1985),
Munro and Scott (1985), and Lewis (1982).
n For a recent model on multiple-species fisheries see Fischer and Mirman(1992). However, this
paper does not deal with the collapse or extinction issue.
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Nevertheless, though we realize the limitations, we resort to these
simplifications to focus on collapse arguments that emphasize the combined effects
from: (i) non-concavities in the natural growth function F(x), and (ii) non-concavities
in the harvesting technology h(.).
We follow this approach because we aim to clarify some ambiguities that tend
to arise in policy implementation discussions when they refer to the fishing collapse
problem. Before going into details, let us explore, for comparative purposes, the
incentive structure that can lead to a fishing collapse within a strictly convex choice
world.
(2.E.1) Collapse within a convex choice space.
(2.E.1.a) The sole owner model.
Let us again address the sole ownership choice problem described by equations (2)-
(3). Given joint strict concavity in h and x of this maximization problem, we know
that equation (9) describes a unique stationary long-run equilibrium x-level denoted
by x. By direct inspection of this equilibrium condition we can deduce that f will
be lower, the higher the discount rate 6 isa".
For fish species with 'sufficiently low' growth rates F'(x), especially for small
x, and where the function fl(x,h) is either (i) 'relatively insensitive' to marginal
changes in x (for example, low x-sensitivity of marginal harvesting costs), or (ii)
fl(x,h) has a 'relatively high' and positive sensitivity to additional units of h (for
example, given a 'high' and positive current harvesting margin), we can expect that
the higher the relevant discount rate, the higher the possibility that x*=O will be the
long-run optimal steady state.
Recall that we must evaluate the functions' value at the steady state vector (f, h').
Near the critical x-level x that triggers the definition of fishing collapse.
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This means, given the above referred conditions, that the intertemporal
arbitrage (equilibrium) condition that rules the investment decisions in x can prescribe
that, in terms of present value, it is optimal for our sole owner decision maker to
allow for collapse. This implies that fishing collapse could be, under some particular
conditions, the welfare optimal solution. Clark (1973) offers a discrete time model
in this line of arguments.
(2.E.1.b) Open access commonality.
Common property with open access is usually interpreted as leading to stock myopic
harvesting strategies, where myopic harvesting means that finns will not internalize
the opportunity cost of extracting an additional unit of fish stock (see chapter 6). This
is not an obvious proposition. However, let us suppose that 'high' costs of
excluding rivals' harvesting leal to a stock myopic harvesting competition that
inefficiently dissipates the natural resource's rents.
Following the myopia argument, the traditional literature on fisheries has
suggested that the allocative effect of open access commonality with multiple
harvesting firms is analogous to an infinite discount rate for the case of a sole owner
harvester (Scott, 1955 and Clark, 1976, chapter 2.5); in the sense that, in both cases,
the future state of the system under depletion has no implications for current
harvesting decisions.
This line of argument then proposes that such incentive structure could
eventually lead to the collapse of the fishery. The point to be stressed here is that
'open access commonality' is not a sufficient condition by itself to bring about a
collapse outcome. And it may or may not be a necessary condition, depending on the
explicit modelling structure under analysis.
Negligible transaction costs, in allowing and enforcing the exclusive use of units of i, could
allow the emergence of Coasian contracts aimed at avoiding the inefficient dissipation of Ricardian
rents. This idea is valid with or without formal private property rights.
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In order to validate the collapse corollary within the myopic harvesting
proposition, we need to assume that the industry as a whole still faces positive profit
margins per unit of marginal harvesting when the fishery arrives at the critical x. that
triggers the local stability of the x-range (or x-level) that is associated with fishing
collapse. This additional condition of positive profit margins when x-'x. 1, is not an
obvious assumption. Think of the possibility of increasing marginal harvesting costs
as the stock x falls. If this were the case, harvesting firms would have incentives to
reduce their catches as stock x falls. If marginal harvesting costs were sufficiently
sensitive with respect to decreasing x levels, the open access equilibrium could imply
long-run equilibrium levels for stock x above its critical value Xm.
However, by combining open access commonality with 'strong' profit
incentives for intensive and continued current harvesting, it is possible to obtain a
plausible explanation for the occurrence of some fishing collapse experiences. For
instance, the collapse of the Blue Whale international fishery: the combination
between a 'low' growth function F'(x) with respect to the obtainable current profit
margin per unit of harvesting, and the existence of a de facto open access
commonality are generally thought to have led to collapse. Similar arguments have
been used to explain the economic collapse of several pelagic industrial fisheries. In
the latter case a special emphasis is put on the effect of falling average harvesting
costs that result from defensive strategies that these fish species follow at reduced
population 1evels.
(2.E.2) Collapse with non-concavities in the natural growth function.
Several models that discuss fishing collapse problems are based on natural growth
functions F(x) =dxldt that do not exhibit strict concavity. This helps to model the
27 As the fish stock becomes smaller, individuals tend to increase their (density) concentration as
a defensive response to natural predators. For species that live near the surface, like pelagic fish, this
tends to reduce the fleet's harvesting costs.
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possibility of multiple steady state equilibria with local stability. By introducing a
non-concavity in F(x) for low x-values we can generate local stability for a steady
state solution such that x-0, given a prespecified neighbourhood with boundaries
such that 0 ^ x ^ xm (see, for example, Lewis and Schmalensee, 1982; and Levhari,
Michener and Mirman, 1982).
The feature of initial non-concavity in F(x) usually aims to model the presence
of increasing biological growth returns for low population levels; that is, that the
proportional growth rate r(x) = [dx/dt]Ix initially be an increasing function of x for
low x levels. However, this is not always a necessary condition to obtain the local
stability of a collapse outcome. For the case of a strictly concave natural growth
function F(x) =dx/dt, with F(x) >0 for all x >0, we could model an initial region of
negative net growth (natural growth minus total catches), by simply considering a
constant positive rate of harvesting (independent of x values). The region of x values
with negative net growth would imply local stability for the steady state equilibrium
x=0. Some models resort to this option (see, for example, Mirman and Spulber,
1984).
Models that consider non-concavities in F(x) normally work with harvesting
functions which are linear in stock x. In the case of linear harvesting technologies,
the use of strictly concave functions F(x) would allow to obtain only one stable
steady state equilibrium, either positive or equal to zero (full depletion). The feature
of initial non-concavity in F(x) helps to model more interesting (multiple equilibria)
solutions, with at least two steady state equilibria showing local stability.
The models referred to in this section use either one of the following two
types of local non-concavities in the natural growth function F(x). Following Clark
(1976, ch. 1) and Lewis and Schmalensee (1982), the first type is known as
These functions are of the type h=qzx, with h as the harvest rate, q as a constant productivity
parameter, z denoting fishing effort and x as the fish stock. This technology corresponds to the well-
known Schaefer production function within fishery economics (see Clait, 1976, chapter 2).
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depensation growth: it arises if the proportional growth rate r(x) =F(x)Ix is an
increasing function of x for a given range of low x values (see Figure 2.2). The main
effect that stems from these initial increasing returns in biological productivity
consists in defining a critical harvesting level hC (equal to the maximum proportional
growth rate r(x)) above which population x is always driven towards extinction. For
linear harvesting rates h such that 0< h <he, like h 1 in Figure 2.2, we obtain a
positive and locally stable steady state x2 and the unstable steady state equilibrium x1.
If the initial stock level is above x 1 , the harvest rate h 1 will drive the population to
the positive equilibrium x2. If the initial stock is below x1 , the population is driven
to extinction. For more formal details see, for example, Clark (1971).
A second type is usually modelled as implying F(x) <0 for a given range of
low x values, in the vicinity of x=0 (see Figure 2.3). This case is known as critical
depensation growth (Clark, 1976). It exhibits all of the features mentioned above for
the first type but also an additional phenomenon: it defines a critical (minimum
viable) population level Xc, with F(xc) =0, such that if x falls below Xc then an
irreversible process begins such that necessarily x-0, even without harvesting. As
with the previous type of depensatory effects, any positive linear harvest rate, like
h2 in Figure 2.3, gives rise to two equilibria, x 1 and x2, the former being unstable
while the latter locally stable. For initial stock levels below x1-type equilibrium, any
positive harvest rate will drive the fish population to extinction30.
Are these depensatory effects a sufficient condition for a collapse outcome?
Are they a necessary condition? To both questions the answer is clearly no. First, in
terms of the necessity issue, we have already seen that even within strictly convex
In this case x=O is also a locally stable steady state.
We will keep the notation Xc to refer to critical depensatory effects. Notice in Figure 2.3 that








choice problems we can argue for the possibility of a fishing collapse. Accordingly,
depensatory effects in the biological growth function are not a strictly necessary
condition to prove that x can collapse.
With respect to the sufficiency issue: when a critical depensation growth
function exists, collapse inevitably occurs if x falls below XC. In this case, even with
zero harvesting, x would tend to collapse. An identical limit result (x-'O) would occur
with a non-critical depensatory growth function if the harvesting rate is located above
the aforementioned critical harvesting level (hC in Figure 2.2). However, in both
cases the question that arises is: why would firms, who are fully aware of this risk,
and presumably risk averse agents31 , not reduce, or even stop, their harvesting
operations when they approximate the critical level XC, or the critical harvesting level
hC for the case of non-critical depensation?
If we were to consider a sole owner case, as already discussed in section
(2.E. 1), the optimal fishing policy could be to allow for extinction. But then collapse
would be explained by the arbitrage condition in equation (9). Hence, non-concavities
in the natural growth function would be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition
for fishing collapse.
The question in the paragraph above surely loses interest when we think of
common pooi fisheries subject to multiple firm non-cooperative harvesting. In this
case, even excluding problems of uncertainty on the true state of stock x, high costs
of excluding rival firms' harvesting can help to explain why individual firms may
intensively harvest the fish stock, to the extent that positive operating profit margins
allow it, even if they are aware of the risk of fishing collapse. However, again in this
case the non-concavity of function F(x) is not by itself a sufficient condition to
explain the occurrence of fishing collapse.
31 The probability of risk aversion presumably increases, the smaller the harvesting firms' size and
the more specific (sunk) the capital stocks required in the harvesting technology.
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Another important factor, frequently mentioned as a contributor to the
occurrence of fishing collapses, is the existence of sunk harvesting capacity. This
relates to arguments of costly downward adjustments for fishing efforts. We examine
these ideas in what follows.
(2.E.3) Collapse due to non-convexities in the harvesting cost function.
Suppose that a single stock fishery is 'relatively near' to a critical Xm level such that
x.1 triggers the local stability of a collapse outcome. Define the collapse outcome as
x=O. Assume that harvesting firms have perfect information on their relevant
environment. The question to be addressed is: how the presence of harvesting
indivisibilities can affect the incentives to reduce or stop depletion activities in order
to avoid the triggering stock level x.?
The 'folk' proposition under evaluation is that the existence of indivisible and
highly specific harvesting capacity reinforces the incentives to approximate a collapse
outcome. We argue that this proposition must be conditioned by the nature of the
fixed costs arising from harvesting installed capacity.
We can think of two basic modeffing options to address the effects from
harvesting indivisibifities. First, we can define a harvesting technology h=h(x,z,K)
with x as the fish stock, z as the single variable input, call it fishing effort, which
also corresponds to the single choice variable, and K as a fixed input which implies
a cost K>032 which may or may not be avoidable if we set h=O. The fixed factor
(cost) K introduces harvesting indivisibilities. Its presence generates increasing
harvesting returns in the variable input z (a decreasing average cost per unit of z) as
harvest levels increase and the corresponding equilibrium x level falls.
Following the series of papers by Lewis and Schmalensee (1977, 1979 and
1982, call them LS), our analysis differentiates between two types of cost K: (i) a
In order to simplify notation, let us suppose that the price per unit of fixed factor is equal to 1.
Hence K units of fixed factor imply a fixed cost of K monetaly units.
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quasi-fixed cost Q>O that is required if h>O, but which is avoidable (Q=O) if the
harvester shutdowns his operations (h=O)33, and (ii) a fixed cost R>O that is
triggered by the decision to stop harvesting operations with the intention to resume
them later. We can think of R> 0 as an ex post 're-entry' fixed cost, or as an ex ante
'exit' cost previous to the shutdown decisionM.
The second modelling option would be to assume that the harvesting
technology h=h(x,y), withy denoting all other necessary inputs (in addition to x) for
harvesting operations, has increasing returns to scale (IRS) for small x levels; that
is, given an identical proportional change in x and y, the harvesting technology will
show a more than proportional change in h levels. Again the result is that the choice
variable (in this case h) has increasing returns in its operation as we move closer to
low x levels, in the vicinity of the collapse outcome. This option is the standard way
to deal with increasing returns when we want to analyse long-run equilibrium
positions. We assume that all relevant input choices can be changed if we wish to do
so35.
In what follows we make explicit which modelling option is being considered
by the analysis. Whatever be the case, the harvesting technology will be defmed for
a given harvesting firm. Unless stated otherwise, we will assume a fishing industry
with price taking firms.
' Think of Q >0 as fixed searching costs or lump sum wage payments to the fleet's crew.
For example, R>O can represent fixed costs that arise with temporary shutdown if the
harvesting firm is vertically integrated with a processing plant. Imagine that an important cost in the
latter stage corresponds to energy inputs. The standard technology for fish meal industries, for
instance, implies that energy costs increase discontinuously, and initially above their operating mode
level, after a temporary shutdown and the resumption of processing operations.
However, economic intuition tells us that the proposition of IRS in h(x,y) also needs to make
use, although it does it implicitly, of an assumption about the presence of some indivisible factor in
the relevant technology. Otherwise, how could we justify the more than proportional productivity of
the variable input choices?
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(2.E.3.a) Do increasing returns in harvesting prevent collapse?
There is a line of arguments that proposes that IRS in h=h(x,y), at small x levels,
can be a sufficient condition to avoid a collapse outcome such as x=0. Beddington,
Watts and Wright (1975), henceforth BWW, is perhaps the best example3'. Their
basic (simplified) model considers: (1) a common pool renewable resource subject
to closed entry, (2) multiple price-taking symmetric firms, each of them assumed to
behave as a static profit optimizing harvester, (3) a strictly concave (logistic) growth
function F(x), (4) a harvesting cost function C(h,x) = AhkX1!, with A as a positive
constant, >0, k> 1 implying strict convexity of C(h,.), and no fixed costs.
Arguing that IRS in h(x,y) is equivalent to imposing the condition k- <1 on the cost
function C(x,h), and defining harvest rate h as the choice variable, BWW propose
that the presence of IRS at small x levels is a sufficient condition to prevent collapse.
Related to this, they argue that constant or decreasing returns to scale in harvesting
is a necessary condition to achieve a collapse result.
The intuition that BWW offer to support their sufficiency proposition is that,
at low x levels, harvesting firms will have incentives to increase stock x in order to
reduce average harvesting costs by taking advantage of the economies of scale. Apart
from the exclusion of non-concavities in the growth function F(x), we will see that
the assumption of zero fixed costs plays an important role in BWW's proposition.
In fact, as LS's (1982) model helps to clarify later, this assumption is implicitly
assuming that to reduce h levels is a costless decision. Using the notation that we
defined at the beginning of this section, the BWW's result requires not only
supposing that Q=O, but also that R=0.
' Berck (1979) cites other papers that follow similar arguments.
The cost function C(h,x) is defined as corresponding to y combinations such that harvesting
operations imply a least y-cost, for any given x level and any desired harvest rate h. The explicit
functional form of C(h,x) is motivated as a combined result of (i) a Cobb-Douglas harvesting
technology and (ii) the price taking behaviour of harvesting firms.
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Closely related to BWW's arguments, there is a complementary line of
arguments that offers a way out to the possibility of a collapse. The basic proposition
is that fishing collapses are avoidable if the harvesting cost function C=C(h,x) is
'sufficiently responsive' to changes in x levels when x approaches dangerous levels
such as x11 , even for cases of free access to x and non-concavities in the growth
function. Clark (1971) is an example showing how constant average harvesting costs
and constant selling prices help to obtain an extinction result. By contrast, several
papers use the assumption that C(x,h) <0 in order to obtain stability for a positive
steady state value of x. The classical paper by Scott (1955) belongs to this group. We
can also quote the papers by Smith (1968), Levhari, Michener and Mirman (1982),
Hartwick (1982) and Mirman and Spulber (1984). As an example, let us briefly
explore Hartwick's (1982) model.
Hartwick's (1982) basic model structure considers: (1) an aggregate
harvesting function H=Zg(x), with g'(x)>O and Z as aggregate fishing effort, (2)
a proportional-to-profit entry equation (dZ/dt= kEl, k>0 and II denoting profits) that
characterizes a free-access fishery such that dZ=0 when fl=0, (3) a continuous
logistic (strictly concave) growth function F(x), (4) selling price responsiveness to H
such that p =p(H), p' <0, and (5) a constant cost w per unit of fishing effort. Using
this structure, Hartwick proves the local stability of the steady state pair (x>0,
Z >0) if two necessary conditions are satisfied.
The first condition is that the inverse demand function p(H) does not
sufficiently offset, via increases in price, the revenue effects [p(H)H] that arise from
the reductions in the aggregate harvesting return H as x becomes smaller. This
condition requires that I e >1, with € = [dHIdp][p'IH denoting the demand price
elasticicity. This condition implies that a decline in harvest, due to a decline in x,
will result in a decline in industry revenue, thus dampening the potential inflow of
Hartwick's discussion has no explicit modelling of each firm's optimization problem. The free
entry equation solves for the endogenous variable Z.
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new entrants attracted by a higher price p. This condition plays a stabilizing role
because it reduces harvesting pressures when x falls.
The second condition refers to a sufficiently x-responsiveness of the average
cost harvesting function c=w/g(x). This condition requires that
= [dg/dx[xIg(x)]> 1, where 'q can be interpreted as the elasticity of (average) boat
catch with respect to stock size. The condition '7>1 implies that a decline in x leads
to a more than proportionate decline in boat catch. This condition also implies that
a fall in x produces a more than proportionate increase in the average harvesting cost
c. Hence, on its own this condition suggests that exit will be encouraged by a decline
in x at current prices.
The necessity of both conditions is meant to ensure that reductions in x will
behave as a stabilizing force with respect to free access harvesting incentives. The
point to be highlighted is that again these 'cost increases' models resort to the
assumption that it is costless to reduce fishing effort levels when low x harvesting
performances create incentives to do so. Let us see how conclusions change when we
explicitly introduce harvesting indivisibilities by the presence of a positive fixed cost
K.
(2.E.3.b) Increasing returns in 'costly to reduce' fishing efforts.
Hoel (1978) offers a note that rejects the sufficiency proposition of BWW (1975). He
argues that IRS in harvesting technology by no means suffices to make the resource
safe from extinction; neither does he accept that constant or decreasing returns to
scale in harvesting technology is a necessary condition to achieve a collapse outcome.
Among the different ad hoc intuitive counter-examples that Hoe! offers, all of them
for a closed entry fishery with price taking and fully myopic (static optimizing)
harvesting firms, he implicitly introduces the issue of costly downward adjustments
in fishing effort levels.
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Apart from the criticism that BWW exclude non-concavity effects from the
growth function F(x), Hoe! provides some counter-examples which imply aggregate
harvests which always (Yx) exceed the biological growth of stock x, in spite of
exemplifying different individual harvesting technologies h(x,y) with IRS Vx. Hence,
despite the presence of IRS in individual harvesting technologies, the common pool
resource is not safe from extinction. But why individual harvest rates are not
downwardly adjusted in a faster way when x-'O? Hoe! ad hoc examples do not
provide an explicit answer to this. Berck (1979) offers a complementary exposition
which helps us to clarify the issue.
Modeffing a free access fishery with a proportional-to-profits entry equation,
subject to fully myopic harvesting, Berck considers the possibility of an x-range
where F(x)<0, calling the critical XC level such that F(xC)=0 as the "minimum viable
stock". Then Berck introduces a fixed cost K>0 that defmes a "minimum profitable"
stock The presence of the fixed cost K introduces increasing returns in the choice
of the harvesting rate. Berck's basic proposition is that collapse arguments need, to
impose as a necessary condition, a restriction on the ratio r(x) = [X'/X1 such that if
r(x)> 1, then a collapse outcome will be possible. The underlying intuition is that the
indivisibility introduced by K >0 will tend to promote intensive harvesting, making
the occurrence of fishing collapse more likely.
However, Berck's (1979) argument does not deal with the issue of why
harvesting firms would not follow cyclical harvesting strategies, given the presence
of fixed factors. That is, harvesting 'heavily' for a while and hence taking advantage
of increasing returns in fishing efforts z, but reducing or even stopping z >0 when
the system F(x) approaches a 'dangerous' x level such as XC; then allowing for a
period of recovery of x and, finally, restarting harvesting only when a safer level of
x is achieved. In fact, to justify the arrival at a collapse outcome would require to
specify, in addition to Berck's necessary condition, the assumption that it is not
profitable to stop harvesting even if we know that we are arriving at XC. As with
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Hoel's counter-examples to BWW's proposition, the latter condition calls for an
assumption of costly downward adjustments in fishing effort levels.
The series of models of IS (1977, 1979 and 1982) offer a clearer exposition
of the latter idea. Assuming a sole owner harvester, whose objective function is
identical to that of a social planner, IS abstract from the issue of commonality
externalities. Within a continuous time framework, their models evaluate the
optimality of cyclical or 'pulse fishing' harvesting strategies, when the optimization
problem considers non-convexities of the growth function and those arising from the
existence of two different types of harvesting indivisibilities or fixed costs: (i) a fixed
cost Q>0 that is required if h>0, but it is avoidable if h=0, and (ii) a fixed cost
R>0 that is triggered by the decision to stop harvesting operations with the intention
to resume them later.
The basic proposition from the series of LS's models consists in arguing for
the optimality of cyclical harvesting when the harvesting technology requires quasi-
fixed (avoidable) costs Q >0 along with positive, though 'not sufficiently high' 39, re-
entry costs R. Given this particular combination of Q and R values, 'pulse fishing'
strategies will not only be optimal from the sole-owner perspective, but they can also
prevent collapse outcomes.
More precisely, the assumption that it is costless to reduce harvesting or
fishing efforts, when increasing returns at low x offer incentives to do so,
corresponds to a case with R=0. This is the framework within which BWW (1975)
build up their proposition.
Along a similar line of arguments to BWW, by considering the case when
R=0, IS (1982) argue for the possibility of 'convexifying' the originally non-convex
choice problem (given Q>0 and XC> 0°), by making use of infinitely frequent
'9 We clarify this conditionality in the following paragraphs.
The latter results from LS's modelling of critical depensation growth.
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adjustments in the harvesting or fishing effort rate. Clark (1976, p.171) refers to this
type of decision policy as a "chattering control" solution. The key issue in this
proposition, valid only for continuous time settings, is the sole owner's ability to
stop, and later resume, fishing efforts without any explicit entry or exit cost attached
to the decision "set z=0; then resume z>0". In a case of this type, Q>0 will
effectively reduce the initial level of investment in x; however, because Q is
avoidable if we set h=z=0 when the fishery approaches XC, 'quick' pulse fishing
operations will help to avoid a problem of collapse or extinction.
Let us now impose R>0 costs to the use of chattering harvesting controls. If
R becomes 'large enough' to discourage the use df any cyclical harvesting, the
optimal harvesting strategy will then be to either harvest the resource on a sustained
basis or to extinguish it in fmite time (see LS, 1977 and 1982 for more details). The
corollary is that, as R> 0 increases, harvesting indivusibilities (generated by Q >0)
tend to increase the likelihood of attaining extinction as a dominant (preferred)
strategy within the sole ownership framework.
If, on the contrary, the relevant fishery setting defmes an 'intermediate' level
for Q >0 and R >0, a regeneration cyclical harvesting strategy can become optimal;
that is, to stop harvesting to avoid fixed costs Q; then to allow stock x to increase
and to recuperate; and finally, to restart harvesting When the stock has become large
or safe enough.
In other words, increases in R >0 tend to increase the time taken on each
harvesting cycle t' (the 'cycle length') and also tend to increase the difference between
the upper and lower bounds for the stock x levels42. By contrast, as Q >0 increases,
ceteris paribus, the time spent in harvesting operations tends to be reduced, because
of the more intensive harvesting that arises from the indivisibility introduced by Q.
Or, a greater R tends to reduce the 'periodicity' of each cycle.
C Or, a greater R tends to increase the 'amplitude' of the harvesting cycles.
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In the case of discrete time settings it is not feasible to 'convexify' an
originally non-convex optimization problem by 'infiniteiy rapidly' setting and
changing the harvesting rate, even if R=0 (see Clark, 1976). Instead, for cases with
Q>O and R=0 the optimal policies correspond to cyclical harvesting strategies. They
resemble the "regeneration/exploitation" strategies that arise within continuous time
models with Q>0 and R>O. Other combinations between Q and R values, within
discrete time models, imply qualitatively similar results to those already described for
continuous time settings. The models of Spulber (1983), Jacquete (1974) and Reed
(1974) are some examples of discrete time models, with sole ownership and Q >0
assumptions, that bring about results in favour of optimal pulse fishing strategies.
These three models also consider random shocks within the growth function F(x).
(2.F) Final remarks.
There is no doubt that the issue of long-run sustainability has played, and still does
so, a prominent role within the discussion and implementation of fishing regulations.
However, in policy oriented debates we find ambiguities in concept definitions and
causality arguments. These ambiguities can be partially understood as the result of
technical complexities that one encounters when more rigorous analyses of this issue
are attempted. Multiple equilibria issues, dynamic considerations, uncertain states of
nature, irreversibility of capital stocks, and incomplete property rights are some of
the key issues that are combined within the sustainability debate in fisheries.
This chapter has attempted to contribute to build a bridge between rough
simplifications that practical policy implementation imposes on the analysis, and
abstractions from other important issues that more rigorous analyses need to make.
We have tried to make headway on the precision of some key concept definitions and
also on the causality arguments that underlie policy oriented discussions concerning
fishing regulations.
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One of the main messages is that fishing regulators and related analysts need
to make as explicit as possible the welfare model that they are using as a yardstick
of evaluation. The multiple dimensional feature of the sustainability debate makes the
latter requirement an essential component of fishing regulatory arguments.
A corollary that emerges from this requirement is to realize that collapse
concerns are only an alternative cost argument. A collapse outcome does not imply,
a priori, a net welfare worsening result. This type of welfare proposition would make
it necessary to prove not only that collapse is a possible result and that what is lost
is a valuable asset, but also that the value of those capital losses overcompensates the
private benefit streams that motivate the occurrence of a fishing collapse.
As usual, many important issues have been left untouched. The relevance of
uncertain nature's states within marine industrial fisheries is one of them. It also
remains as a challenge to advance on the explicit consideration of commonality
externalities, and the corresponding hypotheses regarding harvesters' strategic
interactions, in the adjustment cost effects that emerge from harvesting indivisibilities
and sunk installed capacity. The combination of fish stocks' commonality and the
indivisibility of harvesting technologies undoubtedly affects the incentive structures
that can lead to fishing collapses.
Closely related to this challenge, it remains to advance further on the
optimality evaluation of cyclical or 'pulse fishing' harvesting strategies. Empirical




ON TILE REGULATION OF MARINE INDUSTRIAL FISHERIES:
ThE CASE OF CHILE
(3.A) Introduction
This chapter analyses the history of Chilean fishing regulations over the last five
decades. We focus on the evolution of access restrictions and catch quotas. We
analyse the fishing regulator's persistent inability to enforce annual quotas.
Distributive conificts and triggered lobbying powers play an important role in the
explanation of this phenomenon. We analyse the possibility that private interest
groups have partially captured the regulatory decision making process. An in-depth
analysis, which is consistent with the latter line of thought, is developed to explain
the Chilean fishing law of 1991. This was finally enacted after a protracted period
(three years) of negotiations among the government, the fishing regulators, and the
main lobbying groups who represented the more powerful private interest groups that
were affected by the proposed regulatory changes.
For more than 50 years Chilean marine industrial fisheries were ruled by a
criterion of historical rights in the issuing of fishing permits. This form of regulation
made it possible to have some control on access to the fisheries, but it did not solve
the common property issue. In fact, historical rights were combined with the cyclical
use of access restrictions and direct controls on fishing efforts. Global annual catch
quotas were suggested in several periods, but always without effective enforcement
powers.
This latter feature can be mainly explained by the lack of political support for
the enforcement of more restrictive fishing regulations. Over this period, other policy
objectives (e.g., industrial development, reduction of the State's direct regulatory
role, success of reprivatization reforms) had higher political priority. The relative
high abundance of fish stocks surely contributed to shape these priorities. This
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chapter also analyses the possibility that regulatory capture by private interest groups
may have affected the regulatory outcomes. Partial evidence in favour of this latter
argument is discussed.
In the late 1980s, a controversy arose with respect to the prevailing regulatory
framework for fisheries. Most of the initial discussions hinged on how efficacious and
efficient different regulatoiy instruments were. As time went by, factors of a more
institutional nature began to be given consideration. Among the latter, a key
controversy concerned the constitutionality of the State's rights to limit access to
fisheries and to sell fisil property rights over fish stocks.
On the issue of regulatory instruments, one of the key reforms that was
proposed attempted to implement a system of individual transferable (catch) quotas
(FOJ for the most important fisheries in the country. However, a strong opposition
arose from the long-established incumbent firms catching in the Northern fishing
grounds. Fish stocks in this region had been heavily exploited and catch performances
had been steadily falling since the mid 1980s. Therefore, Northern entrepreneurs
wanted to reallocate part of their fishing efforts towards the more abundant Southern
fishing grounds. Southern incumbent firms, by contrast, were more sympathetic to
the use of JTQs regulations, but if and only if 1TQs were initially allocated according
to regional historical rights. This initial access restriction, given the expected positive
pricing of JTQs, would help to reduce the competitive pressures that were arising
from the Northern firms' desire to reallocate part of their fishing activities towards
the South. As a result, Northern firms (which were highly concentrated) became the
main lobbying power opposing the use of ITQs and other types of access restrictions
to the Southern fishing area. Then a complex multi-part bargaining over the proposed
regulatory changes started, stemming from the distributive disputes among the vested
interests. It took more than three years and six deferrals in Congress until a new
fishing law was finally enacted in September 1991.
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The resulting fishing law is a hybrid between two earlier proposed bills. It
retains free access as the general framework, subject to transitory entry restrictions
if conditions of biological overfishing are agreed on. The most important industrial
fishing grounds (j)elagic species) are currently classified in a stage of biological
overfishing. This means that these fisheries are kept under (annually renewable)
closed entry regulation. Direct control mechanisms over fishing efforts virtually
disappear, as for instance the previous limits on fleet's fishing capacity. More
biologically oriented controls on fishing efforts (such as seasonal closures, minimum
net sizes, minimum catch sizes) remain within the set of policy instruments. With
respect to quota devices, the new fishing law provides for the use of global and
individual quotas on catches, but without defining a set of compulsory triggering
conditions for their use. This and other administrative procedures significantly reduce
not only the importance of ITQs within the current set of regulatory instruments, but
also with respect to their role in the originally proposed bills. Another novelty of the
new fishing Law consists in vesting several private lobbies with partial resolutive
powers in some of the most important areas of regulatory decisions.
The analysis in this chapter is the first to combine a detailed and consistent
historical analysis of Chilean fishing regulations with new information on the
industrial structure of the main fisheries under regulatory control, while emphasizing
an "interest group" theory perspective in the analysis of private lobbying efforts to
capture the regulatory outcome.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section (3.B) describes the relative
size and temporal evolution, in terms of tonnage caught, of the main Chilean fishing
grounds and fish species under industrial exploitation. Section (3.C) discusses the
phenomenon of industrial concentration that prevails at some of the most important
Chilean (pelagic) fisheries. Personal interviews with fishing experts and
entrepreneurs, and our own collection and aggregation of detailed micro (at the firm
level) statistical information, support the analysis in this section. Section (3.D)
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reviews the main policy objectives (stability and efficiency aims) that are usually
resorted to in order to justify the need for fishing regulations. This discussion helps
to clarify the key issues at stake in the negotiations to set up specific fishing
regulations. Section (3.E) briefly reviews the history of Chilean fishing regulations.
Emphasis is plaeed on the analysis of access restrictions and catch quotas. Section
(3.F) analyses four possible and complementary explanations of the persistence of
enforcement wealmesses in the regulatory agencies' attempts to implement binding
annual catch quotas. The arguments analysed deal with government's objectives and
policy priorities, the institutional organization of regulatory agencies' tasks,
information problems that surround the implementation of catch quotas, and the
possibility of regulatory capture effects. Section (3.G) analyses in depth the late
1980s regulatory controversies that were triggered by the enactment of a new Chilean
fishing law. Special emphasis is put on the analysis of the distributive conificts and
the resulting lobbying pressures that surrounded, and partially captured, the
negotiations on fishing regulatory schemes. Finally, section (3.H) offers some
concluding remarks including a comparison with other major fishing countries'
experiences in regulating common pool marine industrial fisheries.
Main abbreviations.
[FOP:	 Development Fisheries Institute.
SUBPESCA:	 Undersecretaryship of Fishing.
SERNAP:	 National Fishing Agency.
CORFO:	 National Development Agency.
(3.B) Chilean fishing grounds and main fish species.
In this section we offer an introductory description of the most important Chilean
marine industrial fisheries. The objective is to describe the relative importance, in
terms of tonnage caught, of the main fishing areas and fish species. We also describe
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the main (processing) uses of the fish caught, and the temporal changes in the relative
importance of the main fishing grounds. We focus on fish species fisheries, given
their predominant importance within the country's total catches. We do not consider
fisheries related to the harvesting of algae, molluscs and crustaceans'.
Table 3.1 shows Chilean fish species catches, measured in thousands (000)
of tons, during 1993. These catches include the harvesting of 73 different classified
fish species. The main fish species, in terms of tonnage caught, are shown in Tables
3.2 and 3.3. Table 3.1 shows the relative importance of industrial, artisanal, and fish
farming fisheries within the country's total harvesting2. Industrial fisheries represent
around 90 per cent of this total. At fish farming3 and artisanal4 fisheries the tragedy
of the commons tends to be ameliorated, mainly because of lower costs of enforcing
exclusive user rights versus the case of marine industrial fisheries (see Ostrom, 1990;
Libecap, 1989; Eggertsson, 1990). As in the rest of this thesis, in this chapter we
focus our analysis on the latter category of fisheries.
'During 1993, Chilean total catches of all fish species accounted for 5.86 millions of tons. This
includes the catches from foreign factoiy boats; algae accounted for 155 thousand tons; molluscs for
110 thousand tons, and crustaceans for 26 thousand tons. As an indirect measure of the relative size
of Chilean catches in world terms we can mention that, during 19 85-86, the average annual total
catches (including fish species, crustaceans and molluscs) in the USA were equivalent to 2.87 million
tons, 5.88 million tons for the aggregate catches from the main fishing countries within the EEC
(Spain, Denmark, UK, France, Italy, Portugal and Germany), 1.36 million tons for CanajI, and 3.62
million tons for the aggregate catches from Norway and Iceland. In all these cases, the definition of
each country's total catches considers national landings in domestic ports, according to OECD statistics
(Review of Fisheries in OECD Member Cowuries, OECD, 1987, Paris).
2 This total does not consider the harvesting fromfacroiy boats which accounted for 60.1 thousand
tons during 1993. Factory boats are usually owned by foreign fishermen and mainly operate outside
Chile's exclusive fishing zone.
3	 majority of fish farming is developed in the Austral fishing zone. In 1993 salmon fanning
accounted for 55.2 thousand tons and trout farming for 22.2 thousand tons.
4 Aiisana1 fisheries usually correspond to fishing grounds harvested by small size boats. in the
case of Chilean marine fisheries, artisanal boats usually operate no farther than five marine miles from
the coast. In the case of pelagic fishing grounds, artisanal boats are defined as those with a cargo
capacity no greater than 50 tons.
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Table 3.1 also gives information on the main fishing areas within the country.
Fishing experts and marine biologists agree on dividing Chilean fishing grounds into
four main geographical areas, each of them distinguished by specific biological
conditions and behaviour of the fish populations that they include. Northern fisheries
are divided into two fishing grounds, where zone A concentrates the majority of the
harvesting in the Northern region. Harvesting in zone A accounts for 35 per cent of
national fish catches. In the south of the country, the Austral fishing zone is mainly
specialized in fish farming, but it also includes industrial harvesting of some
important demersal5 fish species (Fable 3.3). But the majority of the catches from
Southern fishing grounds comes from the VIllth region6 which, in 1993, concentrates
the higher regional harvesting, accounting for 54 per cent of national total catches.
As in the case of the Northern zone A, these fishing grounds are predominant in
pelagic species (Fable 3.2), although they also generate harvesting of some valuable
demersal fish, as is the case of hake species (Table 3.3).
Northern zone A is the Chilean fishing ground which is closest to Peruvian
waters. In this area some of the main fish species are harvested by the Chilean and
Peruvian fleets7. This zone concentrates the historically most important Chilean
industrial fishing grounds, which started their industrial development in the mid
l950s. A majority percentage of the harvesting in this zone is devoted to fish meal
production (Fable 3.4). Most of the catches in this region corresponds to pelagic fish
5 Demersal fish species are white food fish, usually harvested by trawl net fleets, and mainly used
for direct human consumption. These fish species tend to live deeper in the ocean than pelagic species.
6 This region is nearly 500 kin to the south of Santiago, and approximately 2000 km to the south
of the Northern fishing grounds in zone A.
7 For example, the Chilean Development Fisheries Institute (IFOP) estimates that in this region
60 % of the anchovy stock is shared between Chilean and Peruvian fleets. In the case of other fish
species, such as sardines or South Pacific pilchard, that percentage drops to around 5% (source:
interviews with IFOP's fishing experts).
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species, with mackerels, anchovies and sardines as the three most important species
(Table 3.2).
Pelagic (shoaling) fish species tend to be more abundant but more variable
than other fish stocks, e.g., demersal species. They are more variable, in their
availability at a given fishing area, because they have significant migratory patterns
and also because their stock levels tend to be highly variable through time8. Pelagic
species also live near the surface, in densely concentrated fish patches; hence, they
have a relatively low harvesting cost (per ton of fish caught). They are fish with
darker and more oily flesh than demersal species. Due to these features, they are not
very attractive for direct human consumption and, therefore, they are mainly used for
fish meal production.
Pelagic fish species are also dominant among the industrial catches from the
Northern fishing zone B and from the most important fishing area in the Southern
regions, that is, the fishing grounds in the Vifith region (Table 3.2). As a
consequence, fish meal production is also dominant among the industrial processing
industries in this latter region. However, in this Southern region canning and frozen-
fish industries also show some degree of development, accounting jointly for nearly
200 thousand tons of processed raw fish or 6.5 per cent of the total tonnage of raw
fish processed in that zone (Table 3.4). Canning and frozen-fish industries are based
on the processing of demersal fish species.
Demersal fish catches are mainly concentrated at the Southern fishing grounds
in the VIfith region and Austral fisheries (Fable 3.3). Factory boats tend to operate
moving from one fishing ground to another, but in the case of demersal species
factory boats always operate in the proximity of Austral fishing grounds. Harvesting
in the Vifith region, from artisanal and industrial fishermen, accounts for nearly 55
'Pelagic stocks are usually short lived and faster growing in comparison to other important fish
species, e.g. demersal species. As a conseqtnce of this, they are more exposed to recruitment
fluctuations. And recruits (juvenile individuals) in these fish populations tend to show high variability
due to environmental shocks.
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per cent of the national harvesting of the main demersal species, whereas factory
boats' harvesting accounts for nearly 25 per cent of this total. The harvesting at
international waters fisheries is mainly carried out by foreign fishing fleets.
Table 3.5 shows the temporal evolution of total pelagic industrial catches from
the two most important fishing areas in Chile: the Northern region A and the
Southern Vifith region. It also includes information on Peruvian total pelagic
harvesting during the 1970s and l98Os. This latter series allows us to observe the
harvesting consequences from the collapse of the Peruvian anchovy fishery that
occurred between 1972-73 (see section 4.C.2).
Pelagic fish catches in the Northern zone A show an increasing trend since the
mid 1970s, a period in which a widespread process (across productive sectors) of
reprivatization took place in the Chilean economy'°. The increasing pelagic catches
in the Northern zone A achieved a peak level in 1986. This evolution was parallel
to an increasing size of the industrial fishing fleet operating in this zone. The number
of purse-seine industrial boats" increased from 116 in 1978 to 182 in 1986. The
cargo capacity of the fishing fleet increased from 19700 m 3 in 1978 to 45900 m3 in
1986 (IFOP's statistics)' 2 . This increasing scale of operation occurred during a period
of a de facto open access to these fishing grounds.
9 RecaII that pad of the Peruvian pelagic catches come from fish populations that are shared with
Chilean harvesting operations in the Northern zone A.
'°The reprivatization of the Chilean fishing sector was consolidated in 1978.
"This is the predominant type of fishing boat that operates in modern industrial pelagic fisheries.
'2 At 1993, the number of purse-seine fishing boats was 157 while the fleet's cargo capacity was
equivalent to 46600 in3 (IFOP's statistics).
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Table 3.1
Chilean Fish Catches, 1993
(all fish species; tons, 000)
Northern Fisheries Southern Fisheries	 TotalOthers
A	 B	 VIII	 Austral	 Country
Total	 2015.1	 266.8	 3126.2	 96.9	 285.1	 5790.1
Industrial catches 1914.7	 216.8	 2863.6	 11.3	 255.4	 5261.8
Artisanal catches 	 100.4	 50.0	 262.6	 9.5	 28.3	 450.8
Fish farming	 -	 -	 -	 76.1	 1.4	 77.5
e is divided into 12 different administrative regions.
A: considers regions I and II; B: considers regions ifi and IV
Vifi: 8th region; Austral: Regions X+XI+XII.
Table 3.2
Chilean industrial catches, 1993
main fish species
(tons, 000)
Fish species	 Northern fisheries	 Southern fisheries 	 .	 TotalOther Regions
A	 B	 (VIIrh region)	 Country
Anchovies (P)	 1094.3	 67.0	 69.3	 64.9	 1295.5
Pacific Mackerel(P) 	 93.7	 0.4	 0.8	 -	 94.9
Horse Mackerel (P)	 374.8	 93.0	 2569.1	 164.9	 3201.8
Chilean hake	 -	 0.1	 42.2	 9.3	 51.6
Tailed hake**	 -	 -	 70.4	 0.5	 70.9
Sardine* (P)	 350.0	 55.3	 29.7	 6.8	 441.8
Pacific Herrmg (P)	 -	 -	 79.6	 8.0	 87.6
Others	 1.9	 1.0	 2.5	 12.3	 17.7
Total fish species	 1914.7	 216.8	 2863.6	 266.7	 5261.8
(%)	 (36.4)	 (4.1)	 (54.4)	 (5.1)	 (100)
A: includes regions I and U; B : includes regions 111 and IV.
P: denotes pelagic fish species.
*: also called South Pacific Pilchard.
**: demersal species that shows seasonal pelagic behaviour.
Source for Tables 3.1 and 3.2: Annual Fishing Statistical Report, 1993, SERNAP.
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As a result of these patterns, since the 1960s and until the late 1980s the
Northern pelagic fisheries were clearly the most important industrial fisheries in
Chile. However, since the early 1990s this region has lost its predominant position
as the leading fishing ground. The significant and persistent harvesting at zone A has
reduced the population levels of some of the main fish species which are caught in
zone A.
The graphs in appendix 3.1 show the time evolution of fish stocks and catch
levels of two of the main pelagic fish species (sardines and horse mackerel) that have
sustained the fishing activities in zone A. Official (IFOP's) fish stock estimations and
catch statistics are originally measured in tons. Fish stock estimations add individuals'
weight across different age cohorts. We have calculated indexes with basis 1985=100
for fish stocks and catch (tonnage) series.
In the case of sardines we clearly see the beginning of a decreasing trend in
fish stock levels at zone A since the early 1980s. Then a clear pattern of decreasing
catches follows, with a time lag of 4-5 years. In fact, sardine annual catches in zone
A reached a peak level of 2.6 million tons in 1985, and then started a decreasing
pattern until reaching a level of 630 thousand tons in 1992.
In the case of horse mackerel annual series, we observe a less trended but
more cyclical pattern versus the case of sardines. On average, horse mackerel stock
levels in zone A tend to increase during the first half of the 1980s, but since 1985
they experienced a clear fall in their levels. The harvesting series look positively
correlated to the stock levels, and for the early 1990s we can observe a lower average
annual catch versus the average between 1981-85.
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Table 3.3
Catches of main demersal fish species




________ ________ Factory	 International Total country
	
boats'	 waters
Vifi Region	 Austral	 harvesting	 fisheries
Tooth fish	 1.1	 2.0	 4.4	 11.9	 22.0
Chilean hake	 46.3	 0.5	 -	 -	 64.3
Austral	 -	 -	 27.6	 -	 27.6
pollack *
Antarctic	 -	 10.5	 9.7	 -	 20.1
whiting________ _______ ________ _________ ________
Tailed hake	 70.6	 -	 11.4	 -	 82.6
Total	 118.0	 13 0	 53.1	 11.9	 216.6
[otes:
Total country catches consider industrial, artisanal and international waters harvesting. It includes
catches from other minor fishing grounds in addition to those considered in this Table.
Aisstral fisheries: considers catches in regions X, XI and XII.
*: also known as blue whiting
Source: Annual Fishing Statistical Report, 1993, SERNAP.
Table 3.4
Main processing fishing industries































rote: Supply sources need not belong to the own region.
Source: Annual Fishing Statistical Report, 1993, SERNAP
73
Table 3.5 shows an aggregate summary of the decreasing pattern in pelagic
species catches in the Northern zone A since the late 1980s. The average annual catch
in this zone has decreased more than 1 million tons when we compare the average
performance between 1985-89 with the annual catches between 1990-92. This is a
result of the booming harvesting pattern that started around 1977-78. Since 1989 the
pelagic fisheries in zone A have been declared, by the fishing regulatory agency, in
a stage of biological overexploitation (see below).
In contrast with the evolution of the Northern pelagic fisheries, Table 3.5
shows increasing annual catches from the pelagic fisheries located in the Southern
yth region. In terms of tonnage caught, fishing grounds in this region were clearly
less important than Northern ones during the 1970s. However, the beginning of a
laissez faire regulatory policy since 1977-78, that permitted an open access regime
for all pelagic fisheries, helped to promote increasing fishing efforts and harvesting
levels in these Southern fisheries.
In fact, since 198 1-82 a process of significant entry to these fisheries started'3,
implying the increasing harvesting levels which are shown in Table 3.5. During the
early 1990s, annual pelagic species catches at the VilIth region have been clearly
above Northern catches: in 1992 and 1993 Southern harvesting has been around 3
million tons, while in Northern zone A annual catches have been around 2 million
tons. Nonetheless, since the end of 1989 the pelagic fisheries in the VJIIth region
have also been declared in a stage of biological overexploitation by the fishing
regulatory agency. In the following sections we will see that this stage had closed
entry and a freezing of fleet cargo capacity.
'3 IFOP's 1993 annual report on Chilean pelagic fisheries describes an increase of 200 %, between
1982 and 1993, in the number of purse seine boats that operate as part of the industrial fleet in the
Southern Vfflhb region. In the same period, the aggregate cargo capacity of the industrial fishing fleet
increased9timeswithrespecttoitsl982level.At1993, l33boatswereoperatinginthisregion,with
an aggregate cargo capacity of 77000 in3.
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(3.C) Industrial structure in the main Chilean marine fisheries.
In this section we present information on the phenomena of industrial concentration
and vertical integration that we encounter in some of the main Chilean marine
industrial fisheries. Our current interest in the concentration issue stems from its
impact as a source of significant private lobbying powers, and the influence of the
latter in terms of 'capturing' the regulatory agencies' decisions. The following
sections explore these ideas.
Reliable and detailed statistical information on the industrial composition of
Chilean fisheries is very scarce indeed. We have been unable to find serious studies
on the industrial structure of these fisheries 14. However, based on our own
calculations that have used different disaggregated sources (most of them at the firm's
level), we have been able to collect and aggregate information on production series
that support the existence of a partial degree of industrial concentration in the main
Chilean marine fisheries.
For example, in the Southern VilIth region the biggest 10 fish meal processing
firms'5 produced nearly 80 per cent of the regional exports of this product during
1992 (Table 3.6). Export data are a very close statistics of production data, as the
Chilean fish meal industry exports no less than 95% of the country's total production.
This evidence in favour of industrial concentration in the production of fish meal is
also an evidence of the presence of concentration in harvesting operations. Through
our contacts with fishing experts' 6, we have (verbally) verified that around 60 per
cent of processing plants' raw material (raw fish) is supplied by boats which are
directly owned by the processing firms, while the remaining 40 per cent is obtained
from independent suppliers.
Some introductoiy analyses can be found in Duhart and Weistein (1988), and SUBPESCA-
CORFO's (1989) mi,neo report.
'5 Most of the industiial catches in this region are used in fish meal production (Table 3.4).
'6 We thank H.Lampe (IFOP) on this point.
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Table 3.5
Pelagic fish industrial catches (tons, 000)
Main fishing grounds: Chile and Peru
Years	 Chile	 Peru (5)
North*	 South	 Total


















































































































Average 85-89	 2927.0	 1539.0	 4466.0	 5480.6
Average 90-92	 1857.1	 2590.4	 4447.5
(1) Seasonal closures begin in this year.
(2)Freezing on fleet's storage-capacity, in the North and Vffl region, starts this year.
(3)May 7th, 1973: Beginning of State-owned firm p	 p
(4)Peruvian private fishing sector is reactivated.
(5)Peruvian total pelagic catches (purse seine fleet). Source: Sueiro (1991).
* Zone A: regions I + Ii.
Source: Records from Chilean Development Fisheries Institute (IFOP) and private sector firms.
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We do not have precise information on the temporal evolution that preceded
the current situation of industrial concentration at the Southern pelagic fisheries.
However, the regional harvesting trends that are shown in Table 3.5 lead us to
conjecture that the Southern concentration phenomenon is probably a result of the
recent expansion period that has occurred in these fishing grounds'7.
For the case of the Northern pelagic fishery (zone A) we have been able to
collect some additional detailed information. Hence we concentrate our next
comments on this marine industrial fishery. The process of private industrial
concentration in this fishery started in the mid 1970s. Hence it is an older
phenomenon than in the Southern fisheries. Also the current level of industrial
concentration in this fishery is higher than the one currently prevailing in the
Southern pelagic fishery.
Since its origins as an industrial fishery (1954-57), Northern fishing grounds
have experienced two periods subject to industrial concentration. The first one,
between 1967 and 1973, was the result of a defacto public takeover of the ownership
and managerial control of the most important firms in the industry. This result, close
to a case of public monopoly, was a policy response to a widespread problem of
financial bankruptcy risks that had affected private firms working in the industry'8.
' 7 Personal interviews with Chilean fishing experts (H.Lampe, IFOP) have informally ratified this
conjecture. IFOP's 1993 Annual Report confirms that until 1982 the size of the Southern fleet
operating in the Vifith region was quite stable, and that only since then an important growth period
started.
"At the peak (1966) of the fishing boom of the 1960s, which occurred in Northern zone A, there
were 25 privately owned industrial fishing firms. After the bankruptcy crisis of the late 1960s, from
the 10 surviving fishing firms 7 of them had, in 1970, state ownership shares that ranged between 40
to 100 per cent. These shares increased to almost full state ownership during 1971-73, period in which
a socialist (Allende's) government attempted to implement profound changes in the ownership structure
of the countiy (CORFO Reports, Industry Department, 1970).
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Table 3.6
Chilean Southern pelagic fishery (Vifith region)
Share of biggest processing firms
in regional fishmeal exports
1991	 1992
5 biggest firms (%)	 40.9	 45.0
10 biggest firms (%)	 67.7	 76.2
15 biggest firms (%)	 87.6	 91.9
Source: Chilean Development Fisheries Institute (IFOP), based on Custom's information.
Such a situation was partially the result of a combination of' 9 (a) 5 to 6 years
of rapid expansion in the industry's total catches, as an open access situation and
attractive profit margins encouraged the increasing entry of newcomer harvesters; (b)
financing of this expansion with subsidized cheap public credit, aimed at promoting
industrial development, that provoked risky increases in the private firms' debt-equity
ratios; and (c) the occurrence in 1965 of a strong "El Niño" marine phenomenon, that
significantly reduced the harvesting performances within this industry 20. A similar
public monopoly fishing policy took place in the Peruvian anchovy fishery between
1974-84 (see Table 4.1). Again this was the result of the fishing authority's reaction
to an economic collapse problem in this fishery (the 1972-73 collapse).
In the Chilean case, the public ownership policy was fully reversed between
1974-78, a period in which a widespread process of reprivatization took place in the
Chilean economy. This policy was part of a profound economic transformation
process that started after the military coup of 1973. As a result of the 1974-78 public
More details in Amenabar (1972) and Alvarez (1993).
As a reference, during the 1960s this fishery was mostly dependent on the harvesting of
anchovies. In 1954 the annual catches of this species were 1100 tons in the Northern region. At the
peak of the 1960s-expansion period of this industry (year 1966) these annual catches had increased to
1 million tons. In that same year, the installed fish meal productive capacity was able to process 5
million tons/year, that is, five times the current level of the annual catches (CORFO Reports, 1970).
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auctioning of all the State's rights in the most important fishing firms, an increasing
pattern of private industrial concentration started to emerge in the most important
industrial fishery at that time, that is, the Northern pelagic fishery.
Appendix 3.4.A shows the Northern industry's total harvests between 1974
and 1992. Each measure of catches, in thousands (000) of tons, has its corresponding
index value with 1980 as the base year (100). Appendices 3.2.A and 3.2.B plot part
of this data. We provide information on the harvesting of three sets of firms.
The set denoted by Otherfirms covers a group of relatively small firms, which
in 1989 represented approximately 40 firms, that in the late 1980s and early 1990s
accounted for slightly more than 20 per cent of the industry's total catches 21 . Most
of these firms only perform harvesting opemtions, seffing their (raw fish) catches
to fish meal processing plants. These plants are owned by firms that are vertically
integrated to harvesting fleet's operations. The group of small firms supplies its
production to these vertically integrated firms, in several cases under exclusive ties
or long run contracting mechanisms.
Coloso is a multi-boat and multi-plant vertically integrated firm that has
historically represented around 20 percent of the industry's total production. During
most of the period 1974-92, its ownership structure has been controlled by family tied
equity rights.
21 In 1993 this subgroup was reduced to 24 independent harvesting firms. In the original IFOP's
statistics, each industrial boat is correlated to the name of the owner company. However, for small
finns that own 1,2 or 3 boats, the original source only uses the label 'private owner' for each boat's
ownership. Hence we cannot distinguish between harvesting firms that own only 1 boat versus 2-3
boats. We have followed the convention to consider each boat entry denoted by the label 'private
owner' as an independent single boat firm. In 1988 there were 35 entries of this type. In 1993 there
were 21.
In 1988 only 6 firms within the group of Otherfinns owned at the least one fish meal processing
plant (SERNAP).
In 1993 Coloso owned 28 industrial harvesting boats that operated within Northern anne A. In
the same year, the Angelini group had direct equity control over 87 harvesting boats in this region.
The regional industrial fleet in 1993 included 157 harvesting boats (IFOP's unpublished statistics).
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The Angelin! group is a conglomerate of several firms (Appendix 3.4.B), also
with vertically integrated operations of the processing and harvesting stages, all of
which are equity and strategically controlled by a single owner. This conglomerate
was consolidated during the 1974-78 reprivatization period. Since the mid 1980s, the
Angelin.i group has represented around 55-65 per cent of the regional annual industrial
catches.
Despite the equity connections across firms belonging to the Angelini group,
each firm has its own managerial staff with independent decision making powers in
several important areas (mainly operational ones). Similarly, there exists a widely
accepted perception, within the insiders to this industiy, that firms belonging to the
Angelini group have predominantly behaved as rival competitors in terms of
harvesting strategies. However, and based on similar sources of information, since
1991 there seems to be greater coordination between these different firms' fleet
harvesting operations and processing plants' production decisions.
Appendix 3.2.B plots the temporal pattern of each subgroup's share in the
regional annual catches. This graph also plots the index (1980=100) of the industry's
total catches in each year. Its level is measured in the left vertical axis. The shares
Information obtained in our previously mentioned interviews during 1993-94.
We could propose that rival harvesting strategies across firms in the Angelini group are due to
two main factors: (1) an apparently static maximizing behaviour, explained in part by the commonality
issue and partly by relatively high costs in enforcing each firm's exclusive harvesting, that could lead
to the main objective of maximizing the current level of the conglomerate's catches (bearing in mind
the price taking behaviour of this industry); and (2) a hidden action incentive problem for the boat's
owner (principal), consisting in monitoring and enforcing costs that arise from the boat owner's aim
to maximize catch output, given a conflict of interest with the imperfectly observable fishing efforts
from the boat crew's members. The principal's optimal incentive mechanism in this situation could
correspond to a rival harvesting contest across the firms belonging to the Angdini group. The alleged
1991 change towards more coordinated (inter-firms) harvesting operations could be explained as the
result of increasing harvesting costs within this fishery, given the case of biological overfishing.
Greater coordination implies more centralimd (coordinated) planning with respect to the
geographical reallocation and use intensities of the different finns' harvesting fleets, as well as with
respect to the least marginal cost of supplying the different firms' processing plants located in different
geographical areas.
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in the industry's total catch are measured in the right vertical axis. We can observe
a negative correlation between Angelini group's share and the smaller (Others) firms'
share in total catches. The relative share of the subgroup Others is clearly more
volatile than Coloso's share.
Appendix 3.3 shows the time evolution of the catch performances from the
main individual harvesting firms. Coloso and the firm Guanaye are the biggest
individual firms, but Guanaye has been part of the Angelini group since 1985. The
next two biggest firms under the Angelini group's control are Eperva and indo.
Appendix 3.4.B shows detailed information on the remaining smaller harvesting firms
which are also part of the Angelini group. With the exception of the smaller firms
Chilemar, Tocopilla and Puma Angamos, the remaining four firms under the control
of the Angelini group show full vertical integration between processing and harvesting
operations. The former three smaller firms supply raw fish catches to the processing
operations of the other four vertically integrated firms.
Appendix 3.3 shows positively correlated catch performances among
competing harvesting firms. This positive correlation is basically explained by an
homogeneous expost search performance, for fish stocks' locations, across different
harvesting firms. It is true that bigger firms can detect fish patches more quickly, but
once an important fish patch is located by one of these firms, this information quickly
becomes common knowledge (in less than 24 hours).
This phenomenon is not only valid for different boats belonging to the same
fishing firm, but also for boats that belong to rival firms. The key point is that
private information over fish patches' locations can not be kept pri vate for too long.
Given the size of the marine area under depletion, the boats' engine power, and the
relatively big size and high density of pelagic fish patches, the time lag in the
searching success does not seem to significantly reduce the catch performances
The recovery of Angelini group's share in 1985 is due to its takeover of a big harvesting firm
(Guanaye), until that year an independent rival finn accounted for by the subgroup Othm.
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attained by the latecomers (smaller firms) to the fish patches. Hence, changes in the
regional abundance of fish stocks tend to affect different firms' harvesting
productivity in a similar way, all the more so when the harvesting firms have similar
operational sizes.
The combination of a clear positive correlation across different firms' current
harvesting performances, and the presence of a small number of firms that accounts
for a significant proportion of this fishery's annual harvesting, lead us to anticipate
the presence in this industry of strong private lobbying efforts aimed at opposing
regulations based on binding annual catch quotas which could negatively affect the
harvesting performances of incumbent firms. Related to this intuition, let us consider
a final comment on the relative economic size of the Angelini group.
According to a recent study (Paredes and Sanchez, 1994), in 1992 the
Angelini group was the biggest economic conglomerate in Chile. This conglomerate
has diversified equity rights in several firms which operate within the fishing
industry, the forestry sector, the energy sector, the insurance services industry, the
retailing sector and also other minor industrial subsectors. By combining the
operational (accounting) sales of all these different firms during 1992, the authors
obtained a total sales level of 2,125.7 million US current dollars. As an indirect
statistics of the relative economic size of this private conglomerate, we can mention
that in 1992 Chilean total exports accounted for 10,125.5 million US dollars. Hence,
this economic conglomerate's total operational sales were equivalent to 20 per cent
of the national annual exports. National exports in that year accounted for nearly 28
per cent of the Chilean gross domestic product, GDP (Central Bank statistics).
Therefore, the economic and political importance of the Angelini group within
the Chilean economy is clear. Its importance goes well beyond the fishing industry.
The export value is a better comparative yardstick for an indirect measure of the Angelini
group's relative economic size, versus the use of the GDP value, given that the latter variable
measures value added instead of gross sale levels.
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In the following sections we will see how this conglomerate's economic power
exerted influence on important regulatory changes that recently affected Chilean
fishing industries. Before this, let us consider a brief review of the main policy
objectives that usually justify the use of fishing regulations. This will help us to have
a clearer idea of the key issues at stake.
(3.D) Regulatory aims.
In this section we describe the main arguments which are used to justify fishing
regulations. We review the meanings attached to stability and efficiency objectives
that invariably permeate the discussions related to fishing regulations.
Regulatory tasks usually involve multi-objectives problems. In marine fisheries
we can find transboundary resource problems, caning for intercountry negotiations;
we can also fmd either explicit distributive issues at stake, explicit environmental
considerations, problems referring to location-specific fishing developments, or
arguments in the line of industrial policy aims, and so on.
However, it is clear that discussions concerning the regulation of marine
fisheries tend to concentrate on two main issues: (1) instability and the long-run
sustainabilily of the biological systems involved, and (2) inefficient resource
allocations, essentially defmed by the problem of inefficient rent dissipation that
arises from the common property of fish stocks. The instability problem normally
implies overfishing definitions based on biological criteria. Discussions on the
inefficiency issue concentrate on the set of marginal incentives that dictate the
harvesting decisions, leaving out explicit considerations of instability and multiple
equilibria. Both issues imply different defmitions of regulatory objectives and policy
priorities when thinking of an oveifishing problem.
In the Chilean case, the most important fishery in this situation is the Northern anchovy stock
which, according to IFOP's estimates, is shared between Peni and Chile in the order of 60 per cent
of the total stock, whereas other Northern fish species show shared populations in much lower
percentages (around 5 per cent in the case of the sardine stock).
83
(3.D.1) Instability issues.
Instability arguments tend to involve two different issues: the problem of economic
collapse and/or biological extinction, and the intent to reduce the costs of facing a
high degree of fluctuation in catch performances.
(3.D.1.a) The collapse problem.3°
This regulatory concern is aimed at ensuring the economic survival of the affected
fishing industry or, in other words, the economic sustainability of the biological
system under exploitation. Using different arguments, it proposes that it is too costly,
in a welfare sense, to allow the economic collapse of that system, either due to
explicit environmental or biological consequences or due to technological
irreversibilities in the economic penalties imposed on geographically non-substitutable
fishing activities. The key issue in the sustainability argument is the proposition that
a profitable substitution between natural (fish) and artificial (man-made) capital stocks
will not take place and that the high specificity of the remaining capital stocks will
impede a profitable substitution and factor movements to other production processes,
hence dooming that geographical location to languish through prolonged inactivity.
The collapse concern is based on the proposition that (especially pelagic)
industrial fisheries face a critical level of harvesting beyond which the growth
dynamics of the fish stock enters a zone of high instability, possibly leading to its
economic collapse (see chapter 2). The discussions concerning the collapse argument
concentrate on the conditions needed to enter this zone of growth instability and also
on the degree of controllability of these conditions. Controllability means not only
the knowledge we have about these conditions, but also the ability that the fishing
regulatory authorities have to manipulate or anticipate them. We certainly require
more studies on these issues. The information available, however, shows that the risk
of collapse is real (chapter 2). Therefore, any fishing regulatory framework should
consider it.
3°For a more detailed discussion, see chapter 2.
84
(3.D.1.b) The issue of undesired catch fluctuations.
There is a second interpretation of the instability issue which is less clearly
expressed, even though it is also considered in regulatory discussions. This
interpretation concerns undesired fluctuations in the industry's catch performances.
This corresponds to a classical argument on the costs of facing cyclical and/or
uncertain levels of production and income flows.
From the viewpoint of the fishing regulatory authority, the justification for
this aim arises essentially from the adjustment costs generated, if and when it is
necessary to accommodate the industry's production to different levels of operation.
Therefore, the regulatory case is justified more on the basis of the costs of facing
variability or cycles in production levels, rather than on risk aversion arguments or
costs of facing uncertain income flows.
Based on the available empirical evidence on fishing regulation priorities (for
instance, Scott, 1979; Charles, 1988; Cushing, 1988; Gulland, 1988; Townsend,
1990) it seems clear, however, that this dimension of the instability concern is less
important, by comparison to the collapse issue, as an argument to justify regulation
of fisheries. Despite this, much more work remains to be done to define both
rea1ings of the instability issue in a more precise manner, and also to pinpoint the
welfare effects ascribable to them.
(3.D.2) The inefficiency issue.
The key issue here is the incentive problem that is generated by the common (or
incomplete private) property of fish stocks. Under this property structure, even if we
have closed entry to the industry, multiple harvesting firms will have incentives to
equate their variable inputs' average product (rather than their marginal product) to
the inputs' marginal costs. This proposition assumes that it is too costly, relative to
the expected benefits, to sign and to enforce voluntary and cooperative Coasian
contracts among the harvesting firms in order to coordinate their harvesting
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decisions. These transaction costs can be thought of as a consequence of infomwlion
costs caused by costly monitoring of rivals' actions and incomplete information about
Nature's states.
If the previous conditions prevail, none of the individual fishermen can claim
or enforce exclusive rights over the use of fish stocks and hence everyone has
incentives for harvesting the fish stocks until their (Ricardian) rents are completely
exhausted. This will imply an inefficient dissipation of the producers' surplus. This
inefficient rent dissipation is what economists call the overfishing outcome. Under this
economic reading of the problem, the regulatory aim consists in avoiding the
inefficient waste of the natural resource's Ricardian rents.
A standard way of defming the efficiency yardstick, so as to compare it with
the harvesting outcome deriving from common property, consists in assuming a social
planner (with the same informational constraints as those faced by private firms) who
is interested in maximizing the discounted expected present value of the Ricardian
rents generating from the harvesting of the fish stock during a given time horizon.
These rents correspond to the difference between the harvest value and the costs of
production. These costs, of course, include the operational costs of the fishing fleet
as well as the alternative costs of the capital (human, physical and financial) inputs
used in that production. The harvesting time path that solves this planner optimization
problem is what economists call the intertemporal efficient harvesting outcom&'.
Let us briefly discuss how this definition of efficient harvesting relates to a
regulatory criterion which has been traditionally used in fishing management: the
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) criterion.
By definition, this optimization yardstick considers puce vectors and discount factors that
correspond to shadow (social) values.
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On the MSY criterion for regulation.
One of the pioneers in the field of fisheries science defined the MSY criterion in
1931:
.it was desirable to keep the fish stock X at such a level, or to
bring X to such a level, that the maximum value of commercially
utilizable fish can be drawn from it annually without causing a
progressive diminution of X". (Russell, 1931).
In simpler words this means Ny to catch as much fish as you can in a
sustainable way"32. This concept is still frequently mentioned, and widely popular
among marine biologists, as a guiding criterion for fishing management. However,
this definition clearly overlooks that the maximum value of total production is not
always the optimal one, once account is taken of costs and discount rates.
It is interesting to note that the concept of MSY has also been quite popular
in the discussions among foresters on the optimal rotation period for a forest.
Samuelson (1976) offers a remarkable discussion regarding this point, quoting
references to this concept as early as 1788, where it is recommended that 'the cut
to be regulated by how much the average tree age is above or below the optimal age
that maximizes steady state lumber yield per acre" (Samuelson, 1976, p. 489).
If we assume that the MSY is defined in value terms (not as a physical
quantity), our welfare maximizing planner's criterion can differ from it basically due
to four reasonsM:
Assuming price taking behaviour by harvesting firms.
33 Samuelson sets out the right solution given by M.Faustmann in 1849 but also quotes several
inaccurate solutions given by great economists, among them von Thunen (1826), Fisher (1930),
Hotelling (1925) and Boulding (1935).
We will not give proofs for these arguments, because most of them are well revied in the
literature. See, for example, Munro (1982), Munro and Scott (1985), Neher's introduction to Part ifi
of Scott (1985), Clark, Munro and Charles (1985) and Spulber's survey in Mirman and Spulber (1982)
for proofs and further references.
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(i)	 Even within a steady state analytical setting 35 the maximum catch (with given
prices) will not be optimal if total harvesting costs are somehow correlated
with the fish stock size at More formally, let C=C(h,x) be the total
harvesting cost function, where h and x are the current harvesting and fish
stock levels. A necessary condition for MSY to be optimal is that 8C/âx=O
at x; that is, when total costs C are independent of the stock level at x.
If ac/ax ^ 0, then the MSY is not optimal. For example, if total harvesting
costs are negatively correlated with x, that is, it is more costly to harvest
when the stock is smaller, the optimal stock is higher than that at MSY,
reflecting that a higher level of x is desired in order to decrease total
harvesting costs.
The reason is that under the MSY criterion the desired equilibrium
corresponds to a stock level such that the marginal change in sustainable harvesting
yield, deriving from a marginal change in the stock level x, is zer&7. To obtain an
equivalence between the MSY criterion and efficiency, total harvesting costs would
have to be independent of x. If aC/ax <0, would imply inefficient
overexploitation. This is the point made by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) and is
related to what is called the "marginal stock effect" (decreasing profits due to
increasing harvesting costs at lower stock levels).38
In the sense of concentrating the analysis only on comparisons of steady state equilibrium points,
and without making explicit reference to positive time discounting.
x is defined as the stock level at which a strictly concave instantaneous natural growth
function F(x)=dxldt achieves a maximum level (F'(x)=O) and thereby it allows a maximum
sustainable level of catches.
This situation corresponds to the unique maximum point that is located on a strictly concave
instantaneous growth function F(x)=dxldt, with F'(x)<O after x. For example, a logistic growth
function.
In terms of our welfare model in chapter 2, the optimality of the MSY criterion requires
imposing two restrictions upon the solution nile for the problem of optimal resource depletion (see
equation (9)). First, that the marginal stock effect is zero or ôr/8x*=O. Second, that the discount rate
6 is also zero. Only under these circumstances the optimal rule of resource depletion is equivalent to
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Let us note that this argument is valid for fisheries where the species have
strong schooling behaviour (high densities of individuals of similar size), as is the
case of pelagic fisheries, where it is possible that, at lower stock levels, average
harvesting costs decrease due to the higher density of the fish stocks.
If we now assume that the MSY criterion is defined as a net value yield (net
of operational and capital costs), our planner's efficiency criterion may still differ
from it basically for three other reasons:
(ii) Even if we concentrate the evaluation of optimality on long-run equilibrium
levels (as does the concept of MSY), but allow for the incorporation of a rate
of social time preferences, the optimality of the MSY catch prescription
requires that the rate of time preferences be zero. If this rate is positive, the
MSY will imply (social) underexploitation of the natural resource (see
references in footnote 34).
(iii) If we now introduce explicit dynamic considerations into the analysis, in the
sense of time lags or costly rigidities in the adjustment paths of fish and
capital stocks40, the MSY criterion says nothing about the optimal paths
approaching the steady state optimum as this criterion is defined in a
comparative statics sense.
(iv) Finally, the introduction of fish stock uncertainty adds new problems to the
use of the MSY criterion, given the impact on the time discount rates and the
valuation of capital stocks. This uncertainty can imply trade offs between the
the MSY prescription; that is, to harvest the resource until F'(x)=O, with F(x)=dx/dt representing the
instantaneous growth rate.
In fact, this is a dangerous complexity in pelagic fisheries, because although the fish stock can
have entered a zone of depensatory (negative) growth, the catch performances do not necessarily fall,
given the high density of its population.
e These rigidities or time lagged responses can be modelled, for example, with the inclusion of
multicohort (different age groups) models for the fish stock dynamics, or via the introduction of sunk
costs in the harvesting technology.
89
expected rents and risks involved. The optimal answer to that may be quite
different from the MSY prescription.
Similar criticisms could be raised against other biological criteria of fishing
management which, in one way or another, are based on this notion of a maximum
utilization of the natural resource. For example, the "maximum yield per recruit",
the "status quo catch" (the estimated catch with constant fishing mortality) proposed
by Pope (1982), and the constant instantaneous coefficient of fishing mortality (M01)41
(more details in Gulland, 1988, chapters 1,5 and 6).
(3.E) Review of the legal background to the industrial fishing sector.42
Among the regulatory decisions concerning fishing industries, a key set of problems
is related to the definition, control and enforcement of access schemes and property
(user) rights over the natural resource. In this section we briefly explore the Chilean
experience on these issues.
The first Chilean Code of Civil Laws (1855) defined fishing rights for those
who first initiated the resource depletion. These rights were defined as "rights of
occupation". Additional (access) restnctions were considered in terms of the
fishermen's nationality and the territorial area under exploitation. The first specific
Fishing Laws (1929 and 1931) retained, in essence, this basic doctrine of historical
rights.
In 1956 pennits for fishing operations began to be required. Initially, this was
a pure access regulation. However, since the early 1960s (Law Decrees No. 597,
1960, and No. 524, 1964) the fishing authorities intended to link the issuing of new
In this criterion M corresponds to the ratio between the catch and the average fish stock (with
both variables measured in numbers of individuals). Its value M 1 corresponds, for a given model of
biological growth, to 'a level of fishing effort less than that which produces the MSY, in order to
prevent an overshoot due to errors in the system of stock assessment (VPA or Virtual Population
Analysis)'. See Cushing (1988, page 263).
For some comments on the histoiy of Chilean fishing laws, see Montt (1985).
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permits (in terms of firms and vessels) to the compliance with objectives of maximum
global permissible (annual) catches (MPCs). When global effective catches
approached the maximum permissible level, the intention of the regulator was to
close the entry to that fishery.
However, during all this period these permissible catches were more of a
signal to the private sector, rather than an effectively erj'orceable quota polic)A3. In
fact, during the 1960s the dominant policy aims were promoting the industrial
development of marine fisheries and improving the information on different aspects
of the fish populations. As a result of these priorities, the effective regulatory
instrument during this period was entry restriction via fishing permit applications.
This regulatory scheme prevailed until the mid 1970s.
In the mid 1970s there was a wave of criticism against the doctrine of
historical rights, which still dominated the issue of fishing permits. The main
criticism" was that this type of regulation prevented competition between potential
investors, monopolizing the resources to the benefit of those who had already
established their presence.
Simultaneously, other factors helped to promote a rethinking of the prevailing
rules. Among these factors were:
During the 1960s and 1970s, fishing authorities and the related civil servant staffs seem not to
have had the required technical knowledge to implement a stock assessment methodology with enough
scientific precision such as to validate, in the eyes of the private fishing sector, a regular enforcement
of fishing regulations based on annual catch quotas. In 1980-81, the first systematic stock assessment
calculations were made. Despite the annual calculations of these stock assessments during the 1980s,
the suggested annual quotas were never enforced in the marine fisheries with a greater level of
economic exploitation (Northern pelagic fisheries). A few attempts to enforce global quotas in these
fisheries during this period faced a successful opposition from private fishing lobbies. We thank the
marine biologist A. Zuleta for this information.
This line of arguments was led by a group a economists who had obtained the control of the
government bureaucracy. Most of these professionals had post-graduate training at the Chicago School
of Economics and from this feature they started to be known as the uChicago boy?.
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(i) accumulated experiences around the world showing the failure of free access
schemes to protect the economic survival of industrial pelagic fisheries'5,
(ii) a corresponding increasing consensus on the need to combine access restrictions
with quotas on harvesting 1evels',
(iii) the increasing economic importance of fisheries for the Chilean economy, as the
sector grew rapidly from the mid 1970s until the late 1980s. This growing production
started to make fish populations a more scarce resource and, correspondingly, the
costs involved in the expansion and future sustainability of the fishing sector became
more obvious.
As an outcome of these ideas, in 1978 there was a partial weakening in the
historical rights doctrine. The Law Decree No. 2442 led to free access. This implied
that all applications for fishing permits (from resident fishermen) should be accepted,
if some minimum technical requirements were fulfiled. Free access was promoted by
pro-competition economists who had the control of the government bureaucracy. This
policy was also consistent with the government's political priority to promote the
economic growth of recently reprivatized industries, including the fishing sector, as
a way to consolidate a widespread process of reprivatization that took place in the
Chilean economy between 1974-1982.
Until the 1940s, managers around the world did not believe that fishing efforts should be
restrained. These beliefs were based on scientific propositions that had prevailed for almost 70 years
among marine biologists. Fish stocks were seen basically as free goods (for the period in question, it
was probably right to think so). Professor T.H.Huxley in 1884 (then president of the UK Royal
Society) wrote for an International Fisheries Conference: UI believe, then, that the cod fishery, the
herring fishery, the pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery and probably all the great sea fisheries are
inexhaustible; that is to say, that nothing we do seriously affects the numbers of fish. And any attempt
to regulate these fisheries seems, consequently, from the nature of the case to be useless (Cushing,
1988, page 117).
The shifting emphasis from global to individual catch quotas is a phenomenon that has taken real
force only since the early 1980s. (See Scott, 1988).
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Law Decree No. 2442 also centralized the responsibility of fishing regulations
in a recently created (1976) public regulatory agency (SUBPESCA)' 7, which was
vested with independent powers in most of the decisions on fishing regulations. The
head of this civil service institution, who was and still is second in hierarchy to the
Minister of Economics, retained the right to deny fishing permit applications.
In 1978 the National Fishing Service (SERNAP) was also created. This is a
second public sector agency whose main objectives were centralizing the public
sector's statistical records of private fishing activities, monitoring and controlling the
fulfilment of the prevailing fishing regulations, and prosecuting any violations. The
jurisdiction over these prosecutions came under local police courts. In the Chilean
legal system, these courts have lower legal status than Civil Court? 8. The prevailing
fishing regulations at the time defined these Courts' right to fine to violators, but the
law did not specify explicit values or an explicit methodology to calculate these fines.
Hence, local judges had a significant discretion over the determination of the
penalties values.
In order to enable SERNAP's accounting and monitoring tasks, fishing
regulations defined the legal obligation, for each fishing boat, to regularly report on
the catches of each fishing trip. SERNAP's controlling tasks were to be
complemented by monitoring from the Chilean Army and the corresponding local
police. Monitoring consisted in random inspections at landing ports and also at
marine harvesting zones.
Within the public sector hierarchy, SERNAP was defined as a directly
dependent institution under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Economics. However,
' Until then, fishing regulations were under the rule of the Ministry of Agriculture. Under this
scheme fishing matters were secondary with respect to agricultural issues, and the ruling of fishing
regulations was dispersed among several civil service bureaucrats.
Local police courts are defined in the Chilean legal system as courts with jurisdiction over minor
local legal violations (e.g., speeding violations of the traffic law). These courts' jurisdiction over
violations of fishing regulations is an indication of the low priority which at the time was assigned to
fishing regulations.
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due to SERNAP's tasks which are directly related to the control and enforcement of
fishing regulations, this definition of hierarchical dependence seems to have produced
some problems of coordination with respect to SUBPESCA's policy making and
executive powers. On some occasions, these public sector agencies seem to have been
involved in conificts related to which agency was paramount'9.
In the main Chilean fishing grounds, the free access framework prevailed until
1986. In terms of global catch quotas, the suggested, but non enforceable, character
of these recommended catch quotas was even more explicit. These suggestions were
always exceeded.
The de facto ineffectiveness of dispersed fishing regulations 5° was reinforced
by a regulation issued in 1980 (Law Decree No. 175) which omitted any explicit
mention of global quotas and did not specify a clear commitment to a free access
principle. This decree retained the regulator's 51 right to issue fishing permits, but it
left this right subject to discretionary criteria and did not specify explicit conditions
for the granting of fishing permits.
During the 1980s most of the regulatory decisions continued to be taken on
discretionary or case-by-case bases. Different regulatory instruments (e.g., fishing
moratoria and minimum catch sizes) tended to be irregular in application, usually
following cyclical patterns (some restrictions replacing earlier ones, then to be
revoked and replaced by the earlier regulations). Policy changes appeared to be
improvisations in the face of 'dangerous' resource levels. This issue deserves a
comment.
Verbal opinions obtained from experienced fishing experts in the functioning of the public sector
fishing institutions. Similar disputes, related to hierarchical preeminences, seem to have occurred in
tasks jointly carried out between SUBPESCA and the more research oriented Development Fisheries
Institute, IFOP (created in 1964).
At this time there was no unified legal piece covering all the relevant aspects related to fishing
regulations.
51 By this we refer to the Director of SUBPESCA.
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By 'discretionary' or 'irregular' regulations we mean that the fishing
regulatory authorities were systematically unable to enforce policies based on a given
set of rules, deriving from previously agreed on, widely accepted, and clearly defined
regulatory criteria and enforcement rules. Although the technology of pelagic
fisheries and the uncertainty of Nature's states require flexibility in the application of
regulatory rules, the fishing regulatory authorities' policy objectives and the
application of the regulatory policies stemming from them were ambiguous and ad
hoc.
However, and despite the persistence of discretionary decisions, during the
1980s there were some improvements in the fishing regulation. First, since 1980-81
fishing regulatory agencies started to use more technically qualified staff. This
process occurred in parallel to a period of modernization within the whole Chilean
civil service sector. Second, during this period, there began a regular calculation of
annual scientific stock assessments for the main fish species populations 52. The use
of this instrument helped to formalize the idea of permissible global annual catches.
In fact, since 1982 annual global quotas started to be used and enforced in demersal
fisheries (hake and whiting fisheries) located in the Southern fishing grounds. Third,
new regulatory instruments became available: in 1981 (Law Decree No. 458), catch
regulations based on minimum sizes for different fish species caught were introduced.
This instrument was initially applied to sardine and horse mackerel catches.
From 1982-83, however, there was conflict between fishing regulators and
private fishing firms over which instruments were more appropriate to regulate
marine industrial fisheries. This controversy was directly related to the increasing
scarcity of pelagic species in the Northern fishing grounds, that had been heavily
harvested since the mid 1970s. As from that time, the Northern pelagic fisheries
became the most contentious fisheries to be regulated. The conflicts were reinforced
Based on the stock assessment methodology known as Virtual Population Analysis (see Gulland,
1988).
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by the lobbying powers that stemmed from the high concentration and large size of
the dominant firms operating in this fishery.
The absence of consensus on regulatory methods led to the increasing use of
biological seasonal closures53 as the main method to regulate fishing efforts from
private firms. Seasonal closures were perceived as a more consensual instrument of
regulation. As with the use of previous instruments, the fishing regulatory authorities
maintained a discretional ruling in the temporal pattern of use for seasonal closures.
Between 1982 and 1986 total industrial catches continued to increase (see
Table 3.5). During this period, the fishing regulatory authorities wanted to reduce
total harvesting, particularly at the Northern pelagic fisheries. However, the
regulatory efforts were unsuccessful. For example, the first (and probably the only)
serious attempt to enforce a policy of global catch quotas, at Northern pelagic
fisheries (Law Decree No. 460, october 1981), was unsuccessful: this Decree
proposed to enforce a maximum catch quota of 1.3 million tons for sardine annual
catches in Northern zone A. Northern entrepreneurs then made lobbying efforts to
increase this quota. As a result of these lobbying pressures, a second Law Decree
(No. 263, September 1982) increased the maximum permissible level to 1.41 million
tons. At the end of 1982, the effective total sardine catches in Northern region A
achieved a level of 1.779 million tons. Not one transgressor was penalized. Private
fishing firms were successful in obtaining the backing of higher level civil servants.
As a direct consequence of the unsuccessful regulatory controls in the
Northern pelagic fisheries, a policy of a defacto closed entry was implemented after
the mid l980s. Since 1986 (Law Decree No. 436) until 1991M, the fishing efforts55
For example, Law Decree No. 160 (1983) was the first to define seasonal closures for sardine
catches in the Northern zone A. After 1985 there were regular seasonal closures each year.
More precisely, until the end of 1991 when a new Chilean fishing law was enacted after slightly
more than three years of discussions and negotiations. More details at section (3.G).
" Defined in terms of the total tonnage capacity of the vessels in operation.
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in the main industrial fisheries (pelagic fishing grounds in the Northern zone A and
Southern VllJ. region) have been frozen at their levels of 1985. This meant, in
practical terms, a situation of closed access to these fisheries.
The measure of freezing fishing efforts was adopted as a response to a
dangerous (from the fishing authorities' perspective) decrease, since 198 1-82, in the
stock levels of the main species under exploitation, especially in the case of the
Northern sardine stocks since 1981-82 (see Appendix 3.1). Again, during the 1980s
global annual catch quotas were recommended; yet again, they lacked a real
compulsory or enforceable power.
The fishing regulatory authorities were unable to enforce annual catch quotas
in the main industrial (pelagic) fishing grounds. Table 3.7 shows, for the main
species of the Northern industrial pelagic fishery, the divergence between actual
annual catches and those suggested by the fishing regulatory authorities during the
late 1980s. Table 3.7 shows a .ystematic exploitation over and above the suggested
catch quotas. Concurrently, pelagic fish stocks (particularly sardines and horse
mackerels) started to show a decreasing trend towards the second half of the 1980s,
helping to account for the significant fall in catches during the first years of the 1990s
(Table 3.5). Table 3.7 suggests that in Chile there was enough information to predict
the decrease in fish stock levels a number of years before it actually affected catch
performances. This suggests that the recent fall in catches could probably have been
mitigated, if the suggested quotas had been properly enforced.
In the next section we consider why the fishing regulatory authorities did not




















































Suggested annual quotas versus effective catches
(Three main pelagic species, Northern Zone A)
(tons, thousands)
Horse mackerels	 Sardines	 Anchovies
TSC	 EC,	 TSC	 EC	 TSC(	 EC
Sources: (1): Bania and Serra, 1989a, (2): Barrfa and Serra, 1991, (3): CORFO and IFOP, 1987,
AP 87/6, (4): Barna and Serra, 1989b, (5): Barria and Serra, 1991a, (6): IFOP, 1989, (7): Barria
and Serra, 1991,b.
Notes:
TSC: Total suggested (annual) catches.
EC: Effective (industrial fleet) catches.
na: non-available to the author.
Zone A: Regions I and II
- Definition of the TSC:
The criterion for estimating the TSC considers what marine biologists call the
instantaneous coefficient of fishing mortality. This index is an estimate of the ratio between
catch and average fish stock. TSC aims at keeping fishing efforts within a level that will allow the
survival of a minimum spawning stock, enough to maintain the long run sustainability of the
harvesting activity, with the aim of attempting to prevent negative overshooting due to random
Nature's shocks or to errors in the stock assessment (Pope, 1984, and Cushing, 1988, p.263). It
is a management measure based on a long run stability objective. It is obviously defined by a
biologically oriented objective of regulation and conservation.
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(3.F) On enforcement weaknesses.
In this section we propose four complementary explanations for the failure or the lack
of government's efforts to enforce catch quota policies on many occasions during the
last three decades.
(3.F.1) Government's objectives and policy priorities.
Regulators are agents of political principals. It is reasonable to expect that regulatory
decisions will be affected by political objectives given that the political principal sets
the regulatory agencies' budget. In the Chilean case, the three public sector
institutions that are directly related to fishing regulatory tasks (SUBPESCA, SERNAP
and IFOP) have budgets that are annually determined by the political authority.
In the case of Chilean fishing regulations, it seems clear that catch quota
objectives have been dominated, during most of the period since the mid 1960s, by
policy objectives with higher political priority.
During the 1960s the main policy priorities, within the fishing sector, were
to promote industrial development and to acquire scientific knowledge on fish
populations' behaviour (SUBPESCA-CORFO, 1989). On some occasions resource
conservation strategies were promoted by the more technical staff (marine biologists
and fishing technicians) working at regulatory agencies. But most of the time these
strategies did not obtain enough political support to overcome private sector
opposition. This phenomenon is consistent with the commonly predominant view at
the time of fish stocks as very abundant resources.
During the 1970s the Chilean economy faced profound economic changes.
Parallel to the consolidation of a military dictatorship, a widespread program of
liberal pro-market reforms was implemented. This included a widespread process of
reprivatization and a significant reduction in the State's direct regulatory role. For
Especially towards 1965-66, after a very rapid expansion peiiod in the harvesting of the
Northern anchovy fish stock.
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the political hierarchy in control of the government bureaucracy, the dominant
economic priorities were to consolidate, through accelerated economic growth, the
reprivatization program and the reduction of the State's intervention in economic
matters. Under this framework, it is not surprising that fishing regulators could not
enforce restrictive catch quota regulations.
During the 1980s resource conservation concerns became more widely shared
among different public and private interest groups in Chile, particularly towards the
end of the decade. Fish populations started to be increasingly perceived as scarce
resources. However, the political group in control of the government bureaucracy
(the so-called "Chicago Boys") still preferred, as a general principle, to avoid the
direct economic regulations proposed by marine biologists and fishing technicians in
response to depleted marine fish populations in the Northern pelagic fisheries. These
views did not obtain enough political support. Instead, a more market-oriented policy,
transferable individual catch quotas, started to be discussed (section 3.G).
(3.F.2) Institutional organization.
When several regulatory agencies are involved in regulating an industry, conffict can
arise from the ambiguous allocations of residual rights of control over the regulatory
decision making process. Conflicts of this type wifl be more frequent, ceteris parthus,
the lower the priority assigned by the political principal(s) to these decisions. Conflict
between regulatory agencies can diminish their regulatory efficiency.
In the Chilean case, problems of this type seem to have occurred between the
three public sector institutions directly involved in fishing regulatory tasks.
SUBPESCA is the executive and resolutive regulatory agency. SERNAP is formally
in charge of information accounting, monitoring and enforcement regulatory tasks.
[FOP is the more research oriented agency responsible for providing the scientific
information required by SUBPESCA's decision making process.
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SERNAP and IFOP are formally subordinate to SUBPESCA. But the latter
has no direct control over their budgets. The Director of SUBPESCA is responsible
to the Minister of Economics. But the latter is also the principal of the Director of
SERNAP. On occasions, this has triggered conflict between SUBPESCA and
SERNAP. Budget disputes, and conflicts over decision making preeminence, have
also occurred between SUBPESCA and IFOP. These latter disputes seem to have
been triggered by significant budget reductions faced by both institutions during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, as part of the government's strategies aimed at reducing
the State's economic role in Chile.
These conflicts between regulatory agencies can have contributed to the
inability of Chilean fishing regulators to enforce more restrictive catch regulations,
especially in the Northern pelagic fisheries. But it is clear that this type of problem
is closer to a consequence (of policy priorities) than to an original cause.
(3.F.3) Information problems.
On many occasions private fishing firms argued that the regulatory agencies did not
have enough reliable scientific knowledge and information on the levels,
characteristics and behaviour of the fish populations under exploitation, to formulate
an objective and efficient regulation based on annual catch policies. This lack of
information, they argued, would probably produce arbitrariness and distortions in the
definition of the maximum catch limits.
If a genuine justification for fishing regulations was accepted, incumbent
fishing firms usually favoured more direct controls over fishing efforts, such as entry
restrictions on additional fishing capacity, fishing moratoria and other minor
restrictions over inputs' uses (e.g., type of fishing nets). Most of these regulatory
measures would probably have produced smaller reductions in incumbent firms'
profits, when compared with restrictive catch quotas.
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The 'lack of information" argument seems to have had relatively sound bases,
at least until the beginning of the 1980s. However, we have already stated that since
1980-81 a process of systematic fish stock assessment calculations was started. The
assessment method followed up to date world technology. The quality of the
information gathering process upon the catches' age composition, on which the stock
assessment methodology is based, steadily improved. The graphs of official (IFOP's)
fish stock estimations shown in Appendix 3.1, and the decreasing (since the mid
1980s) actual aggregate annual catches in the Northern pelagic grounds (see Table
3.5), give us a rough idea of the reasonable predictive power of these fish stock
assessments in terms of anticipating future average catch levels.
Despite the methodological improvements in the official fish stock
assessments, private fishing firms argued that there still persisted a significant
uncertainty in these estimations. Hence, the incumbent fishing firms' criticisms on
the use of quota policies persisted along the 1980s. In section (3.G) we offer a more
detailed account of these criticisms, particularly applied to the government's proposal
to implement a system of transferable individual catch quotas.
(3.F.4) Regulatory capture.
"Economists' surveys of fishery regulation make much of the power
of government action to remedy the wastes of common property and
similar market failures. But I do not believe that an increase in
efficiency in resource allocation very often enters into politicians'
motivation for intervening in the fishery, or in any other sector...
Political support would be given to restrictions on the overapplication
of inputs if.. .they would work to the advantage of incumbent
fishermen.' (Scott, 1979, pp. 729-730)
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Scott (1979) belongs to the so-called "capture" or "interest group" theory that
emphasizes the role of interest groups in the formation of public policy. Under this
paradigm, economic regulations are understood as often motivated or controlled by
the industries to be regulated. This is in contrast with the so-called "public interest"
theory that emphasizes the government's role in correcting different types of market
imperfections; and where regulatory agencies are viewed as direct benevolent
maximizers of social welfare. Classical sources on the "capture" regulatory theory
are Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1976). For more
details and additional references, see Laffont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11).
In the interest group theory regulatory agencies are usually analysed as facing
incentives to identify with specific interest groups. Sometimes these agencies (or their
political principals) can behave as simple arbitrators among competing private
interests (Peltzman, 1976). On occasions they can be captured by the private parties'
interests under regulation (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971). But the key common insight
is that regulatory outcomes are not independent of the lobbying powers of private
groups. The principal-agent relationships that arise from these multiple-tiered power
interactions, and the private (rent) stakes that they involve, have their origins in the
existence of informational asymmetries. The latter explain why regulators can have
discretion and why interest groups have power and stakes.
The repeated inability of Chilean fishing regulators to enforce restrictive catch
quotas in the Northern pelagic fishing grounds can be partially explained by "capture"
arguments. We already described the economic power of the dominant incumbent
firms that have operated in this fishery for at least two decades. We have mentioned
the informational uncertainties involved in the attempts to regulate pelagic fisheries.
We have also described some of the fishing regulators' informational weaknesses.
Finally, it is clear that the common property of marine fish stocks makes
distributional disputes an unavoidable and important aspect of fishing regulations.
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In fact, fishing regulators need to simultaneously cope with attempting to
reduce the allocative inefficiencies deriving from common or incomplete property
rights, and also with arbitrating on the distributive disputes that will be triggered by
the attempts to regulate harvesting activities. The next section illustrates this type of
problems with more detail.
(3.G) The recent discussion on the regulation of Chilean fisheries.
In this section we analyse the late 1980s controversies that arose in Chile as the
consequence of two different governments' attempts to enact a new Chilean fishing
law. We aim to illustrate some of the complexities involved in the implementation of
fishing regulations and, more particularly, the distributional conflicts and resulting
lobbying to capture regulation when regulatory authorities' attempt to internalize the
increasing scarcity values of common pooi natural resources.
In December 1989 the military government enacted a new fishing law (the
Merino Law). Its formal implementation was intended to become effective as from
March 1990. A few days before its introduction, the recently elected Aylwin
government proposed postponing the implementation of the new law until October
1990. This proposal was accepted by the newly elected Congress on the basis of a
commitment to review the structure of the law. This triggered a protracted discussion
of the regulation of fisheries until the end of 1991, after six deferrals in Congress to
deal with the proposed bill of reforms. The resulting fishing law was finally approved
and enacted in September 1991.
In this section we describe and analyse this process of negotiations over
fishing regulations. We proceed as follows. Subsections (3.G. 1) to (3.0.4) discuss
the three proposed bills of fishing law, their main features, the key controversial
issues that stopped them being approved, and the main distributional disputes behind
those controversies. Subsection (3.G.5) discusses some lessons on sources of conflict
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and possible areas for future improvements in the design of regulatory strategies.
Finally, we offer some closing remarks.
(3.G.1) The original proposal: the Merino Law.
The Merino Law defined two types of fisheries: those in a stage of fidi exploitation
and all the remaining ones. The definition offull exploitation was based on biological
criteria. A fishery is said to be in a stage of fish exploitation if exploitation is high
enough to offset the "surplus productivity" of the species 58 . The surplus productivity
of a given fish stock is measured as the difference between recruitment (new
individuals that enter the commercially exploitable population) and the natural
mortality. Given this defmition, the most important industrial fishing grounds were
in a stage of full exploitation (pelagic species in the Northern zone A and Southern
Vifith region). These were the most heavily exploited fishing grounds and,
accordingly, they were the fisheries that most urgently required changes in their
regulation.
Access to fisheries, other than those in full exploitation, was to be free,
although there was a registration requirement. The crucial innovation of the Merino
Law, however, was related to the access regulation for full exploitation fisheries.
Until then, access to fisheries in this stage was closed by a freezing policy on the
industrial fleet's cargo capacity (section 3.E). The Merino Law proposed that access
The name of this proposal stems from the surname of the Commander in chief of the Chilean
Navy (Admiral J. Tonbio Merino) who initially promoted the enactment of a new fishing law.
This condition simply defines a constant fish stock level. If economic exploitation equates or
overcomes the surplus productivity of a given fish species, its population remains constant or decreases
respectively. The initial level of the fish stock is irrelevant for the definition offiill exploitation status.
This is an odd feature of this definition. However, it seems that the legislator's intention was to keep
an explicit ambiguity in this definition. Presumably, the underlying idea consisted of defining a
nuzximwn sustainable yield (MSY) condition. This idea would correspond with inaximwn sustainable
economic exploitation (harvesting). A possible justification for the underlying ambiguity in the formal
definition of the full exploitation status could be that it allows the regulator to define in a more flexible
way the precise meaning of MSY, for a given fish population. We thank the marine biologist A. Zuleta
for suggesting us this interpretation.
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to these fisheries be regulated through a system of individual, permanent and
marketable licenses for fishing, freely transferable and divisible. These were to be
based on Individual Transftrable Quotas (1TQs) which were defined as a percentage
of the annual global quotas (defined in terms of weight caught). The global quota was
defined for a "fishery unit" which consisted of a particular fish species and a given
harvesting zone. The transferable individual licences gave the right to catch a specific
weight (tonnage) of fish.
The original allocation of these ITQs was to be a function of the individual
firms' average catches in the three previous years to the implementation of the new
law; more precisely, of their percentage share of the corresponding annual catches
of those years. This system of allocation was attacked vigorously by representatives
of the private fishing entrepreneurs, especially from the incumbent firms operating
at the Northern fishing grounds. Recall the dominant presence of the Angelini group
in these fisheries.
The initial proposal for allocating transferable individual fishing rights, based
on historical presence, ruled out the access of newcomers to a given fishing areas,
unless they were willing to buy fishing rights from incumbent firms. This entry
restriction represented a significant cost for the incumbent fishing firms operating at
the overexploited Northern fishing grounds, because they were planning to redirect
part of their fishing efforts toward the more abundant Southern fish stocks.
Alternative proposals, none of them finally accepted, allowed some percentage
of initial participation for new investors, through a public auctioning of part of the
global quota. The incumbent firms operating at the overexploited Northern fishing
grounds preferred to lobby for free access conditions to the more abundant Southern
fishing grounds to the auctioning of lTQs. The incumbent firms succeeded only
The original proposal also included an absolute restriction for licence renting, together with a
restriction for individual ownership of 50% or more of the total annual quota of two or more fishery
units.
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partially in their lobbying strategy. Although a general system of free access finally
prevailed, Southern fishing grounds were kept under annually renewable access
restrictions, as long as their fish stocks were classified as fishery units in stage of full
exploitation.
The use of 1TQs in the regulation of fisheries was encouraged and supported
by several Chilean authors, mainly economists. They argued that the main problem
at industrial fisheries is one of common property, which creates incentives for an
inefficient rent dissipation due to excessive competition among harvesting units. They
argued that an efficient way to regulate is through the allocation of private property
rights over fish stocks, in order to solve the commonality problem. They also argued
that the more traditional global regulations, such as global quotas or fishing
moratoria, even though they might solve the biological problem (risk of collapse),
they can not solve the efficiency problem, because they do not stop 'excessive'
harvesting competition (Bitrán, 1989; Gómez-Lobo and Jiles, 1991; Tasc Report,
1991).
At the institutional level, the Merino Law created a National Fishing Council60
which was vested with consultative powers, while the traditional fishing regulatory
authorities (SUBPESCA and SERNAP) retained policy making and enforcing powers
respectively.
However, one of the first actions of the recently instated (March 1990)
Aylwin's government was a proposal to defer and modify the Merino Law. There
were two main ecplicit arguments behind this proposal. First, the new government
argued that the originally proposed bill did not include any budget increase to cover
the higher costs required to enforce the new regulatory scheme. Second, it was
Formed by representatives of different groups involved in the fishing sector, such as
entrepreneurs, workers, fishing experts and civil servants. Membership in the National Fishing Council
was an ad honorem activity.
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argued that the proposed free access regime for fisheries, other than those in a stage
of full exploitation, would imply overfishing and overinvestment in these fisheries.
There was also an important implicit argument underlying the government's
decision to postpone the enactment of the Merino Law. The ongoing discussion of
this proposed bill had resulted in a widespread argument about the constitutional
validity of the State's rights to apply and enforce some key regulatory instruments at
fishing industries. In particular, the State's rights to limit access to fisheries and to
sell property rights over the use of fish stocks were questioned.
Under these circumstances, the new government's diagnosis was that the
enactment of the Merino Law could have challenged the fishing authorities' capacity
to enforce regulatory actions at industrial fisheries, as this issue had to be adjudicated
by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal61 . This possibility was
perceived as a significant risk, given that 1TQs were the key regulatory instrument
within the Merino Law. If ITQs were judged to be unconstitutional, the fishing
authorities' regulatory capacity would then have been severely reduced62.
Both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal had a sensitive
political relationship with the new government. The possibility of a political
bargaining on this issue, between the executive branch of the government and these
other two key judicial institutions, was something that the new government wished
to avoid. During this period any constitutional controversy raised delicate issues,
because a complex process of political transition from a 16 year military dictatorship
to a democratic system was taking place.
The Northern entrepreneurs were not the only private lobby that opposed the
Merino Law. Fishing workers' unions also opposed this law but their lobbying
The Constitutional Tribunal is an institution designed with the specific purpose of discussing and
suggesting solutions for constitutional controversies.
62 are indebted to Joaquin Vial for clarification on this issue (J. Vial was a leading economist
in the public sector, among the group of civil servants in charge of the political bargaining required
by the final enactment of the new fishing law).
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powers had been reduced as a consequence of pro-competition labour reforms which
had been implemented since the late 1970s by the military government. Fishing
workers' unions argued that the Merino Law implied a "privatization of the sea,
which they opposed. They also feared that this new legal framework could imply
higher unemployment because of entry restrictions and smaller catches.
The Northern entrepreneurs opposed the use of ITQs and access limits.
Incumbent Southern entrepreneurs were more sympathetic to both types of
regulations. This was because they helped to reduce the increasing competitive
pressures from the Northern entrepreneurs' desire to reallocate part of their
harvesting activities towards the Southern fishing grounds.
(3.G.2) The democratic government's proposal.
After the postponement of the Merino Law, the Aylwin's government prepared its
own proposal, trying to include points of view from different groups linked to the
fishing sector such as entrepreneurs, workers, fishing experts and related civil
servants. In order to do so, a National Fishing Commission was appointed. In order
to avoid political conificts that could damage the recently restored democracy, the
newly elected Aylwin's government tried to achieve consensus in most of the relevant
political issues. The discussion about a new fishing law was one of these issues.
What differences did this new proposal have with respect to the Merino Law?
First, access to all fisheries, excluding those under full exploitation, was now to be
allowed only with the prior approval of the executive fishing regulatory authority
(SUBPESCA), instead of the previously proposed simple registration requirements.
Second, the new proposal included more regulatory instruments to regulate fisheries
under full exploitation than the previous proposal. These included limits on the
Presumably, the approval of the executive fishing authority would be more restrictive concerning
access conditions than the previously proposed registration requirements for harvesting at fisheries
other than those underfull exploitation. However, there was no explicit criterion in the bill to be more
precise on this comparison.
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number of ships, fishing effort regulations, global catch quotas, and ITQs allocated
completely via historical rights.
At the institutional level, the enforcement capacity of the fishing authorities
was strengthened: their budgets were increased and their rule making powers were
retained. This proposal also created one National and several Local Fishing Councils,
designed to serve as institutions of discussion and consultation.
Both proposals had important similarities. First, both recognized the need to
regulate the fishing activity. Second, both included access limitations and ITQ5 as
important regulatory instruments. Third, both proposals granted rule making and
enforcement powers to public sector institutions which were not formally linked to
the different private lobbying groups.
This new proposal was again attacked by the Northern entrepreneurs. By
contrast, Southern entrepreneurs, artisanal fishermen and fishing workers gave their
support to it. But this support was not enough to allow the final enactment of this
proposal and a protracted multi-party bargaining process started, lasting from 1989
to 1991.
(3.G.3) The bargaining process and the political agreement.
The controversies that arose during the period from 1989 to 1991 were related to four
key points:
(a)	 Redistributional disputes about the initial allocation of the exclusive fishing
rights, in terms of who were eligible for them, with what proportions of the
global quota and subject to what payment for these rights.
M5 feature would change in the finally enacted fishing law.
' Other minor issues under discussion included the possibility of unemployment costs and the
problem of transboundary fish stocks shared with Pens.
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(b) Constitutional issues concerning the State's right to limit access to fisheries
and to sell full property rights over fish stocks. The key issue was what type
of rights the State has and hence can transfer to private agents over sea
resources67.
(c) Private entrepreneurs argued that an ITQs scheme had infeasible ionnation
requirements. They argued that regulatory bodies do not, and can not, know
the information required to implement an efficient system of ITQ5. This
criticism is mainly related to the costs of monitoring the true state of fish
stocks and, with less emphasis, the individual actions of harvesting firms.
(d) Northern entrepreneurs questioned the whole rationale for fishing regulations.
They argued that there was a cyclical substitution process among the main
species under exploitation, especially between sardines and anchovies. They
argued that when one of the species suffers a strong depletion, affecting its
basis of reproduction, another species will take up its position in the
ecosystem. Therefore, any reduction in a single stock will be counteracted by
an increase in another competing species, allowing for continuity in the
fishing activity. Moreover, it is asserted that the depleted species will come
back after a while, the specific period of recovery depending on the particular
species growth patterns and the firms' multispecies harvesting strategies.
The cyclical substitution thesis is still controversial among marine biologists.
It is possible to cite partial evidence justifying this case for other fisheries around the
world; but no definitive conclusion can yet be drawn (e.g., see Cushing, 1988, and
The constitutional issue has been a common and critical problem in the regulation of fisheries.
Comments on the case of U.S. fisheries can be found in Keen (1988) and Fletcher (1965).
For a legal analysis of this issue, see lnforme Constitucional sobre Ley de Pesca
(Constitutional Report on the Fishing Law), December 31d 1990.
Especially those involved in the Northern fish meal industry. For instance, see El Merasrio
(January 14k, 1990) for the opinions expressed by Felipe Lamarca, one of the top managers of the
Angelini group, the conglomerate that is a dominant firm within this industry.
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Gulland, 1988). The key issues are the time period and natural conditions required
for such a substitution to take place. Regulators argue that these conditions can be
highly uncertain and that therefore the continuity of the fishing activity can also be
uncertain.
Northern entrepreneurs succeeded in using arguments (b), (c) and (d) to
reduce the use of ITQs and access restrictions. Among the issues under controversy,
the constitutional debate became the dominant discussion. In October 1990, the
Constitutional Tribunal ruled that several articles of this proposed bill of law on
fishing were unconstitutional. The Tribunal's statement was related only to minor
legal procedural issues, and did not clarify the main issue of the State's rights to limit
access to fish stocks and to sell full property rights over them.
As a result of this ruling, the government was forced to seek a compromise
agreement in order to avoid further postponement of the law. By September 1991 a
political agreement was arrived at by the main political parties controlling the
Congress70. The multi-party bargaining problem was finally solved via political
procedures, with the legislative branch of the government acting as an arbitrator.
The key aspects of the 1991 Fishing Law actually enacted are:
(i) Substantial restriction of the use of ITQs, compared to the central role they
played in the Merino Law. ITQs remained as a possible, though not compulsory,
regulation for fishery units under the stage offidl exploitation. Moreover, the use of
1TQs in fisheries under afull exploitation regime is limited to a maximum of half of
'9 In order to gain access to Southern fish stocks, the Northern entrepreneurs wanted to eliminate
the fleet (size) freezing regulation imposed by the military government since 1986. An additional way
to bypass this regulation consisted in installing new processing plants at the target region, and then
defending the need of an own fleet in order to successfully supply the required fresh raw fish. This
tactic helped to increase the regional fleet's fishing capacity, despite the formal existence of a freezing
policy on its level.
See the amendments to the original new Fishing Law, in Diario Oficial (Official Gazette),
September 6, 1991, Law No. 19079 and Law No.19080.
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the annual total catch quota while the other half of the annual quota remains under
a free access regime.
This maximum proportion of 50 per cent is supposed to be reached through
the annual public sell of 5-per-cent rights over the current annual total quotas. Each
year the government can publicly auction individual fishing rights that cannot exceed
a 5 per cent of the corresponding annual catch quota for that year. These restrictions
imply that the maximum permissible proportion of global annual catch quotas under
JTQs is achieved over a period of 10 years. Each ITQ is defined as a specific
percentage right over current annual global quotas, whatever be the particular level
of the latter. 1TQs define transitory fishing rights valid for a 10 year period. Each
ITQ right can be transferred to another individual only once a year.
(ii) Two other status for fisheries, known as fisheries under recovery (after
overexploitation), and fisheries in a stage of infant development71 were created. In
these fisheries there is no upper limit to the use of ITQs which are allocated by
public auction.
(iii) The law maintained the previous proposal of a National and Local Fishing
Councils which are composed of representatives of different interest groups involved
in the fishing sector (entrepreneurs, workers, fishing experts and civil servants)72.
Under the 1991 fishing law these Councils are vested with rule making powers
in practically all the most important regulatory issues (see Table 3.9).
(iv) The general regulatory framework maintains free access as the basic principle.
Entry restrictions are possible if: (1) the fishery is under recovery or in a stage of
The definition of infwu development and under recoverj is based on biological cnteria. Both
types of fisheries represent only a minor proportion of the national fisheries under current exploitation.
' Membership to these Fishing Councils is an ad honorem activity. There are five Local Fishing
Councils, each defined for a different fishing region, and one National Fishing Council. The latter has
20 members. Four of them are representatives of entrepreneurial organizations, four of labour
organizations, three are civil servants directly related to fishing regulatory tasks, one is the Director
of SUEPESCA, another is an executive secretary who is nominated by the Director of
SUBPESCA.The other seven members are directly nominated by the President of Chile.
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infant development; or (2) the fishery is in a stage of fidi exploitation. A technical
report from the fishing regulatory authority (SUBPESCA) and the approval of at least
two thirds of the National and Local Fishing Councils are required in either case.
In case (2), entry restrictions are formally allowed only as a transitory device.
Entry restrictions, for that part of the global quota which is excluded from the ITQ
mechanism, are possible but with a time limit of one year. However, the fishing
authorities can each year propose a new one year extension of the entry restriction.
(v) Finally, the law retains (1) annual global catch quotas and (2) other
biologically oriented controls on fishing efforts (seasonal closures, minimum net
sizes, and minimum catch sizes) as the core instruments of control.
(3.G.4) Possible sources of distortion in the current fishing law.
Table 3.8 shows the main features in the evolution of the recent discussion on the
Chilean fishing law. Rows show the three different legal proposals, and columns
describe the access regimes, the main regulatory instruments and the decision making
mechanisms contained in each proposal. Table 3.9 shows in more detail the different
decision areas and the corresponding legal requirements for the 1991 Fishing Law.
In what follows we pinpoint three possible sources of distortions or imperfections
within this legal structure:
(i) Available regulatory instruments and their enforcement.
The current legislation is basically free access oriented and the main
regulatory instrument consists of global catch quotas. Empirical evidence has shown
that these two instruments are ineffective and also inefficient in solving the
overfishing problem, both from the biological and economic perspective 73 . The impact
Surveys and case study analyses which describe the inefficient resource allocations that result
from fishing regulations based on global instruments of harvesting control and direct controls over
fishing efforts, can be found in Munro and Scott's (1985) and Munro's (1982a) surveys of Canadian
fishing regulations. See also the multi-country descriptions in Charles (1988), Townsend (1990) d
Copes (1986) and the case studies in the special issues of two specialized journals in fishery
economics: the Marine Resource Economicc, Vol.5, No.4, 1988, and the Journal of the FLcherie.r
Research Board of Canada, Vol. 36, No. 7, 1979.
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of regulation will depend on the fishing regulator's effective powers to enforce the
available instruments when the regulatory decisions involve costly adjustments for
incumbent firms. The regulator's enforcement powers are directly related to the
support of his political principals. Budgetary decisions are a key aspect of this
support. Since the enactment of the 1991 fishing law, both SERNAP's and
SUBPESCA's budgets have increased in real terms (above inflationary indexation).
However, the enforcement productivity of this additional financing still remains to
be evaluated.
Beside budgetary issues, the new fishing law offers some scope for
improvement, versus the previous legal framework, in the organization and
implementation of the fishing regulator's enforcement actions.
First, SERNAP's monitoring and controlling tasks are supported by private
fishing firms' legal duty to register in a National Fishing Register, in which they
have to report technical aspects of their fishing fleet. Each fishing boat also must give
information on its catch in each fishing trip. Processing plants must regularly provide
information on their use of raw fish catches and their suppliers (boats).
This makes it possible to cross check the validity of boats' catch reports.
SERNAP now has the opportunity to change its traditional policing-type approach,
placing now more emphasis on auditing given the possibility of cross checking
between boats' direct catch reports and the processing plants' production report
duties. As we mentioned before (section 3.E), SERNAP's traditional approach to
regulatory enforcement has consisted in checking boats' catch reports by performing
random policing visits to landing ports and harvesting areas. Now the policing task
must also be extended to processing plants74 . Refocusing enforcement efforts towards
more auditing probably requires budgetary increases for SERNAP. The resulting
"SERNAP is also attempting to implement a monitoring system which consists of satellite control
upon boats' harvesting actions.
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combination of policing and auditing efforts will affect the efficiency of
enforcement75.
Second, violations of fishing regulations and other related legal duties are now
penalized, for the first time, by clearly defined fines. The new fishing law contains
an explicit section (Thie IX) defining a range of non-monetary penalties76 and
graduated monetary fines for different types of transgressions.
The graded system of monetary penalties makes the fine a proportion of the
catch value. More precisely, different proportional factors, according to the severity
of the infraction, are applied to "infraction values" which are defined by multiplying
the catch tonnage under violation and the unit value (landing beach price) of the
species caught. The dependence of the fine level upon the catch value provides
more efficient penalty incentives than fixed penalties (Stigler, 1970; Posner, 1986).
Finally, the legal jurisdiction over prosecution cases against violators of the
fishing law rests with the Civil Courts. They are more powerful tribunals than the
local police courts which were previously in charge.
(ii) Scope for the use of ITQs.
Even though the use of ITQs is possible, it is limited to a maximum of half
of the global annual quota at fisheries under fidi exploitation. There seems to be no
Two interesting institutional analyses of enforcement problems of fishing regulations can be
found in Clark, Major and Mollett (1988) and Anderson (1989).
' For instance, the closure of processing plants, the appropriation of the tonnage caught and/or
fishing equipments, the caducity of boats' fishing permits and fishermen's individual fishing licenses.
7'For example, violations which are classified as severe imply: (a) a monetary fine which can
vary between 3 to 4 times the corresponding infraaion values. The Civil Judge determines, within this
range, the specific proportional factor to be finally used. The legal responsibility to pay the fine falls
on the material author of the infraction. (b) The captain of the industrial boat that violates the law is
also personally penalized by fines that can vaiy between (Chilean pesos) values which are equivalent
to a range of US $ 1400-15000. (c) 3 months suspension periods for fishing licenses of captains whose
boats have been proved to commit severe violations, and the permanent cancellation of the captain's
fishing license if a reiterative violation is proved. The law includes within the category of severe
violation, among other infractions, the absence or untruthful submission of the boats' regular reports
on each fishing trip's catch productivity.
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clear-cut technical justifications for a partial use of the ITQ instrument. The 'biomass
information requirements' argument does not justify it because there are no
significant differences in the biomass information required to apply either the global
quota or the ITQ system. On the other hand, the argument that the enforcement of
ITQs would be very costly (to be efficacious) seems to be not very strong. Not if we
at least compare this cost with the enforcement costs of annual global quotas.
Moreover, some authors (e.g., Gómez-Lobo and Jiles, 1992) have argued that the
enforcement of ITQs should not be too costly, given that most of the fishing
production is exported and hence there is a complementary way, to direct controls
on individual catches, in controlling and enforcing the ITQs. The complementary
enforcement could make use of monitoring devices based on export statistics.
A plausible explanation for the restricted scope of 1TQs is that it is a
compromise to the lobbying pressures that were triggered by the disputes over the
initial allocation scheme for the ITQ rights. Given this compromise solution, it is
probable that ITQs, if they are used, will not control all rent dissipation.
The new fishing law does not define whether the owners of ITQs have the
right to harvest before (a first mover advantage) the other firms which harvest under
free access conditions, or whether both types of fishing schemes have to
simultaneously compete in harvesting. In either of these two cases, it is not clear a
priori how the regulator will be able to enforce the catch quota limits. Also, in both
cases each fisherman with 1TQs has the incentive to harvest early to fill his quota
when fish is still relatively abundant and costs are relatively lower. The resulting rush
and investment in capital and labour inputs raise the aggregate costs of landing the
allowable catch. This type of harvesting incentive becomes stronger the shorter the
temporal advantage firms with ITQs have over the firms that harvest under free
access conditions.
(iii) Rent seeking behaviour.
Another potential source of problems is related to the decision making
mechanisms and their influence on the fishing regulator's enforcement. The new
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fishing law gives partial resolutive powers to private lobbie& 8 whose objectives may
differ from the social ones. These powers might strengthen the rent seeking efforts
of these lobbies. It is not obvious, however, that all private sector's representatives
will necessarily collude against the fishing regulator. It is even possible that a wider
private participation in the regulatory decisions can bring more credibility and
institutional stability to fishing regulations. More precise comments will have to wait
for more empirical evidence on the operation of this new fishing law.
At the time this chapter is written, the 1991 Fishing Law will have been in
operation for almost three years. During this period, we have observed some
promising improvements in regulation. For instance, the successful application of
1TQs in the case of the red shrimp (pleurocondes monodon) (Calfucura and Jiles,
1994); also the combined application of (a) seasonal closures and (b) individual catch
permits, when harvesting is allowed, in the case of the Chilean abalone (concholepas
concholepas)'9. In both cases, the current legal framework has made it possible to
arrive at promising solutions as an initial step in a situation of biologically
overdepleted fish populations.
However, ITQs are still not applied to the most conificting fisheries, that is,
the pelagic fishing grounds in the Northern zone A and Southern Vifith region. Both
fisheries are still kept under (annually renewable) closed entry regulation and subject
to regular seasonal closures.
See footnote 72 and Table 3.9.
In this case an official Register has been created which lists the authorized fishermen in this
artLsanal fishery. Membership in the Register gives the right to an individual fishing permit. New entry
to the official Register has been closed since the start of this new regulatory program. To obtain
membership, when the program started, fishermen had to fulfil some technical and legal conditions
which are subsequently enforced by local fishing authorities. When harvesting activities are allowed,
the fishing regulatory authority (SIJBPESCA) announces a total catch quota for that harvesting season.
The global quota is then automatically divided by equal parts among the valid members of the
Register. Between 1993-94, harvesting seasons have been opened twice each year, each time for
periods of approximately 4-6 weeks.
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TABLE 3.8
Evolution of the recent discussion on
the Chilean Fishing Law
Access regime and regulatory instruments	 Decision making mechanism
Law No. 18.892	 1) Full Exploitation Fsabene:	 - Declaration of full exploitation
(The Merino	 stage and auctioning of ITQs
Law)	 - Limited access, conditioned by the use of ITQa	 require technical approval from
allocated via historical nghts(75%) and public 	 SUBPESCA (resolutive power),
(Dec. 1989)	 auctions (25%).	 and an expert report from the
National Fishing Council
2) Other Th1aen:	 (consultative power).
- Free access, simple registration is required. 	 ______________________________
Aylwin's	 1) Full Exploitation flshenea: 	 - SUBPESCA has full resolutive
Government	 rights, and the National Fishing
Proposed Bill of	 - Limits on number of ships. 	 Council has only consultative
Law	 - Fishing effort regulations.	 powers.
- Use of ITQs allocated only via historical rrghis.
(July-Sept. 1990)
2) Other flaheries:
- Entry permission from the fishing authority is
______ required.	 _____________
1991 Law	 I) Full-Exploitation FIsheries:	 - SIJBPESCA can declare a fishery
(Sept.)	 in stage of full exploitation, and
- Free access, unless the fishing authority states the 	 auction ITQs, with the approval of
contrary (see decision mechanism). 	 both the National and Local Fishing
- Limitation of access means to put a limit on the	 Councils (absolute majority
fleets tonnage capacity. 	 required).
- Possiblebutnotcornpulsoryuseofglobalcatches - SUBPESCA can close access to
quotas.	 fisheries under full exploitation
- Possible but not compulsory use of ITQs, 	 stagewithapprovaloftwothirdsof
restricted to only a maximum of 50% of the	 the National and Local Fishing
global annual quota. Each year only 5% of the	 Councils.
global annual quota can be auctioned.	 - SUBPESCA can set annual global
quotas with the approval of the
2) Two other fisheries' status are created:	 majority of the National Fishing
fisheries Under recovery and in lnfant	 Council aixi upon consultation to
development: 	 the Local Fishing Council.
- SUBPESCA can auction lTQs in
- Use of ITQs on catches, allocated completely via 	 fisheries under recoveiy and in
public auctioning.	 infant development with the
approval of the majority of the
3) Other Fisheries: (traditional).
	
	 National Fishing Council and upon
consultation to the Local Fishing
- Fishing permit requirements. 	 Council.
SOIJRCES:Fishing Law, Tasc Report (1991), Jiles (1992). For more details on the 1991 Fishing Law, see Table
3.9.




Decision making mechanisms in the
1991 Fishing Law
Decision Area	 Requirements for legal	 Remarks
___________	 approval	 _________________________
(I)Declarabon	 - Fishing authority's technical report.
offiil	 - Absolute majority in Local and
exploitation	 National Fishing Councils.
stage:	 __________________________________ ______________________________________
(1.1) Access	 - 2/3 members approval in Local and - Access restrictions are transitory, with a
restrictions	 National Fishing Councils, 	 maximum duration of one year.
- Fishing authority's technical report.	 However, they can be extended each
______________	 time by one more year.
(1.2) Return to	 - Absolute majority in Local and
the general	 National Fishing Councils.
acceis regime.	 -Fishing authority's technical report. _________________________
(1.3)Global	 - Fishing authority's technical report. - If unexpected favourable natural
annual quotas	 - Consultation with Local Fishing	 phenomena occur, it is possible to
Councils	 increase the global quota with the
- Absolute majority in National	 approval of National Fishing Council.
_____________	 Fishing Council.
(1 .4)ITQs	 - Absolute majority in Local and - If ITQs are auctioned in a year, access
National Fishing Councils, 	 to the fishery is closed that year.
- Fishing authority's technical report. ___________________________
(II)Declaration	 - Fishing authority's technical report - If this stage is declared, previous fishing
of under	 - Consultation with Local Fishing 	 permits are finished.
recovery stage	 Councils.	 - During first year, 100% of the total
and ITQs (*)	 - Absolute majority in National 	 annual quota is auctioned.
___________ Fishing Council.
(ifi) Declaration	 - Fishing authority's technical report. - If this stage is declared, special
of infant	 - Consultation with Local Fishing 	 transitory permits (for three years) are
development	 Councils,	 given to those fishermen already
stage and ITQs	 - Absolute majority in National	 established hi the fishery. After that, a
(*)	 Fishing Council.	 new fishing permit is given for ten years
more.
- If there arc fishermen previously
established in the fishery, 90% of the
global annual quota is auctioned.
On the contrary, the whole quota
__________ _____________________ (100%) is auctioned.
SOURCE: Current Fishing Law.
() The declaration of this gage triggers the option to use fl'Q,.
120
Despite the uncertainties involved in the future performance of this new
regulatory framework, there are some lessons that can be drawn. This is what we
examine next.
(3.G.5) On sources of conflict and areas for improvement.
(3.G.5.a) Institutionalizing the increasing scarcity of common pool resources
History teaches us that the creation of private property is an endogenous and gradual
response to the increasing scarcity value of common pool resources originally treated
as free goods 1 . However, private property rights are not always the optimal (least
costly) institutional response to the increasing scarcity value of these resources. The
use of private property can sometimes involve significant costs. Private adjustments
in the optimal size and structure of the productive firms are an alternative response,
as are private contractual arrangements between firms. Regulatory schemes and the
corresponding legal rules are another option. Which will be the optimal solution for
internalizing the increasing scarcity values depends on industry specific conditions.
The constitutional controversy that arose in Chile with respect to the State's
rights to control access to marine fish stocks and to assign and sell full property
rights over them suggests the need to consider the efficient evolution of the legal
status of originally free available resources that change their scarcity values over time
and hence their alternative economic costs. Legislators need to define in a more
precise way the State's rights over these matters. This issue has far more general
applications than fishing industries.
In fact, this is a classical example of problems that legislations face when
originally free goods, or public goods which are not subject to congestion, are
transformed by increasing use into scarce resources. Externalities in consumption (air
and water pollution) or 'rival consumption' goods subject to commonality problems
(fish stocks) are only two examples.
"See, for instance, Libecap (1989), North (1990) and North and Thomas (1973).
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(3.G.5.b) Short run versus long run aims
Any regulatory framework faces the problem of formulating two types of strategies.
One is choosing the most efficient instruments when the regulated sector is
approaching expected long run industry's patterns. The other type involves regulatory
policies related to undesired short run disequilibria; for instance, when a government
decides to buy out a given percentage of an overcapitalized fishing fleet which is in
the hands of the private sector.
The temporal distinction between these types of regulatory strategy should give
a insight into the short run negotiations between regulators and the private sector. It
seems wise to divide the regulatory discussion between, first, trying to achieve an
agreement on what is desired in the long run (aims); and second, how we wish to and
can approach that situation (nieans and short run targets). This negotiation strategy
may reduce the likelihood of getting trapped in vicious circles of disagreement,
especially when the rates of temporal discount are high (as they normally are in
developing countries) and the stakes under dispute are significant.
(3.G.5.c) Distributive disputes
Any regulation that restricts access to a valuable resource, which up to then has been
freely available, is likely to give rise to socially costly distributional disputes.
Regulators have to be prepared to arbitrate among the competing claimants.
The distributional issue was clear in the recent Chilean controversy over
fishing regulations. Consider the Northern entrepreneurs's strong and systematic
opposition to ITQs proposals and access restrictions. Their opposition was one of the
main causes of the dismissal of the first two proposed bills.
There are no clear technical reasons to justify the different ITQ regulations
that were finally enacted and accepted for fisheries under fidi exploitation, versus
those under recovery or in infant development. However, there exists a clear and
important asymmetry between both types of fisheries. Only in fisheries under full
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exploitation status were there long-established firms, with significant harvesting levels
and with strong lobbying powers.
In these fisheries the prospect of losses, triggered by a more widespread use
of payment schemes to enjoy exclusive private harvesting, was clearly more
threatening for the incumbent firms. This perception of ITQs, by Northern
entrepreneurs, was reinforced by the overdepleted state of the Northern fish stocks
and the resulting desire of these firms to reallocate their harvesting operations more
intensively in the Southern fishing grounds. This specific feature helps us to
understand the recent Chilean failure in allocating fishing property rights based on
historical presence, despite the economic literature suggesting this allocation device
as a possible solution for the distributional disputes (see, for instance, Cropper and
Oates, 1992; Libecap, 1989).
When a country needs to institutionalize higher social scarcity values for
originally common pool resources, the regulatory authorities must be prepared to deal
with the policy challenges that can be triggered by the probable disputes about the
distribution of the income effects. From the regulator's perspective, the central
element of these challenges consists in helping to agree on and design Paretian
compensations for the losers that can emerge from the institutional recognition that
the common pool resource no longer has a zero shadow scarcity value.
The design of these compensation schemes must overcome two important
obstacles. First, there is a clear difficulty in attempting to assess the relevant value
of the costs and benefits that result from the regulatory changes. This is particularly
so at marine industrial fisheries, where firms' net income flows are affected by
uncertainty on Nature's states and rivals' actions. A clear corollary for fishing
regulatory authorities is the need to persevere with investments in information
gathering concerning the fishing sector. A second key obstacle relates to the
regulator's credibility to fulfil and to enforce the promised compensation schemes,
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once the new legal institutions have been set up. In order to make headway on this
issue, the regulatory authority needs to avoid discretionary policy improvisations82.
(3.H) Fmal remarks.
(3.H.1) Scope.
This chapter has not attempted to give a complete review of Chilean fishing
regulations. There is a whole set of more technical measures which have not been
mentioned in detail: seasonal and geographical closures for fishing activities; input
restrictions, such as regulations on fleet's harvesting capacity, or restrictions on the
type of gear and fishing nets, and restrictions on minimum catch sizes, among the
most important ones. A proper discussion of each of these instruments would take up
too much space. Our emphasis has been placed on access schemes and quota devices.
Both instruments deal directly with the problem of common property which is at the
heart of the fisheries issue.
In the analysis of these instruments we have emphasized the regulatory
problems that usually arise from the conificting interests and bargaining strength of
the private parties affected by the regulatory changes and the triggered modifications
of fonnal or informal property rights.
(3.H.2) Story of Chilean fishing history.
In Chile fishing regulation to solve common pool problems has generally taken
second place to public policy tasks with higher political priority. These included the
promotion of industrial development during the 1960s; and during most of the 1970s
and until the mid 1980s, reprivatization and reduction in the State's direct regulatory
role. This ranking of political priorities helps us to understand the persistence of
enforcement weaknesses in fishing regulations.
Policy credibility is a fashionable topics in the current literature on macro policy. See, for
instance, Persson and Tabellini (1990), Alesina and Tabellini (1988) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
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The persistence of a second place ranking for fishing regulation can be
partially understood as the result of a relatively high abundance of Chilean fish
populations, particularly before the growth of the fishing sector in the mid 1970s. It
is also plausible to argue that the resulting low policy profile for restrictive catch
regulations could have been partly the result of regulatory capture. We have
described the economic and political importance of the conglomerate that has direct
control over a significant proportion of the fishing industry in the Northern pelagic
fishing grounds where most of the disputes arose.
Some of the peculiar features (section 3.G.4) of the new fishing law that
emerged from the recent Chilean controversies over fishing regulations support the
arguments of regulatory capture. This conjecture confirms the importance of the
disputes that are usually triggered by regulatory authorities' attempts to restrict access
and to regulate the increasing scarcity values of common pool marine fisheries.
(3.H.3) Distributional conflicts: feasible regulations.
The recent Chilean controversy over fishing regulations highlights the
importance of transaction costs based regulatory constraints when a government (or
the interest groups that elected that representative body) aims at improving the
economic efficiency of a given institutional arrangement. In the Chilean case,
distributional disputes over the fishing regulations were a binding regulatory
constraint because it was costly to design side payments or Paretian compensation
schemes for the potential losers. These compensation schemes were a costly or
binding mechanism design problem for the government because the negotiations faced
significant transaction costs. The sources for these transaction costs can be traced out,
and related to, asymmetric and incomplete information sets. This is a lesson already
established in the increasing literature on informational economics (see Gravelle and
Rees, 1992, chapter 22; Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
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A clear corollary that arises from this lesson is the misleading welfare
evaluations that can result from using first-best optimality prescriptions. The
possibility of misleading conclusions is directly related to the presence of significant
transaction or informational costs. When transactions are not informationally costless,
welfare prescriptions must consider constrained optimality yardsticks (see, for
instance, Arnott and Stiglitz, 1986; Farrel, 1987) which take account of the relevant
constraints on information sets and the feasible regulatory instruments which are
available to the regulatory authority.
In terms of the regulation of common pool resources, this general principle
implies that regulators cannot expect to eliminate the distributional conflicts that arise
from restricting entry and introducing positive pricing for the use of these resources.
The regulators' objective should be to reduce these conflicts, while simultaneously
aiming to obtain some partial (constrained) improvement in the pricing of the
common pool resource.
Given these distributionally oriented constraints, a relevant criterion in the
evaluation of alternative regulatory instruments should therefore be that the chosen
instrument(s) can be implemented and enforced without causing too disruptive or
socially costly conflicts. If conflicts persist, the authorities' efforts should then be
devoted to reduce the informational asymmetries which lie at the origins of the
unsettled distributional disputes.
(3.11.4) The 1991 Chilean fishing law.
Despite the binding constraints on the fishing regulator, that resulted from the
political solution arrived at for the distributive disputes among the different private
interests involved in the recent controversies, it is plausible that the new fishing law
offers the possibility of net allocative gains when it is compared with the previous
legal setting.
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First, the main achievement from the recent reforms is the creation of a more
unified and more coherent regulatory framework. over time this benefit probably
outweighs the specific imperfections that we have already mentioned with respect to
the new fishing law. In fact, all these imperfections are avoidable or subject to
gradual improvements. Increasing empirical evidence on the effective operation of
this new fishing law can help to advance in this direction.
However, to do so requires that this more coherent legal setting generates
more consistent and hence more credible fishing policy decisions. This requires a
two-sided balance: on the one hand, the fishing authorities' credible commitment to
fliffil and enforce the policy aims and legal procedures which are considered by the
new fishing law; on the other, the private sector's credible commitment to abide by
and cooperate with the decision making mechanisms and the enforcement of the
agreed on regulations.
A more cooperative interaction between the regulatory authority and the
regulated firms would probably help to reduce the transaction costs which are derived
from informationally costly distributional disputes. Lower transaction costs tend to
increase, ceteris paribus, the efficiency in the enforcement of regulatory aims. The
private sector's participation in the decision making process of several key regulatory
decisions may help to improve the outcomes from such interactions. However, the
final result will depend upon the magnitude of the distributional pressures which will
be triggered by new regulatory efforts to internalize the increasing scarcity of the
more depleted common pool fish stocks.
There exists a second line of arguments that leads us to expect a more efficient
performance from the current fishing law compared with earlier experiences. These
arguments refer to the circumstances under which the new law was finally enacted.
First, this law arose after a long and widespread discussion on fishing
regulations. This had not occurred in Chile, at such a scale, in the previous two
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decades. As a consequence this discussion has produced a partial improvement in the
understanding of the key issues subject to controversy.
Second, for the first time over a long period, the issue of fishing regulations
was perceived as a national problem with 'high' political priority: the new fishing law
was the first main law enacted by the recently elected democratic government, after
16 years of military dictatorship.
Third, the long controversy tended to produce a more widespreal perception
that some of the key Chilean fish stocks are scarcer than in the previous decades.
However, it still remains to be seen if the three latter arguments will
effectively translate themselves into future stronger political support for the
enforcement of binding catch regulations, especially when they affect incumbent firms
with significant lobbying powers. The relevance, in the recent past, of arguments in
the line of regulatory capture lead us to be cautious. It may be worth to quote one
of the conclusions of Libecap's (1989, p.3) study of contracting for property rights:
".. .both economic theory and history provide reasons for believing that the net social
gains from changes in property rights at any time will be quite modest. N
(3.11.5) Other countries' experiences.
The Chilean experience in regulating marine industrial fisheries does not differ
qualitatively from the main problems that fishing regulators have also faced in other
countries. The economic literature on common pooi marine industrial fisheries83
' Three analyses of problems of contracting for property rights at common pool natural resource
sectors, including the analysis of attempts to regulate access and to enforce catch quotas, e Libecap
(1989), Eggertsson (1990) and Ostrom (1990). These three studies combine theoretical principles with
information on different in-depth case studies. While the former two include analyses of small-scale
artisanal as well as marine industrial fisheries, Ostrom's study basically concentrates on small-scale
common pooi resource sectors. As a consequence of this, Ostrom puts greater emphasis upon the
possibilities for successful self-organized collective actions aimed at improving the economic
exploitation of these resources. For additional detailed institutional analyses of the regulatory problems
encountered at common pool marine industrial fisheries, see Swanson (1992) and, especially, Wise
(1984) and Miles (1989).
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describes a general trend towards a prolonged persistence of open access and
common property conditions, as the result of the existence of:
(i) high exclusion costs, especially for migratory fish species,
(ii) high internal governance costs among the fishermen with access to the common
pool resource; for instance, think of the problems to self-organize collective
regulatory actions among numerous fishermen with heterogeneous fishing skills, and
(iii) a long-standing legal protection, enforced by the state, of open access to fisheries
by all citizens (most of the times with justification on equity grounds). The case of
US fisheries is widely mentioned as an example of this latter point (Libecap, 1989
and Eggertsson, 1990).
Libecap (1989), Wise (1984), and the series of papers in Miles (1989) are
also particularly clear in emphasizing the importance of the regulatory constraints that
arise from the distributional disputes triggered by the restrictions on access and
catches that fishing regulators attempt to implement and enforce. Related to this,
Libecap (1989) concludes that:
(iv) the concentration of the current and proposed distribution of the rights to exploit
the common poo1 resource, and
(v) the informational asymmetries that surround the negotiations of those rights
among the affected parties,
are factors that, added to (i), (ii) and (iii), create new sources of problems that tend
to intensify the distributional disputes triggered by changes in property rights.
However, as the common pool losses (rent dissipation) increase so do the gains
from additional access restrictions. Therefore, the accumulated experiences around
the world also show (as in the Chilean case) a gradual, but still socially costly in
terms of distributional disputes, evolution from free access towards regulations based
' The quoted taxonomy is best descnbed in Eggertsson (1990, chapter 8).
'5 Among this series of papers, Gulland's essay offers particularly clear insights.
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on entry restrictions, improved enforcement of individual fishing licenses and direct
controls on incumbent firms' fishing efforts, and afterwards towards global catch
quotas.
Each new control on fishing effort and catch restriction has tended to face
opposition from incumbent firms. But the increasing depletion of fish populations led
these firms to finally benefit and hence accept the collective global controls.
However, there is ample evidence that despite the use of global instruments of control
a serious inefficient rent dissipation continues. It is also true that each of these
regulatory instruments has specific advantages as well as disadvantages, where the
net balance between them is usually highly specific to the individual fishery. As
Ostrom (1990) emphasizes, industry specific institutional details are very important
in the analysis of changes in the property rights of common pool natural resources.
In some cases, most of them since the mid 1980s, the slow evolution of
property structures in marine industrial fisheries had led to the successful
enforcement of individual catch quotas. Some examples are the cases of marine
industrial fisheries in Iceland (herring fishery; ITQ5 since 1988), Australia (bluefin
tuna fishery, a transboundary fishery that is shared with Japan and New Zealand;
ITQs since the early 1980s) and, especially, New Zealand (since 1986, New Zealand
has the most complete system of ITQs in the world, covering the regulation of 32
fish species).
For example, despite the generalized criticism with respect to the inefficiencies of using global
fishing regulations, there are some cases where their use seems to have produced reasonable regulatory
results. Along this line, Gomez-Lobo and Jiles (1991) quote the case of the Japanese regulation for
offshore migratory species fisheries, where global catch quotas are combined with boat-specific fishing
licenses. We were not able to find detailed inforntion about the specific institutional details involved
in this case.
For original references, see Gomez-Lobo (1991), Scott (1988), Eggertsson (1990). For a
detailed account of the case of New Zealand, see Clark, Major and Mollet (1988).
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All these cases share the important common feature that ITQs were finally
implemented and successfully enforced, despite the original opposition from
incumbent firms, after a feeling of crisis (meaning a severe deterioration of the catch
per unit of fishing effort) was perceived and accepted on an overall basis by the main
economic agents involved in the regulatory negotiations.
In the successful case of New Zealand, historical rights were used as the key
criterion for the initial allocation of ITQs (this is a common feature with the other
successful implementations of ITQs). JTQs were defined as permanent rights over an
absolute catch tonnage with the aim of minimizing firms' opposition. An enforcement
system, based on cross-checking audit techniques, was implemented (the new Chilean
enforcement system for catch controls is based on this experience). A national fish
quota trading exchange was created with the support of public and private
institutions.
Using the latter institution, at the start of the ITQs system the government
bought back a proportion of ITQs from private firms so as to reduce the total fishing
efforts and aggregate catches. The government's budgetary capacity to do so was an
important factor, according to Clark, Major and Mollet (1988), in contributing to the
initial success of this JTQs system.
The latter point is again related to the key influence of distributional issues on
the fishing regulators' policy-making. This is consistent with the story of Chilean
fishing regulations, which confirms the vision of property rights changes as
endogenous and politically determined collective responses to the changing scarcity
net values of originally common pool resources. The concept of "net" values not only
considers traditional production costs, but also takes into account the exclusion,
governance and enforcement costs which are directly related to the implementation
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Appendix 3.2.B
FigureB % Shares in Industry Catches
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MOTIVATION AND STRUCTURE FOR OLIGOPOLY MODELS
(4.A) Introduction
In this chapter we explain the main motivations leading us to develop the oligopoly
harvesting models offered in chapters 5 and 6. We also explain some of the key
assumptions of these oligopoly models.
In the following chapters we develop two basic models, one static and the
other dynamic, that analyse the issue of overfishing within a multi-firm harvesting
fishery subject to a common property fish stock. Each firm's harvesting decision is
summarized in the choice of a single variable input that we call fishing effort. We
develop these models within a deterministic oligopoly setting. Our analysis compares
the relative overfishing ranking between noncooperative Coumot-Nash and
Stackelberg harvesting equilibria. In our analysis noncooperative harvesting implies
that externalities, originating from common property fish stocks, are not fully
internalized by each firm's harvesting decision.
Section (4.B) describes the main motivations and key assumptions that lead
to the models of chapters 5 and 6. Oligopoly equilibrium concepts, firms' price
taking behaviour, closed entry and optimality benchmarks are some of the key
assumptions which are described and justified. Section (4.C) comments on the
exclusion of processing stages from our fishery models in chapters 5 and 6. This
section also describes evidence (additional to the analysis in section 3.C) that suggests
the presence of industrial concentration in some important marine industrial fisheries.
Section (4.D) offers a final remark.
(4.B) Motivations and key assumptions.
Why are we interested in comparing noncooperative Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg
harvesting equilibria? Our main motivation arises from the intent to develop a formal
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and consistent framework aimed at analysing the traditional and intuitive proposition
that the common property of fish stocks introduces incentives to overdeplete the
common pool natural resource. In this endeavour, by assumption, we preclude the
possibility of cooperative harvesting strategies aimed at internalizing the externality
effects brought about by the common property feature. Our main focus is on the case
of common property marine industrial fisheries, where the evidence in favour of
successful, in the sense of self-enforced and/or credible, cooperative harvesting
agreements is very scarce indeed (for instance, see Swanson, 1992).
The reasons underlying the absence of self-enforced or credible cooperative
agreements in marine industrial fisheries seem to be related to the costs of preventing
free riding or defections from collective cooperative agreement in harvesting. These
costs are generated by the need to monitor each firm's harvesting and to punish
deviations from each individual firm's harvesting quota. We will not pursue an
explicit modeffing of these costs. Instead, it suffices for our purposes to suppose that
these costs tend to increase with either the number of firms with access to the
common pool resource, the size of the harvesting marine area, or the degree of
heterogeneity across the firms' harvesting technologies (see Fisher, 1981, ch. 3;
Eggertsson, 1990, ch. 4 and 8; Libecap, 1989, ch.5).
Within the context of non-cooperative harvesting outcomes, the traditional
research on fisheries (for instance, Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955 and Weitzman, 1974)
has usually assumed open access conditions and decentralized multi-firm harvesting
such that each harvesting firm is assumed to behave as an static optimizing agent. In
most occasions the analysis considers decreasing harvesting returns at the aggregate
or industry level use of a single variable input. By adding the open access condition
to this technological feature, it is possible to derive overproduction propositions when
the industry's harvesting equilibrium is compared to the optimal solution. However,
none of these traditional analyses have explicitly considered strategic features in the
harvesting competition for the freely available Ricardian rents of the common pool
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resource. By contrast, in the following two chapters we will focus our attention on
comparing different types of strategic interactions among harvesting firms. In our
discussion, the concept of strategic interactions is meant to imply oligopolistic
harvesting games within multi-firm and deterministic common property fisheries.
Since the early 1980s an increasing number of papers have modelled the
overdepletion of common pool fish stocks by resorting to the use of Nash type
conjectures within multi-firm oligopoly fisheries, subject to decreasing returns on
the use of a single variable input. In the following chapters we review some of these
analyses, within static and dynamic frameworks. The intuitive reasoning underlying
this type of analysis relates to the informal proposition that a sufficiently large
number of firms with access to the common pooi resource, such that each of these
firms harvests a sufficiently small proportion of the total common property resource,
will tend not to internalize the harvesting interdependencies across firms that arise
from the commonality of fish stocks. In static models these interdependencies are
usually modelled as congestion problems, even though several of these models do not
offer an explicit modelling of the externality issue. In fact, congestion is frequently
modelled as implicitly implying decreasing returns on the aggregate (industry level)
use of a single variable input. In dynamic settings, externality problems are usually
modelled as arising from the effect of firms' current harvesting on the future
availability of the common property fish stock.
However, few efforts have been devoted to generalizing the Nash overfishing
outcomes to other oligopolistic or, more generally, strategic settings. In the following
chapters we review some analyses of oligopolistic harvesting games subject to non-
Nash strategic conjectures. Among them, a few models that have extended their
analysis to leader-follower settings or Stackelberg equilibria. Our efforts in the next
two chapters are devoted to further advance on this line of research. More precisely,
we will study the relative overfishing ranking between Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash
harvesting games in static and dynamic contexts. We aim to analyse how different
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structures of harvesting incentives can change the overfishing ranking between these
two equilibrium concepts. But why is the study of Stackelberg equilibria an
interesting exercise with respect to the overdepletion of common pool marine
resources? The answer arises from the second source of motivation that underlies our
interest in comparing Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg overflshing outcomes: industrial
concentration.
In chapter 3 we have described examples of marine industrial fisheries subject
to the presence of industrial concentration. In section (4.C) we offer additional
evidence which suggests that industrial concentration in marine industrial fisheries
seems not to be such an uncommon feature. In our discussion industrial concentration
loosely implies the presence of large firms, relative to the industry's size, in the
harvesting sector. Hence oligopoly rather than perfectly competitive models may be
appropriate.
Cournot-Nash harvesting models can accommodate competition among the
few. In the following two chapters we review some fishery models that develop this
line of thought. The use of Nash type conjectures is frequently justified as a
reasonable approximation for fishing industries such that each firm tends to perceive
its own harvesting as negligible in comparison with the industry's total catches. By
this token, the assumption of rivals' insensitivity to marginal changes in individual
firms' harvesting seems to be justified.
However, when we encounter fishing industries where one firm, or a group
of equity and managerially related firms, controls either forty, fifty or even sixty per
cent of the industry's total harvesting, the justification for rivals' insensitivity to
changes in the harvesting strategy of these large firms becomes implausible. In these
cases we should probably consider alternative models of strategic interactions across
harvesting firms with access to the common pool resource, rather than only those
defined by Nash conjectures. Our consideration of Stackelberg equilibria is justified
on these grounds.
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There are plenty of other possibilities to account for model refinements aimed
at considering the harvesting impacts from relatively large firms. The different
modeffing possibilities are related to the definition attached to the concept of a large
or dominant firm. For instance, and only to mention a few possibilities, we could
consider dominant firms who base their dominance, or leadership, and strategic
behaviour upon either (i) the access to some specific technological advantage, or (ii)
their endowment with advantageous private information sets, or (iii) the possibility
of exerting price setting powers in segregated markets or markets subject to some
type of price discrimination. However, in our models we do not consider any of these
options. We rule out any explicit modelling of (asymmetric) informational
advantages, given our focus on deterministic models. The issue of technological
advantages will be considered in a very simple way; that is, by introducing a scaling
factor within the firms' harvesting technologies such that it will imply a productivity
advantage in favour of the firm defined as the leader. Our models will consider price
taking harvesting firms, both in output and input market&. We explain this choice in
the next paragraphs.
In keeping with the above, we summarize the idea of a large or dominant firm
by resorting to the definition of Stackelberg leadership attributes. This implies that
we will assume the existence of a leading firm, the leader, that is endowed with a
first mover advantage over his rivals, the followers. The first mov advantage will
consist in the leader's ability to credibly convnit to a given harvesting strategy over
a given time period. The follower firms know the leader's commitment or signalling
policy. The leader also knows each follower's reaction to his signalling policy.
'In standard oligopoly models firms face a negative sloped industry demand curve. In this setting
the strategic interaction among firms is captured by the pecuniary externalities that firms impose on
each other, via the effect of individual firm outputs on the industry price. In our models with price
taking firms, the source of strategic interactions stems from technological externalities, that each firm's
harvesting imposes on her rivals' harvesting, arising from common property fish docks. Despite this
difference with standard oligopoly models, in our analysis we can use the same type of oligopoly
modelling strategies.
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Followers will behave according to Nash type conjectures, and they will not be
allowed to collude as an equilibrium strategy. These features are standard conditions
within Stackelberg models.
Let us turn now to three other important features that will be common to our
modelling in the chapters that follow.
(4.B.1) Price taking behaviour.
Our analysis considers price taking harvesting firms in both input and output markets,
even when we introduce the presence of a Stackelberg leading firm. Chapter 1 has
already described the theoretical inquiry underlying the choice of this assumption.
This assumption is also motivated by the industrial structure of the specific maiine
industrial fisheries that initially led to our interest in the overfishing issue: the
Chilean pelagic fisheries involved in fish meal production (chapter 3).
Fish meal is a commodity mainly used to feed livestock and in some fish
farming (e.g., the salmon industry). In the Chilean case, this is an almost 100 per
cent export industry that essentially considers its selling prices as given. The price
taking behaviour is mainly explained by a high degree of demand substitution that
exists between fish meal and other substitutes such as soybean meal 2. Consequently,
hereinafter we will suppose that our models in chapters 5 and 6 consider a common
poo1 fishery that produces a fish meal type product such that the selling price is
exogenous to the industry and hence to each firm's production decision.
In the case of input markets for harvesting firms we also assume price taking
behaviour. We assume there is a single variable input: fishing effirt. We could justify
this composite input in a variety of ways. The simplest is to assume that different
variable inputs are used in fixed proportions (e.g., working capital, labour related
2 This feature tends to nullify any possibility of price setting powers due to concentration on the
supply side. In 1992, Chilean fish meal exports represented a third of the world total exports of this
commodity. In terms of world production, Chilean fish meal production represented 19.4% of that
total in 1992 (Calfucura and Jiles, 1994).
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inputs, boats' fuel, operational depreciation of fishing nets, gears and other specific
fishing equipments). We do not formally model fixed inputs or fixed costs.
Technological indivisibilities can only be indirectly inferred from decreasing returns
in the use of the variable input fishing effort. The exclusion of fixed costs is
consistent with our modelling of the total number of firms with access to the common
property resource as an exogenous variable.
The price taking behaviour of harvesting firms in input markets (in our
models, the market for fishing efforts) seems to be a plausible assumption when we
consider numerous small harvesting firms, which may be modelled as behaving
according to Nash type conjectures. In the case of adding the existence of a
relatively large harvesting firm versus the other firms, that will be modelled as a
Stackelberg oligopoly equilibrium, we might wish to consider the possibility of the
large firm enjoying price setting powers in input markets. However, for the sake of
simplicity our modelling efforts will exclude this option. We could suppose, for
instance, that fishing effort units are sufficiently mobile that they can move to other
fishing grounds and/or fishing industries3.
(4.B.2) Closed entry.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider common property fisheries subject to closed entry. We do
not model the decision making mechanism that determines the closed entry solution.
This implies that the total number of firms with access to the common pool resource
is an exogenous variable. We do so partly motivated by the widespread increasing
worldwide trend, which has prevailed since the early 1980s, to control the access to
national marine fisheries (Scott, 1988; Wilen, 1988). Our case study of Chilean
pelagic fisheries ratifies this trend (chapter 3).
For the case of fishermen's labour efforts, the assumption of a relatively high geographical
mobility seems to be realistic. We have veiified this feature, for the case of Chilean industrial pelagic
fisheries, in discussions with fishing entrepreneurs who work in these fisheries (personal interviews
carried out during 1993-94).
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This assumption will also help us to study how increases in the number of
firms with access to the common pool fish stock modify the harvesting incentives
faced by different types (leader/follower; static/dynamic profit optimizer) of non-
cooperative harvesting firms. For instance, this type of analysis will allow us to
explore whether or not static optimizing behaviour is the limiting case of a dynamic
Coumot-Nash multi firm fishery as the number of firms increases (chapter 6).
(4.B.3) Optimality benchmarks.
We follow the standard first best optimality yardstick used in overfishing analyses.
This yardstick defines efficiency as corresponding to the harvesting decisions taken
by a social planner who is institutionally costless, as well informed as private firms,
and with full control over the industry's total harvesting fleet (see, for instance,
Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Clark, 1980; Levhari and Mirman, 1980). In models with
price taking behaviour, this definition is equivalent, in terms of harvesting outcomes,
to the case of a profit maximizing sole owner of fish stocks. This optimality yardstick
implies, by definition, a full internalization of any externality effect that may arise
from the common property of fish stocks.
The oligopoly harvesting models in chapters 5 and 6 also consider second best
welfare solutions to assess the inefficiencies related to overfishing. These solutions
are defined by welfare optimization problems where a social planner has control only
upon a limited number of harvesting firms within the common pool fishery. This type
of exercise aims to illustrate arguments of constrained optimality, where a fishing
regulator has limited control and enforcement powers upon the regulated firms'
actions.
(4.C) Industrial concentration in marine industrial fisheries: additional evidence.
Section (3.C) has already described the phenomena of industrial concentration and
vertical integration that we encounter in the two most important Chilean marine
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industrial fisheries. Table 3.6 accounts for the case of the Southern pelagic fishery,
while Appendix 3.2.B plots the shares, in regional annual catches, of the main multi-
firm fishing conglomerate which operates in the Northern pelagic fishery. In both
fisheries, the ten biggest individual firms concentrate more than 50 per cent of the
industry's total production.
Using the latter as an arbitrary yardstick for the presence of industrial
concentration4, this section describes evidence that suggests the presence of industrial
concentration in two other important marine industrial fisheries: (i) the Peruvian
anchovy fish meal fishery during the mid- and late-1960s and during the early 1970s,
and (ii) the US tuna fishery, during the 1970s.
Before going into details, we briefly comment on the research approach that,
until recently, has dominated the study of the issue of industrial concentration in
industrial fisheries; that is, the harvesting effects of having processing sectors with
price setting powers in the market for raw fish catches.
(4.C.1) Monopsonistic powers in the market for catches.
The more traditional research approach to the issue of industrial concentration in
fisheries has consisted in exploring the effects of economies of scale in the processing
stages of fishing industries. The pioneering key work was Crutchfield and
4 This is obviously an arbitrary definition of industrial concentration. But our purpose is just to
define a clear yardstick to compare with the Concentration ratios that we encounter in the industrial
fisheries analysed. The Concentration ratio (CR) is one of the simplest ways to measure industrial
concentration. It simply sums over the shares, usually with respect to industry output, sales or some
other variable that measures scale of operation, of a given number of firms within an industry. See
Waterson (1984, ch.9), Stigler (1983, ch.4), Saving (1970), Hannah and Kay (1977, cbs. 2 and 4),
and Scherer (1980, ch.3), for analyses and further references on this measure of concentration and
other alternative indexes. Stigler ( l983 ,p.3O) mentions that the first industrial censuses (mid 1930s)
considered CR for the four largest firms (in US), for the three largest (in UK), and in Cana1a the
number of firms necessary to account for 80 per cent of industry output. More modern analyses tend
to consider CR (in terms of shares of industry output) for a number of firms that varies between the
largest 4 to the largest 20 firms. (Stigler, 1983, p.3, and Scherer, 1980, p.57).
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Pontecorvo's (1969) book on the Pacific salmon fisheries. These authors concentrated
on studying the harvesting consequences of an increasing returns to scale processing
sector with monopsonistic price powers in the market for raw fish catches. Although
their study have no explicit model, their key conjecture was that a fully
monopsonistic processing firm, when confronting a non-colluding (competitive) multi-
firm harvesting sector, could achieve a Pareto efficient harvesting of a common pool
fish stock, even if processing and harvesting firms were not vertically integrated.
The basic intuitive reasoning was that the price setting powers in the hands
of the monopsonistic processor would allow him to appropriate, and hence
internalize, the fish stock's rents that otherwise would be dissipated by the
competitive, and hence passive bargainer, harvesting sector. Therefore, an
intertemporal profit-optimizing monopsonistic processor, using social discount rates,
could achieve a Pareto optimal harvesting path by choosing a suitable price path for
harvests. The empirical fact that many fisheries with oligopsonistic processing sectors
were "manifestly not run in a socially optimal manner" (Munro, 1982b, p.188) could
be ascribed, according to Crutchfield and Pontecorvo's proposition, to the fact that
the oligopsonies were, contrary to appearances, weak. If this reading were right,
striking policy implications could be derived. Instead of persevering with ineffective
as well as inefficient restricted entry programs aimed at the harvesting sector alone5,
these conjectures could suggest that policy should be aimed at increasing the
monopsony power of processors6.
Later analyses have qualified the conditions under which these arguments can
be valid. Critical analyses and additional refinements of the Crutchfield and
Pontecorvo's proposition can be found in Clark and Munro (1980), who focus their
analysis on the overconservation effects, in a Pareto inefficiency sense, that
On studies about these inefficiencies, see the references quoted in chapter 3.
6 lhis idea was first raised in Cassidy (1973).
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monopsonistic price powers bring about, when the harvesting sector faces increasing
marginal costs as the industry's harvest rate increases. As a result of this, Clark and
Munro's first best policy corresponds to full vertical integration7. A similar
conclusion is obtained by Munro (1982b) when exploring the case of a bilateral
monopoly (cooperative) bargaining game, for the fish stock's rents, between a
monopsonistic processor and a monopolized (fully collusive) harvesting sector.
Schworm (1983) generalizes Clark and Munro (1980) by adding (i) a (static)
congestion externality problem, and (ii) asymmetric convex production technologies
across harvesting firms. By doing so, Schworm proves that a full monopsony in the
processing stage need not lead to a first best outcome when features (i) and (ii) are
present. In this case, Schworm argues that Pareto efficiency would require control
over the harvest rates of each individual firm, while the monopsonist has, in general,
only a single instrument, the price for harvests, which is common to all harvesting
firms. Finally, Stollery (1987) explicitly introduces entry and/or exit costs within the
harvesting sector and argues that this non-perfect malleability feature is a necessary
condition for the validity of the over conservation effect and hence the vertical
integration first best proposition stated in Clark and Munro's (1980) analysis.
Notwithstanding the potential relevance of the issue of processing fishing
sectors subject to increasing returns to scale, in the following chapters we do not
consider the issue of monopsonistic price powers in the market for catches. This is
motivated by the sake of simplicity and modelling tractability. By doing so, we
concentrate on the study of oligopolistic interactions within a (one-sector) harvesting
fishery that exploits a common property fish stock. We aim to specialize our
discussion on the overfishing outcomes that might be anticipated from the presence
of concentration at the harvesting sector and, hence, from some plausible resulting
7 !n order to assure the validity of this first best prescription it is necessary to assume that: (1) the
monopsonistic processor has a discount rate which is identical to the social rate of discount, (2) the
harvesting sector is perfectly competitive and subject to increasing marginal costs of harvesting, and
(3) the processor is a price taking firm in her selling market.
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oligopoly harvesting equilibria. With this objective we compare overfishing results
under Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
Let us now turn to the additional empirical evidence in favour of industrial
concentration in the harvesting stage of marine industrial fisheries.
(4.C.2) The Peruvian anchovy fishery.
Between the mid 1960s and early 1970s this fishery's harvests were the largest in the
world (Idyll, 1973). Anchovies were used in the production of fish meal and fish oil.
It was in 1972-73 that the economic collapse of this fishery took place (see Thorp and
Bertram, 1978; Clark, 1981 and Fitzgerald, 1979). The collapse happened after a
prolonged period of free access and increasing industry catches that were combined,
during 1972-73, with a significant negative shock from the "El Nifio" marine
phenomenon. Table 4.1 provides an idea of the magnitude of this collapse problem:
from a maximum annual catch of 12 million tons in 1970, the annual harvest of
Peruvian anchovies fell to less than 2 million tons in 1973. In the following decade
(1974-84) the average annual catch was only 1.6 million tons.
Despite de facto open access, there is evidence of increasing industrial
concentration within this industry, although only manifested as a clear trend as from
1966g. Some historical descriptions of this phenomenon can be found in Roemer
(1970; pp.72-89), Fitzgerald (1979, p.113-114), Thorp and Bertram (1978, pp. 242-
250) and Abramovich (1973). From the last two works we extract the concentration
numbers that are offered in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.2 shows that between 1966-
70 the share of the 'top producers' in total fish meal production ranged from 61 to
82 per cent. We could not clarify the precise definition of 'top producers' which is
used by a Peruvian annual Fishing Report. However, by using the detailed
information in Abraniovich (1973), for the year 1968, we calculated the
corresponding shares, for different producers' ownership types, of the 10 biggest
$ This fishery started its industrial operation in 1957 (Idyll, 1973).
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firms within the Peruvian fish meal industry. Summing up, over the different
ownership types, we see that in 1968 the top 10 producers controlled 51 per cent of
the industry's production. This percentage leads us to deduce that the definition of
'top producers' in Table 4.2 must cover a greater set than the 'top ten'. Despite the
latter ambiguity, these numbers clearly suggest an industry under some degree of
industrial concentration. Most of the main producers had also vertically integrated
both processing and harvesting operations (see studies above cited).
(4.C.3) The US tuna fishery.
Our key source with respect to this fishery is Gallick's (1984) study, in which the
main concern is the efficiency of exclusive dealing and other vertical arrangements
between processors and harvesters in the US tuna canning industry. Nonetheless, for
our current purposes it suffices to quote two short paragraphs from Gallick's study:
.. .concentration at the processing level was relatively high. In 1952,
for example, three major canners ... accounted for 70-75 per cent of
total canned tuna production in the Southern California area. A few
large processors were alleged to control domestic tuna canning and
harvesting." (page 79; the italics is ours).
and
"Between 1973 and 1978, four firm concentration at the processing
level averaged 79 per cent with the top two processors controlling
over 60 per cent of canned tuna sales. No entry at the processing stage
occurred during this penod despite major additions of plants and
vessels by the top three processors" (page 81).
Although the numbers quoted are with respect to the concentration issue in the
processing sector, the author's analysis of vertical contracting issues allows us to
deduce that the concentration in processing operations was also relevant within the
harvesting sector. In fact, Gallick's study offers diverse examples of processors'
control devices over the boat owners' harvesting operations. Several of these control
devices were directly related to processors' equity rights in harvesting firms.
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Share of the main firms in total fishmeal output, 1966-70
(percentages)
Firms in the "Top Producers" List
Producers
(1)	 (2) (3)	 (4)	 notWholly-	 Joint foreign- Peruvian	 Total	 consideredforeign	 Peruvian
1966	 17.4	 14.5	 28.9	 60.8	 39.2
1968	 23.1	 9.9	 40.9	 73.9	 26.1
1969	 24.0	 10.3	 47.6	 81.9	 18.1
1970	 20.4	 5.1	 49.1	 74.6	 25.4
Notes:
Calculated from the lists of top producers published in Anuario d.c Pesca (Fishing
Yearbook) (1965-6), p.148; Peruvian Times, Fisheries Number, Oct. 20, 1967, (p.7;
Fisheries Supplement, Mar.28, 1969, pp.20-i; Fisheries Supplement, July 24, 1970,
p.5'7; and Fisheries Supplement, Mar.3, 1972, p.68.
The definitions used are copied from Abramovich (1973).
Source: R. Thorp, G. Bertram (1978, p.249).
TABLE 4.3
Peruvian anchovy fishery
Share of 10 biggest firms in total fishmeal output, 1968
NFimns
(1) Non-elite Peruvian Entrepreneurs 	 28.0	 4
(2) Traditional Peruvian elite	 5.7	 2
(3) Wholly-foreign firms	 11.7	 2




"A processor entrant may find it difficult to obtain a domestic source
of supply. Existing processors owned or controlled 80 per cent of the
domestic fleet during the 1972-77 period. The remaining vessels,
except for six, were under contract to one of the major processors"
(p.85).
Despite the ambiguity related to the specific concentration levels involved in
the harvesting sector, it seems to us that the information provided by Gallick is clear
with respect to the presence of a significant concentration in harvesting operations.
(4.D) Final remark.
The empirical evidence described in sections (3.C) and 4.C) suggests the
presence of industrial concentration in a series of important marine industrial
fisheries. This evidence suggests that Cournot-Nash equilibria, which are more
appropriate for a large number oligopoly case, may not be sensible for some fisheries
with high industrial concentration. Therefore, there arises the need for models with
more active features of strategic interaction. A hierarchical Stackelberg equilibrium
is the simplest of these models. In the following two chapters we use this notion of
oligopoly equilibrium as a first attempt to investigate the implications of common
pool harvesting fisheries subject to industrial concentration. We study these
implications by comparing overfishing results under Cournot-Nash settings and
Stackelberg equilibria. In the latter case, we simplify the illustration of a fishery
under industrial concentration by assuming the existence of a single harvesting firm
endowed with Stackelberg leadership attributes.
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CHAPTER 5
OVERFISHING IN A STATIC SEr rING.
(5.A) Introduction.
In this chapter we explore overfishing in a static and deterministic framework. We
concentrate on analysing the overfishing ranking of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg
equilibria. The Cournot-Nash setting is intended to approximate a decentralized and
non-cooperative multi-firm fishery, while the Stackelberg equilibrium is meant to
imply a non-cooperative fishery subject to industrial concentration, where a leading
firm is a Stackelberg leader. In the timeless setting of this chapter, overfishing is
modelled by building a congestion externality into the harvesting technology. The
externality feature arises as a result of the commonality of fish stocks.
The timeless structure in this chapter precludes an explicit analysis of the
stock externality effect as the source of overfishing outcomes (see Clark, 1976, ch.3).
The effect that the industry's current total harvesting has on the future levels of fish
stocks will be addressed in chapter 6. We have followed the strategy of starting our
analysis within a timeless setting, with a view to gain a better understanding of how
the introduction of time and dynamic arguments can act upon the overfishing ranking
of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. The timeless setting of this chapter is
consistent with assuming that each firm maximizes her profits in each period without
considering the impact of current total harvesting on the future levels of the fish
stock. By additionally imposing the condition that all the parameters in the model are
time invariant, the firm's optimization problem will be the same for each time period.
Therefore, we can exclude an explicit notation for time indexes and solve the model
in a fully static fashion.
The analysis of Pareto inefficient overproduction propositions, given the
presence of common property resources and congestion problems has a long history.
Recall the classic controversy of the 1920s between Pigou (1932) and Knight (1924),
154
with respect to traffic congestion problems. Gould (1972) is an illuminating re-
evaluation of the Pigouvian proposition that the use of a free access resource, within
an increasing average cost industry, will imply production levels that tend to expand
beyond the socially optimal output. Gould's arguments generalize the Pigou-Knight
setting for the case of a production technology with two variable factors in addition
to the free access resource. Gould introduces the possibility of inefficient factor
proportions as a consequence of the common property issue. Within this framework,
overexploitation is no longer a necessary consequence of common property.
However, both sources of inefficiencies (factor proportions and output levels) are
directly related to the concept of inefficient rent dissipation that has been already
mentioned in the foregoing chapters.
Within fishery models, there are also some discussions that model congestion
externality effects. All of them consider a single variable factor setting. Smith (1968)
and Brown (1974) are two examples within dynamic settings; however, in both
papers the formal analysis concentrates on steady state conditions. Both papers
consider full symmetry across harvesting firms. In the first, the total (endogenous)
number of firms, which is determined by the industry's breakeven condition,
negatively affects the total operational costs of each firm involved. The overfishing
proposition is obtained by considering a free access resource which is exploited by
multiple price taking firms, in contrast with the optimal harvest decisions taken by
a fully centralized, and perfectly informed, social planner. Brown (1974) considers
an identical optimality benchmark. Additionally, he considers price taking behaviour
in input and output markets. His overfishing proof is obtained by considering an
industry's (aggregate) production function, which is homogeneous of degree one in
the variable factor and the common property resource, but subject to decreasing
returns in the (aggregate) use of the variable factor. It is the latter modelling device
that (implicitly) accounts for the existence of congestion effects. Overexploitation
arises from the numerous private firms equating decreasing average revenue per unit
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of the variable factor to the common and constant factor price. However, in both
papers no attempt is maLle to consider the impact of oligopolistic or, more generally,
strategic interactions between rival harvesting firms.
Within the frame of deterministic and static settings, there exist a few papers
that consider overproduction propositions in relation to oligopolistic and common
pool fishing industries. They implicitly consider congestion effects by again basing
their analysis on the use of an industry's aggregate production function subject to
decreasing returns in the use of the single variable input. Identical firms and the
assumption of a fish stock evenly dispersed make it possible to derive individual
harvests which are proportional to the aggregate catch, where the proportion
corresponds to the use of each firm's variable input relative to its aggregate use.
Comes and Sandier (1983) develop an analysis on these lines with price taking firms
in output and input markets, considering Cournot-Nash and conjectural variations
equilibria. Combining Cournot-Nash conjectures, price taking behaviour and
decreasing aggregate harvest returns in the use of the variable input, Comes and
Sandier (1983) obtain an overfishing result. The comparative analysis between the
Cournot-Nash case and a conjectural variations oligopoly fishery1 allows the authors
to derive the intuition that negative conjectures tend to intensify the Coumot-Nash
overfishing problems, whereas the opposite occurs with positive conjectures.
Comes, Mason and Sandier (1986) extend the previous analysis to the case
of a Coumot-Nash common pool fishery where harvesting firms are price making
agents. The key intuition is that the introduction of price setting powers brings a
conservation incentive into each firm's harvesting decision. Therefore, a trade-off is
created between underproduction effects, due to price setting powers, and
The authors consider an implicit function in order to define the conjectural variations factor.
Denote firm i's variable fishing input by z and the rival firms' use of the variable fishing input by z.
=E, j^i. Hence, [dz.,.IdzJ is defined as corresponding to the implicit function g(O,zJ, with 0 as a
parameter representing the rival firms' responsiveness to firm i's own fishing activity. Function g(.)
can be positive, negative or equal to zero. The latter case corresponds to Nash conjectures.
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overproduction incentives, due to the common pool feature. A balance between both
sources of inefficiency allows the authors to derive an optimal number of firms with
access to the common pool resource. Mason, Sandier and Comes (1988) generalize
this previous intuition for the case of a conjectural variation equilibrium.
In this chapter we extend the analysis of oligopolistic common pool fisheries,
subject to a technological congestion externality, by concentrating on comparing the
relative overfishing outcomes between a Coumot-Nash equilibrium and a Stackeiberg
equilibrium. The Stackeiberg case is one of the simplest ways to model the harvesting
outcomes from common pool fisheries subject to the presence of big firms (relative
to the fishery's size). In chapter 4 we described some empirical evidence that justifies
the relevance of analysing model refinements in this direction.
The analysis of the overfishing ranking between Coumot-Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria is a contribution to the existing literature on fisheries. The
cited models of Comes, Sandier and Mason, which are the closest to the analysis in
this chapter, do not consider the Stackeiberg case. Additionally, the existing studies
of oligopoly harvesting games have not modelled, within the firms' harvesting
function, an explicit parameter for a congestion externality. In this chapter, by
contrast, we develop this modeffing option. This allows us to advance in the study
of the influence that congestion effects have upon the magnitude of the overfishing
problem under oligopolistic harvesting competition.
In our analysis we develop an explicit welfare yardstick, attempting to be
clear on some key restrictive assumptions that support the validity of this exercise.
We differentiate between a "first best" and "second best" welfare solution. The first
best case assumes that the social planner has full control over the industry's total
harvesting fleet. The planner's objective consists in maximizing the industry's total
profits. In this case the planner fully internalizes the congestion externality effect. In
the second best solution the social planner has the sanie objective function, but now
he has control only over one harvesting firm. We suppose that: (i) the second best
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social planner has Stackelberg signalling attributes and (ii) that the fishing fleet under
the social planner's control has a proportional productivity advantage with respect to
the rival (follower) firms' harvesting fleet. In this context, we analyse the deviations
from the first best welfare yardstick for the cases of the Stackelberg, Cournot-Nash
and welfare (second best) equilibria. The extension of the analysis of the overfishing
problem to an explicit second best welfare solution is an original contribution to the
literature on static oligopoly harvesting games.
In this chapter we consider a small country fishery that produces a fish-meal
type product such that the selling price is exogenous to the industry's production. We
also assume that harvesting firms do not have price setting powers in their demand
for input services. As a consequence of the exogeneity of the price variables, the
oligopolistic character of our models derives exclusively from the firms' harvesting
interdependency arising from the common property of fish stocks. The commonality
feature is captured by an explicit congestion externality within the harvesting
technology.
Given the setting of this chapter, with static optimizing firms, price taking
behaviour and a non-zero congestion externality, we obtain the result that the
presence of private Stackelberg leadership intensifies the magnitude of the tragedy of
the commons, versus a Cournot-Nash setting. This result derives from the
combination between congestion effects and the first mover advantage that a
Stackelberg leader has. The first mover advantage allows the leader to preempt
followers' harvesting, because by increasing his harvesting the leader increases the
perceived congestion by the follower firms and hence the latter face incentives to
reduce their fishing efforts.
Nonetheless, it is also true that the leader's marginal cost of harvesting
preemption gets higher as he increases his harvesting because this increases
congestion and hence negatively affects the leader's harvesting productivity. In other
words, a higher value of the congestion parameter implies a trade off in terms of the
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leader's incentives to preempt followers' harvesting. On the one hand, a higher
congestion parameter increases the leader's ability to preempt rivals' harvesting,
because the penalty imposed on the rivals becomes higher. On the other hand, an
exogenous increase in congestion reduces each firm's harvesting productivity, the
leader included. The net balance between both incentive effects depends on the
relative parameter values in the specific harvesting function that the analysis
considers. But the key intuition underlying this trade off relates to the notion of how
costly the attempts to preempt harvesting of rival firms might become (in terms of
triggered overall productivity losses), particularly when exogenous factors (for
example, a Nature's negative random shock) increase the congestion externality
problem.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section (5.B) defines the initial and basic
setting for analysis. Section (5.C) solves for a Stackelberg equilibrium. Section (5.D)
develops a Cournot-Nash case. Section (5.E) solves for the first best optimality
benchmark and discusses an overfishing proposition. Section (5.F) develops a second
best planning solution and discusses the consequences in terms of overfishing. Section
(5.G) explores the robustness of the previous analysis with regard to changes in the
relative technological size of the congestion externality. Section (5.H) explores the
overfishing consequences that stem from exogenous increases in the number of rival
firms that operate in the common poo1 fishery. Section (5.1) concludes.
(5.B) The basic setting for analysis.
Let us consider a profit maximizing, multi-firm, fully deterministic, and single sector
harvesting fishery that exploits a common property and single species fish stock2.
Suppose that only non-cooperative equilibria are feasible in this multi-firm harvesting
game due to the presence of a sufficiently high cost of monitoring rival firms'
2 We will not make explicit the variablefish stock in this chapter, given the timeless setting of our
model. Firms, by definition, will not consider intertemporal effects in their haivesting choices.
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harvesting. This high monitoring cost makes the emergence of a credible and
sustainable cooperative harvesting equilibrium infeasible, because of the risk of
cheating.
Assume that each firm i, with i =1,.. ,N, has only one choice variable that
corresponds to the level of a single variable input denoted by z1 ^ 0. Call it fishing
effort. Assume that z 1 corresponds to a homogeneous mixed-input that includes all the
relevant input choices within the harvesting technology. Suppose that the different
inputs that z include are combined in fixed proportions3. Therefore, we can
summarize all the input choices as the choice of the optimal level of z. Suppose that
the per unit cost of this input is the same for all firms and independent of firms'
harvesting decisions. Denote this constant per unit cost by w >0. Assume that there
are no fixed costs. Therefore, firm i's total harvesting costs are equal to wz1.
Denote firm i's harvest by h, ^ 0. Suppose that the market price for one unit
of harvest is the same for all firms and independent of firms' harvest decisions.
Denote this common selling price by p>O. Accordingly, all harvesting firms behave
as price taking agents, both for input and output markets. Suppose this fishery is
subject to closed entry so that the total number of firms N^2 is an exogenous
variable. Denote the number of rival firms that any one firm has by n=N-1.
In the timeless setting of this chapter, we model the common property issue
by the introduction of a congestion externality within the harvesting technology. The
congestion effect introduces rival conswnption across firms, in terms of their current
harvesting. When a given firm increases her fishing effort, her rivals will perceive
a reduction in their own harvesting levels for a given level of effort4.
In order to model the congestion effect and to be able to obtain analytical
solutions, let us consider the following harvesting technology for firm i:
3 This seems to be a reasonable assumption for marine industrial fisheries.
It seems reasonable to expect that congestion effects are more likely to appear in a fishing
industry, the higher the level of industry's total harvesting is relative to the fish stock level.
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= a,; _2	 (1)
with a1 >0, j3>0 and y^O, all of them parameters; with h1 ^0 denoting firm i's
harvest level, Zj ^ 0 her fishing effort, and where z.1 ^ 0 denotes the total fishing effort
of i's rival firms; that is, z.1 = E; , j =1,.. ,n with j ^ i. Parameter >0 implies
decreasing marginal product in the own effort z. The parameter y introduces the
possibility of congestion effec&. As we will see later, we need to make further
assumptions about the values of the parameters in (1) to ensure sensible solutions for
this model.
The harvesting function in (1) assumes that the congestion effect for each firm
is proportional to her level of fishing effort. This implies that increases in other
firms' fishing efforts not only reduce firm i's total catch, but also her marginal
product of fishing effort. The latter effect seems plausible, and if it were valid we
should rule out harvesting technologies such as h 1 = a,z-jzj2-'y,(zj+z..j), because in
this case (ah/3z) is independent of z 4. In our study of Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash
equilibria we will assume that (ôh/3z) is negatively affected by increases in z.1, so
equation (1) is a possible technology6.
When we consider the case of a Stackelberg equilibrium, we want to analyse
the harvesting effects that result from a Stackelberg leader that also has a productivity
advantage over his followers. In order to do so, we will assume full symmetry among
5 We could think that a,,y are functions of the fish stock level, denoting it by x, presumably with
a(x)>O, (3,(x)<O and y(x)<O. In fact, equation (1) can be thought as a modified Sdzaeferfianction.
This corresponds to the linear harvesting function (in and x) that is frequently used in fisheiy
models, with 1=y=O and a positive but constant (see Clark, 1985, p.12). However, we will not
make explicit the possibility that h be a function of x, because in our fully static optimizing setting
x has a parametric interpretation; that is, finns do not consider the impact of their current harvesting
on the future levels of x. Hence, let us retain a, and y as simple parameters.
we rule out the possibility that (ahjoz) be affected by z, we could consider a simpler
specification of the congestion externality; for example, with a technology such as
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follower firms, with the representative follower firm having a harvesting technology
such that:
a1 = daL =
If = dj9 = d$
= dyL = dy
where 0< d ^ 1 is a parameter that denotes a proportional productivity differential
between the representative follower firm f and the Stackelberg leader that is denoted
by L. We model this differential in favour of the leading firm. To simplify notation,
as from here we denote the leader's harvesting parameters simply by a, and y.
The optimization problem for each firm i is:
Max; V= ph 1(z,z 1) - wz	 (3)
subject to (1) and z^0.
Additionally, we will suppose that the harvesting function h1(z1,z..1(z)) is
strictly concave in z,, that is the first derivative h . 1 =dh/dz1 >0 and the second
derivative h111 =d2hjdz,2 <0; where we are allowing for the possibility that the rivals'
effort z.., be a function of z1. Denote the conjecture that firm i makes with respect to
her rivals' reaction function, to marginal changes in z, by 0 1 =(8zI3z). The strict
concavity of the function h1(z1 ,z..1(z1)) in z1 makes it necessary that If
0. ^ 0, a case including the option of Nash conjectures, the concavity condition is
valid for any feasible value of , and	 Otherwise, the strict concavity condition
calls for (J3/'y)>
In our model, this concavity condition is sufficient to ensure the existence and
uniqueness of a maximum value for function V1(z1,z..1). If 0<0, note that the strict
concavity condition imposes a constraint on the relative values of and 'y which
allow for sensible solutions within this model for z. That is, if we are going to
(2)
7 To be precise, this result requires us to assume that (öO1Iôz)=O. The specific functions of our
model fulfil this condition.
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characterize a maximum solution for problem (3), the parametric relative values
should imply an endogenous solution for I O I, when 0, <0, such that (i9/ y > I O I.
Otherwise, we will not be describing a maximum positive solution. This should be
understood as imposing limitations on the robustness of our analysis.
Notation summary.
zj	firm i's fishing effort.
z..	 total fishing effort of i's rival firms = E , j =1,.. ,n with j ^ i.
p
	 selling price for harvest output.
w	 per unit cost of fishing effort.
firm i's harvest level.
N
	
total (exogenous) number of firms.
n
	
Number of rival firms, n= N-i
a	 linear harvesting productivity parameter.
decreasing return parameter for fishing effort.
7
	 congestion effect parameter
d
	
parameter that denotes a proportional productivity differential in favour of a
Stackelberg leader versus the set of symmetric followers.
f
	







vi	 firm i's profit function.
Oi






Suppose that in an N-firms fishery there exists a leai:Iing firm, call it the leader and
denote it by L, in the Stackelberg sense. That is, the leader has a first-mover
advantage over the remaining n firms, call them followers , in the sense that L has the
ability to credibly commit itself to a given fishing effort strategy ZL. L's effort
strategy is a signal that is observed by the followers; L also knows the followers'
reaction function to ZL. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that all follower
firms are identical. Denote the representative follower firm by f, with f=1,..,n.
Suppose that followers cannot sign binding collusive agreements among themselves.
As is usual in hierarchical Stackelberg equilibria, assume that each firm f has
Cournot-Nash type conjectures with respect to her rivals' effort decisions such that:
ôz..,	 ÔZL +	 Ia;1
-	 -	 i^fL[J 
=0
with each individual partial derivative in (4) being equal to zero.
The representative firm f's choice problem is (using (1),(2) and (3)):
Max , 1, = pd(aZf-zj--7zz)	
f
subject to z^0.
Given our assumption about the strict concavity of h(z,.) in z1 , the first order
condition av,/aZf=o suffices to characterize the unique solution to problem (5); this
first order condition implies:
az





Using the assumptions of Coumot-Nash conjectures (equation (4)) and full
symmetry among followers (the latter implying that z4=zL -F(n-l)zf), we obtain the
following equilibrium value of Zf conditional to the observed signal zL:
a- (w/pd)- YZL
= 2$ + 'y(n-l)	
, with f=1,...,n	 (7)
The leader knows (7), so he uses this information in his optimization problem
which maximizes (3) subject to (1), (2) and (7). Given (7) and the condition of full
symmetry among firms f, the leader's conjecture O'=(8z LI8zj.), with Z..L =flZf, is:
n-v	 (8)
ÔZL	 2fl+7(n-l)
Conjecture (8) shows the first-mover advantage that arises from the
Stackelberg leadership: as long as 7>0, the leader knows that his commitment
(signalling) ability allows him to reduce his rivals' efforts by increasing his own
fishing effort. In this common pool fishery, this implies that the leader can preempt
followers' harvesting by increasing his own effort. Given that the leader is able to
obtain positive profits from the marginal unit of fishing effort ZL, note that a higher
value of 0L will tend to increase, ceteris paribus, the optimal level of the leader's
fishing effort. We call this phenomenon a harvesting preemption incentive for the
Stackelberg leader. Notice that, ceterisparibus, 0'- I increases with , decreases with
and d I O'I/an >(<)O if(2-'y)>(<)0.
The latter inequality condition summarizes the net balance between two
opposite effects, upon OL I ' that arise from changes in the number of follower finns.
First, a higher n increases the aggregate preemption effect that arises from each
follower firm facing the effect (azf IazL) < 0 when 7>0. Second, a higher n also
implies bigger congestion problems for each harvesting firm. The increasing
congestion reduces each firm's catch productivity and hence each firm f's optimal
fishing effort. Given this, the preemptive power of the leader, in terms of each
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individual firm type f, loses effectiveness as n increases, or
{aIaz(n)IaZL IIan} <0g. This reasoning helps us to deduce that, when (2I-y)> 0,
the changes in the (second) congestion effect are dominated by the former (aggregate)
preemption effect so that an increase in n fmally increases the absolute value 0L 1.







By using the symmetry condition among follower firms, so that z..L= nz, and by
introducing the information of (7) and (8) into (9), we obtain the leader's optimal
effort:






with k= ( yIfl). Notice that we can interpret an increase in k as an increase in the
relative technological size of the congestion effect.
Two important comments on the validity of this solution. First, note that
ZL ^ 0 implies restrictions on the parameters of this model. For instance, notice that
the denominator in equation (10) is positive if k^ 1 or k>2. In these cases, the sign
S In other words, the larger the industry size (in the sense of a bigger number of firms), the
smaller is the leader's preemption effect on each individual follower firm.
'[a I 8 I] is equivalent to the following expression:
^n_i121_i•1 	 J	 Y
Notice that the sign of [ JO'- I 18n] only depends on the sign of the second expression between brackets
which corresponds to the condition [2j-y] (>X<)O. A higher positive value of (2-y) can be
interpreted as a smaller size of the congestion externality, relative to the value of (the decreasing
return parameter for fishing effort).
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of ZL depends on the sign of the expression in the numerator. For example, if d= 1
(the Stackelberg leader has no productivity advantages over the follower firms),
ZL >0 requires that [cr- (w/p)]/(2) >0.
Second, in order that equation (10) represents the unique optimal solution for
the maximization of the leader's profits VL, and given that equation (8) implies that
OL <0 for 'y>O, the strict concavity condition (flfy)> I 01j must be fulfilled. Given
the result in equation (8), this implies a parametric restriction such that (2-k)>nk(k-
1). Notice that there are combinations of values (n,k) for which this condition is not
fulfilled.
For instance, given that invariably n ^ 1, if 0 ^ k ^ 1, the latter condition is
always fulfilled. Accordingly, within this range of values for k we ensure the validity
of solution (10) and the corresponding economic propositions that we can derive from
it. If k^ 1.5, however, the strict concavity condition is violated. In this case we
cannot guarantee that equation (10) represents the unique maximum solution to the
leading firm's optimization problem. Accordingly, the economic conclusions that we
might want to derive from this result are not valid any longer. Finally, for parametric
values such that 1< k <1.5 the validity of the strict concavity condition depends on
the value of n. As n increases, the range of k values that fulfils this condition
becomes smaller.
Assuming that the strict concavity condition is fulfilled in solution (10), we
can introduce (10) into (7) in order to obtain the optimal effort for the representative
follower firm:










Given that the representative follower firm has Cournot-Nash conjectures, we
know that the sufficient condition for the strict concavity of her optimization problem
in (5), that is ($17) > O =[aZ.jaZf], is always fulfilled for $ and greater than zero.
Hence, equations (11-12) represent the unique optimal solution for the representative
follower firm's optimization problem.
However, the condition z> 0 implies additional restrictions on the parameters




z1 (k,n) = ZL 
1 1 (2 -k)(2 +k(n -1) J
with ZL also defmed for d=1. Suppose that ZL >O and k^ 1 in order to be sure that
the solution in equation (10) represents a maximum positive solution. In this case,
Zr'> 0 requires that the expression between brackets in (13) be also positive. It can
be easily checked that, for k ^ 1, if n increases then the range of k values that allows
for sensible solutions for z becomes smaller.
Solutions (10) and (11-12) are complicated expressions. In order to develop
some intuitions, we write these solutions as functions of parameters k and d and we
specialize our discussion as follows. First, in order to compare the Stackelberg and
the Cournot-Nash equilibria we will first consider a particular value of k (k= 1),
leaving d as a free parameter. The condition of k= 1 represents a constraint on the
harvesting technology h1(z,z..). This constraint equates the level of parameter >0,
that introduces decreasing returns in the use of zj, with the parameter 7>0 that
introduces the congestion effect that results from additional units of rivals' fishing




size of the congestion externality effect. In this specific setting we will analyse how
the introduction of Stackelberg leadership attributes affects the industry's fishing
effort equilibrium and the magnitude of the overfishing incentives.
Second, we will study how oligopoly equilibria are affected by variations in
k; that is, how harvesting incentives change, under different definitions of oligopoly
equilibrium, as the relative technological size of the congestion problem varies. For
the sake of simplicity, we will consider the case of a duopoly fishery such that d = 1
(section 5.G).
Using the technological assumption that k =1, we can summarize the
Stackelberg equilibrium as follows (using (10) and (11-12)):
TABLE 5.1: STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM (k=1)




Stackelberg total effort= z	 1 1a(1 + fl ) W 1 +	 1
2$	 n+1	 (n^1)dJ]
(16) z= ZL + flZf'
As expected, the leader's optimal effort increases, the higher his productivity
advantage is (d falls). In our model this effect results from the reduction in
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congestion problems that the leading firm faces due to the lower harvesting
productivity of the follower firms. In fact, a fall in d implies a lower optimal zf'
(equation 15); hence follower firms will reduce their catch levels.
However, in the aggregate (industry level) a fall in d will imply a lower
equilibrium value for total fishing effort z (equation 16). This means that, when
k= 1, the direct lower productivity effect upon followers' optimal fishing effort
dominates (in the industry level) the smaller congestion externality effect that the
leading firm faces and from which the latter has incentives to increase her own
fishing effort. The magnitude of the marginal effect [az5/ad] >0 gets bigger with
increases in the number of follower firms n'°.
Consider the case when d=1. In this case we obtain z,= [1I(2I)][a-(w/p)]
and zf =zL [1I(n+ 1)]. The aggregate (industry) fishing effort zs is given by
[(2n+1)/(n+1)]zL. if we consider the duopoly case (n=1), we obtain the standard
duopoly Stackelberg solution for homogeneous outputs such that z 1 = [zL I2]' 1 . We
can see that the productivity and price/cost parameters have the conventional effects
upon optimal input choices. Increases in harvesting productivity (increases in the ratio
cxIv) imply higher ZL and z. Similarly, increases in the selling price p per unit of
harvest, or reductions in the per unit marginal cost w of fishing efforts, also imply
higher optimal levels for ZL and Z.
In fact, [8z5/ôd] is equivalent to:
iwI 1 ii
2p L^w] d2
In the standard (textbook) duopoly Stackelberg model, firms' interactions are modelled through
the use of an inverse demand function which is negatively related, in a linear fashion, to the rival
firm's output. For instance, Gravelle and Rees (1992, ch. 12) consider a duopoly case with constant
marginal costs of production and an inverse demand function as p= -bq,-c, with i ^j denoting the
duopolists, and c>O. For the case of homogeneous outputs (with identical marginal costs for firm i
andj; and also a=aj =a, and b1 =b=b=c), the authors obtain a Stackelberg equilibrium such that ci=
(q/2), with firm j representing the Stackelberg leader and firm i the follower.
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Let us now consider the marginal effects upon fishing effort decisions that
arise in the current setting (k= 1) from increases in the number (n) of follower firms.




Given that d ^ 1, we know that [8zL/8fl] ^ 0. Why do we obtain this result, despite
the fact that a higher n implies bigger direct congestion problems?
First, consider the case when d <1. Recall that the leader's strategic
conjecture O'=[aZ..LIaZJ <0 increases in absolute value when n increases and (2a-
y) >0. This is the case when k= 1. We have already deduced that in this case the
relative technological size of the congestion externality (the ratio 7/) is not high
enough to overcome (in terms of bigger congestion problems as n increases) the
higher aggregate harvesting preemption power that the leading firm has with respect
to follower firms, given that a higher n amplifies the individual preemption effect
(azf /azl) <0. When d=1, however, equation (17) tell us that ZL becomes insensitive
to changes in n. Why does this occur?
In the latter case we obtain that the marginal harvesting productivity of the
leader's fishing effort, that is [3hLIôzJ, becomes insensitive to changes in n. This
occurs because the increase in the aggregate congestion effect (that result from a
higher n), and the corresponding reduction in the leader's harvesting productivity, is
fully counteracted by the opposite productivity effect that arises from the leader's
higher aggregate harvesting preemption over follower firms (a higher value for 199).
In fact, [ahL/aZd can be written as (when (=y): cr-2zL- n[z -{zL/(n+l)}]. The
first element of the expression between square brackets represents the direct
congestion effect that results from more numerous follower firms with zf > 0. The
second element within the square brackets represents the higher marginal harvesting
preemption that the leader can obtain if n increases and (2-'y) >0. In the current
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case (k= 1, d = 1), both effects are equivalent in absolute value, because we know that
in the Stackelberg equilibrium z1= [zLI(n+ 1)1.
In the case of the representative follower firm the analysis is simpler, because
this type of firm has no harvesting preemption abilities. We know that (see equation
15):
1	 1	 1
on	 2(fl+1)2 [cx pdJ	
(18)
In this case, as long as [cv-w/(pd)] >0, we obtain [Oz/On] <0. The former
positive condition relates to the need of a positive marginal profit income for initial
increases in the follower firm's fishing effort, that is [OV f/Ozf] > 0 when z-'0 and
z (-'O, in order to obtain a positive solution for the representative z. Given this
condition, [Ozf/On] <0 is a result of the higher congestion problems that marginal
increases in n produce upon each follower firm's harvesting productivity.
In terms of the aggregate fishing effort effects that result from marginal
exogenous changes in n, we obtain that:
Oz s ... l	 wl	 I.-- .[a_j (fl+1)2
	
(19)
Therefore, as long as [cx-w/(jxl)] >0 and hence Z f >O, when k= 1 a marginal
(exogenous) increase in the number of follower firms will invariably imply a higher
equilibrium level for the Stackelberg total fishing effort. In this case, the marginal
reduction in each follower firm's optimal fishing effort (that is, [OzIOn] <0)
produces a smaller aggregate effect, in absolute value, than the increasing fishing
effort levels that result from (i) more numerous follower firms with z1> 0, and from
(ii) the increasing aggregate harvesting preemption ability of the leading firm as n
increases (given that [2-'y] >0, and hence [010'- I/an] >0, when k= 1).
Let us now consider a Cournot-Nash non-cooperative equilibrium.
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(5.D) Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Imagine now that L no longer has the Stackelberg commitment attribute. Suppose that
d ^ 1 is the only possible source of asymmetry between this firm and the n (identical)
remaining firms f. Assume, hence, that all N firms behave in a Cournot-Nash
fashion. Therefore, in this section notation L will only represent a firm with the
possibility of higher harvesting productivity versus the representative firm f, with
f=1,..,n.
Solving the same generic problem for each firm i (maximize (3) subject to (1)
and (2)), and using the assumptions of (A. 1) full symmetry across firms f, (A.2)
Cournot-Nash conjectures for all the N firms, and (A.3) the technological assumption
that k= 1, we find the following equilibrium fishing efforts:
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It is evident from comparing results in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 that ZL increases
with the Stackelberg commitment ability. This is a direct consequence of the
harvesting preemptive ability that the Stackelberg le&ler has, given his first mover
or signalling ability. Directly related to this result, we can easily check that the
representative zf ' decreases when we allow the presence of a Stackelberg leader. In
terms of the industry's total efforts:
Proposition 1:
In the static optimizing setting of this model, under the technological assumption that
k=1, the introduction of a leading firm with Stackelberg commitment abilities
invariably increases the equilibrium level of the indumy 's total fishing efforts versus
the case of a Cournot-Nash setting,for the feasible values of the parameters such that
z', Vi, is a unique and positive variable.
Proof:
For d=l, zS = zN + B(1/2)[a-(w/p)], with B=[(n+2)(1+(lIn))}>0. Also
(112fi)[a-(w/p)] >0 is a necessary condition to obtain z >0. Therefore, if n>0 and
z'>0 then invariably z> z.
For 0<d< 1 we omit the formal proof here because it is long (see Appendix 5.1).
But the idea is to express solution zs (Table 5.1) with similar coefficients for a and
(w/pd) as those in solution zN (Table 5.2). Then, in the Stackelberg solution, we
obtain a lower coefficient for (w/pd) than in zN, an identical coefficient for a, and
a proportion [(n+2)/(n+ 1)][(2n+ 1)12(n+ 1)]> 1 that multiplies the outside factor
(1I2). Accordingly, invariably zS > zN U
The result in Proposition 1 is consistent with the usual ordinal ranking of
industry equilibrium outputs that results from comparing one-shot Coumot-Nash
versus Stackelberg (quantity) leadership oligopoly models, when firms face
interdependencies that arise from an inverse demand function that depends negatively
on the industry's total output, and there are no technological externality effects as
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those prevailing in our current model 12. Given this modelling setting, each firm's
profit is a decreasing function of the rival firms' output. In this case, rival firms'
productions behave as substitute outputs. For the case of quantity oligopoly games,
the previous setting generates downward sloping reaction functions in terms of each
firm's optimal output decision as a function of the rival firms' production.
The same effect of substitute' 3 productions is obtained in the current oligopoly
setting with price taking firms, because of the rival consumption effect that is
introduced by the congestion parameter within each firm's harvesting function.
Therefore, the consistency between our industry's fishing effort ranking (between
Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg leadership equilibria) and the previous standard results
in the one-shot oligopoly literature is not surprising.
We can also verify (see ZN in Table 5.2) that decreases in d imply, as in the
Stackelberg case, a lower equilibrium value for the industry's total fishing efforts in
the fully Cournot-Nash fishery. However, as d falls the total fishing efforts in the
Stackelberg equilibrium will fall less than zr'. In fact, we can state:
Proposition 2:
In the setting of our model, and given k=1, decreases in the harvesting productivity
"d of the representative follower firm will invariably imply a higher positive
d(f/'erence between the Stackelberg equilibrium total fishing effort S and the
corresponding Cournot-Nash total effort ZN. In other words, (&'ad) <0 with =
ZN.
Proof:
Let m= (8ZS/ôd) and mN =(3zNIôd). We know that both are positive (see Tables 5.1
and5.2). m = (1I2) (wlp)(l/d2)[n/(n + 1)], whereas m = (l/2)(w/p)(1/d2)[2nJ(n +2)]
12 See, for instance, Gravelle and Rees (1992, ch.12).
Suppose a duopoly industry where firms i andj compete in quantities q and q • Denote firm i's
profit function by fl=fl(q,,a). Substitute outputs mean that fl is a decreasing function of Cb and
fl(qq, ) is a decreasing function of a.
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And [1/(n+ 1)] < [21(n+2)], V n ^ 1. Therefore m < mN and hence Proposition
2 is proved U.
What explains the result in proposition 2? This is related to the harvesting
preemption ability of thefirst mover Stackelberg leading firm. Given the presence of
Stackelberg commitment attributes, a leading firm that increases her productivity
advantage, relative to her rivals (d falls), will have higher preemption powers to
anticipate rival harvesting of follower firms. The same improvement in the relative
harvesting productivity of a leading firm that does not have the Stackelberg leadership
attribute will result in lower increments for her total equilibrium fishing effort.
When d falls the sequence of events is as follows. First, each representative
follower firm's optimal effort z' decreases. This effect is amplified n times by the
existing number of type f firms. This reduces the congestion externality for each firm
in the fishery. The lower congestion increases, ceteris paribus, the marginal
productivity of each firm's fishing effort and hence each firm faces a secondary
marginal incentive to increase her fishing effort. For a leading firm with Staekelberg
leadership attributes the positive effect on her effort productivity implies that she can
preempt more harvesting of follower firms; hence, the latter effect leads the
Stackelberg leader to a greater marginal increase in his fishing effort, versus the case
when the more productive firm L has no Stackelberg signalling abilities. This is the
reason why with the Stackelberg leading firm the industry total fishing effort z falls
less, when d decreases, than the fall in zN.
Let us now consider the effects of changes in the number of rival firms on the
equilibrium fishing efforts in this Cournot-Nash fishery. Let us simplify the analysis
by considering the case when d= 1. Note that in this case firms L and f correspond
to symmetric Cournot-Nash decision makers. Table 5.3 summarizes the results in
comparative terms with respect to the Stackelberg fishery.
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TABLE 5.3: Fishing effort effects from changes in n (k=1, d=1)
Effort effects	 Stackelberg	 Cournot-Nash
1	 1aL 1 <0
ÔZL/ôfl
	
	- (n +2)2 1 P J0
1	 1 a_1 <0
azIan	 - 2(n^1)2 [ p	 idem above
1	
1 a- 1 >0	
1 
1a-' >0aL*n//an	 2(n+1)2 [ p J	 (n+2)2	 "J
The signs of the previous expressions are derived from the fact that [a-
(wlp)] >0 so that harvesting firms be active (z>0). As firm L loses her Stackelberg
signalling attributes, she reacts to increases in the number of rival firms as any other
Cournot-Nash firm. Because an increase in n implies a higher congestion externality,
each Cournot-Nash firm will always marginally reduce her fishing effort. However,
given the technological assumptions such that d=k= 1, the aggregate fishing effort
zN = (zL+nzf) will increase as more firms enter into this restricted entry fishery14.
'4 A higher value of k, that is a higher relative technological size of the congestion effect, would
surely reduce the magnitude of the positive change in zN as a result of a higher n, because in this case
the resulting higher congestion problem would impose more severe marginal productivity penalties on
each harvesting firm. Hence, each firm's optimal fishing effort would be lower.
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Given the technological assumptions in Table 5.3, it can be easily checked
that (i) [azN/an] > [azslan] , despite that (ii) I az'/an is greater in the Cournot-Nash
case than in the Stackelberg fishery, with (i) and (ii) being valid for n ^2. It is not
clear how or whether these results generalize to less specific modelling settings15.
In the current specific setting, however, the basic root of the result
[azN/anl> [azsIan] , for n ^2, stems from the fact that the level of the representative
z7 is sufficiently higher in the Cournot-Nash fishery, versus its level in the
Stackelberg oligopoly, such that the positive difference between both z solutions
more than compensate the combined effect from (i) the higher marginal reduction in
the representative z' in the Cournot-Nash setting (again vs. the Stackelberg case) and
(ii) the absence of reductions in the leading firm's effort z,, as she optimally reacts
to an increase in n, when this firm has Stackelberg leadership attributes and the
harvesting technology is such that k=d= 116.
(5.E) An optimality yardstick: the first best case.
In order to evaluate the overfishing proposition we need to define an explicit
optimality benchmark. In chapter 4 we defined an ideal social planner, institutionally
costless and as equally informed as private firms, who has full control over the
industry's total harvesting fleet. Given this definition, the ideal planner will fully
internalize the congestion effects arising from y>O. We call this case the first best
planning solution.
Therefore, the planner's optimization problem consists in maximizing the
industry's total profits, in each time period'7, by choosing the optimal fishing efforts
See a complementary analysis in section 5.H
"Note that the marginal impact [özEIdn], with E= S,N to denote the equilibrium type, is
equivalent to {ôzffin + zq + n(ôzf3n)), given that zE= z + nzf.
'7 Recall that all time periods are identical in this model, hence we can describe the opfimition
problem as a fully static one.
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for different productivity type firms. Let us retain the .symmetry assumption among
follower firms. If 0 <d <1, the representative follower firm f corresponds to the
low-productivity type. Retain the notation for her fishing effort as z. Simihrly,
denote the effort of the high-productivity firm by ZL. Suppose that price variables p




max W= p(hL +E h) - W(ZL+EZ)	
(23)
	
f- i 	f i
subject to ZL ^O, z^0 and, given the assumption of k=1:
'I
hL = L	 -I3ZLE Zf	
(24)f-i	 n-i
= d [ar_z; Zf [ZL+E zil 1
i-i	 JJi^f
The first order conditions (ÔW/8z 1) =0 and (8WI8z) =0 define the following system
of equations that describes the optimal choices for ZL and zf:
.	 ii	 wl	 (1+
ZL =	 ia -_J - _____	
(25)
and
1 1 1	 w 1	 1 ^(1/d)	 (26)Zf_[a-J-	
2 n
As expected, when productivity differentials disappear (d = 1) solutions (25)
and (26) are fully equivalent. In this case, all N firms are fully symmetric and The
industry's total effort is simply (n+ l)z, with z denoting the representative firm's
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equilibrium effort. Therefore, when d= 1 the optimal industry's total effort in our
first best welfare case is:
	ii 	 wi	 (27)z(k=1, d=1)=	 Ia- —i
	
t	 pJ
Looking at industry's total effort solutions for the Stackelberg and Cournot-
Nash equilibria (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2), when k = 1 and d =1, it is straightforward
to verify that zS=[(2n+1)I(n+ 1)]z and zN= [2(n+ 1)/(n+2)]z'. Proposition 1 has
already shown that z3(k= 1) > z'(k= 1), Yd feasible. And we know that the ratio
[2(n+ 1)/(n+2)] >1, Yn ^ 1. Therefore, we can state:
Proposition 3:
When k=1 and d=1, both the Stackelberg and the Cournot-Nash equilibria imply
higher industiy 's total fishing efforts than the optimal total efforts under the
centralized decision of an institutionally costless and as equally informed (first best)
welfare planner as private finns. This implies that in the Stackelberg and Cournot-
Nash equilibria we encounter overfishing outcomes. Given the result stated in
Proposition 1, the overflshing divergence from Pareto optimalisy is higher in the case
of the leader-follower setting. Therefore, >z'5z under the conditions of this
proposition.
What will occur with the first best welfare solution when harvesting firms
with different productivity types are allowed to exist? That is, one high productivity
firm with effort ZL, and n symmetric lower productivity firms (0< d <1), with a
representative effort z. To answer this, we need to solve the system (25)-(26) for
(z,z). Having done so, we initially find that the solution to this system implies that
ZL <0 and z>0. But we know that negative effort solutions are neither feasible nor
sensible within our model. Therefore, economic intuition suggests that in this case,
given the technological assumptions such that k =1 (hence 7>0), 0< d <1, and the
feasible space of solutions for the planner's problem (z1 ^0, i=L,f), it is not Pareto
optimal that both types of firm (high/low productivity) show positive effort levels.
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InsteaLl, in the first best welfare solution only one type of firm is allowed to harvest.
Hence, the first best planning benchmark corresponds to a corner solution.
The reason for this is that, by stopping the fishing activities of one of the two
types of harvesting firms'8, the first best planner can reduce congestion effects and,
hence, can increase the marginal harvesting productivity of the remaining firms. The
active firm will correspond, unsurprisingly, to the high productivity type. In fact, by
setting the representative fishing effort z=0, the first best planner not only keeps the
higher productivity firm active, but also fully avoids the congestion externality.
Therefore, in this case the sensible first best welfare equilibrium will imply ZL >0
and z=0. The Pareto optimal policy implies that the high productivity firm
concentrates all the industry's fishing effort& 9. By contrast, each firm f (lower
productivity type) will be ordered to stop harvesting operations.
The previous reasoning implies that the industry's total fishing effort, that is
chosen by this welfare planner, is exactly equivalent to the solution in equation (27)20.
Therefore, we have backtracked to the outcome that is valid for a single productivity
type firm and hence to the corollary of a private oligopoly overfishing that was stated
in Proposition 3.
Consequently, given the technological assumption such that k= 1 (hence
-y >0), in this model we will always encounter overfishing outcomes if private
oligopoly equilibria are compared with the first best planning solution. This result is
due to the full control powers (over the industry's harvesting fleet) that the welfare
Recall that the assumption of full symmetry across type f firms, together with the exogeneity
ofthenumberninourmodel, donotallowtheplannertodiscrminatebetweentypefflrms. Hecan
either allow them all to produce with identical effort levels, or to prevent them all from harvesting x.
Our planner does not have any intermediate choices at all.
'9 Bear in mind that in this model we have not specified fishing capacity as a binding constraint
for each firm's fishing effort choice problem.
Set r=O in solution (25).
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planner is vested with in this modelling setting. In fact, the first best welfare planner
can always adjust the operations of the harvesting fleet to an extent such as to fully
eliminate any congestion problem.
(5.E.1) The first best welfare solution when k ^ 1.
We now analyse if k^ 1 implies a change in the previous result that the first
best planning solution coincides with the corner solution: {zr=O, ZL =Z"1}. Let us
focus on the optimal distribution of a given industry's total fishing effort, denote the
latter by z (z =z'), between the two productivity types of firms, f and L, rather than
on finding out the specific optimal level of z when k ^ 1. To simplify, assume the
case of a duopoly fishery with firm L denoting the higher productivity type (d= 1)
and f the lower productivity type (d< 1).
Looking at the planner problem (23)-(24), we can see that the optimal shares
of firm f's and firm L's fishing efforts, in the industry total effort z, are given by
combinations (zf,zL) that maximize industry total harvest H= hf+hL. Given the price
information (p,w), the planner chooses the optimal levels of zf and ZL among the
former combinations (zf,z1).
The optimal distribution of a given level of total fishing effort z, among firms
L and f, is characterized by the following planner problem:
maxç H=hL + hf=azL-,z fzL(z zL) +dcr(z -z1) -di(z -zL)2 d7zL(z z1) (28)
where we have written z1= (z-z1), given that in this case we consider a constant level
of total fishing effort z.
Assuming that the parameter values imply that the strict concavity of H with
respect to ZL is fulfilled, aH/aZL=O characterizes the solution to problem (28). Note
that when (=y (k=1) and d= 1, aH/aZL =O for any combination (zL;z-zI). In this
case the allocation of a given industry total effort among individual firms does not
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affect total output H and, hence, the only relevant economic problem is to find out
the optimal level of z (equation 27).
If > y (hence k < 1), we know that L82HJÔZLI 2(d+ l)(-y-) <0. This
implies a declining marginal harvesting productivity as z increases. When d =1 we
also know that [8H/ôzJ =2(z-2z1)(fl-y)> 0 for any ZL< (zJ2). Hence, when k <1 and
d= 1 the plannerfirst best allocation (aH/az=O) is to set zL=zf=(z/2). If d falls, the
optimal share of ZL in the total effort z should increase. Could it happen that for a
sufficiently small d> 0, the planner would decide to choose full specialization
(zL = z)?
We know that with >y, invariably [8 2H/ÔZL2] <0. Hence, if there exists a
range of parameter values, with d < 1, such that [aH/8z1] >0 for a positive value of
ZL, with ZL =Z, the best effort allocation should be full specialization in the higher
productivity firm L. When d <1, we can write the marginal harvesting productivity
of ZL as follows:
t3H- = a(1 -d) +(z-z,)[2t$ —y(l ^d)] - zL[2fi —y(l +d)]	 (29)
ÔZL
With full specialization such that ZL =Z, [3H/âzJ >0 requires that:
cr(l-d)	 (29')0<ZL<
Note that the ratio in the right hand side of (29') is always positive for d< 1,
a >0 and fi >7. Hence, it is possible that for some parameter values the condition
(29') be valid. In these cases, we would obtain that the first best planning solution
coincides with full specialization such that ZL=Z.
Let us now consider the case when fl(-y and hence k> 1. Suppose first that
d=1. In this case, [3H/azj>0 requires that zL be greater than z/2; but when k> 1,
invariably [32H18ZL1 >0. The latter condition implies increasing marginal fishing
effort productivity. Hence, in this case the best effort allocation coincides with full
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specialization (zL=z, z=O, or ZL =O, z1=z)21 . Recall that this was the best first
solution in the previous section when k = 1 but d < 1. We can generalize the latter
saying that if j3^y and d<1, then the best allocation is to set ZL=Z and zf=O. In
fact, if <'y we know that the marginal productivity of fishing effort will be
increasing. Therefore, it will be convenient for the planner to specialize production
in only one firm. Given this, when d <1, the planner should choose the higher
productivity firm, that is, Zt=Z.
In summary, the first best planning solution implying full specialization
{zL >O, z=O} is not a general rule for all the combination between k and d values.
Nonetheless, as the relative size of the congestion externality parameter increases
with respect to , and the relative productivity level of firm f decreases (d falls), the
possibility that the first best planning solution implies full specialization (zL=z and
z1=O) increases.
Let us now consider an extension of the welfare planner's problem. Until now
our discussion has assumed that the social planner has full control over the total
harvesting fleet that operates in the common pooi and multi-firm fishery. This
assumption may be quite restrictive, and it could imply a highly idealized optimality
benchmark. If the social planner faces additional binding constraints to solve problem
(23)-(24), for example, due to information costs to fully control the industry's total
harvesting fleet, the first best optimality benchmark can overestimate the magnitude
of the oligopoly overfishing outcomes. The next section offers an illustration of this
point.
(5.}) A second best welfare solution.
Suppose a second best welfare problem that consists of a planner that has only partial
control over the harvesting fleet that operates in a restricted entry fishery. Assume
21 Because d = 1, finns f and L are identical. Hence the planner is indifferent between choosing
firm for firm L as the single active harvesting firm.
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that the planner can only control the fishing effort ZL of the more productive firm.
Imagine that information costs prevent the direct control of the representative firm
f's fishing effort z 22 . Firm f will continue to behave in a Cournot-Nash fashion. We
will assume that the social planner behaves as a Stackelberg leader, in the sense of
using z as a credible signalling to affect the fishing behaviour of the representative
firm f. The planner's objective will continue to be the maximization of the industry's
total profit (rather than just the firm L's profit). We can think of this case as a
'partial rationalization' fishing policy, given a public sector's partial control of the
common pool fishery, through the management of one harvesting firm under direct
public sector control.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the case of a duopoly fishery
(n = 1). Let us also maintain the technological assumption such that k= 1. Firm f's
problem is described by equation (5). Hence, firm f's Cournot-Nash behaviour
implies that her optimal fishing effort z, conditional on the planner's signalling
policy ZL, is given by equation (7). Given that k= 1 =n, equation (7) can be rewritten
as:
i(	 wl ZL	 (30)Zf 
=	 1 a_ J -
Again the condition zf^O implies restrictions on the parameters of the model. For
instance, note that, even if ZL=O, (1/2 )[a- (wlpd)] must be positive in order that
firm f be active.
The planner's problem is:
Suppose, for instance, that the fishing effort of the representative firm f (the lower productivity
type) is costly to monitor and to control because of the small scale of operation of type f firms.
185
maxç W= p(hL +h) - W(ZL+Z)	 (31)
subject to the harvesting technologies in equation (24), with n=1, and ZL^O.
Assuming that the strict concavity of W with respect to ZL is fulflllesP, condition
(3W/3z1)=0 characterizes the planner's solution. Solving (3 W/3zL) =0, and using the
fact that the planner knows the follower's reaction function given by (30), such that
ôZf/ÔZL= -1/2, we obtain:
1 Ia(2-i)-l- {r]Zf	 (32)
= fl(3O1
This equation shows the planner's optimal fishing effort policy conditional on
the value of the follower's fishing effort z f; but the planner knows that z f is given by
equation (30). Therefore, by combining the information in (30) and (32) we obtain
the equilibrium values for z and ZL. Appendix 5.2 shows the second best welfare
equilibrium in comparative terms with respect to the Stackelberg, Cournot-Nash, and
first best welfare duopoly equilibria. Note that when we impose the condition that
d= 1, we obtain the duopoly equilibria shown in Table 5.4.
Notice that in the duopoly case with d= 1 the industry's total fishing effort is
the same in the first best and second best welfare solutions. In the latter case the first
best solution is achieved because the planner opts for setting zL=O. By doing so he
fully avoids congestion problems, as in the previous welfare exercise (when k= 1 and
d <1; or when k> 1 and d ^ 1), making the follower firm the sole owner of the
common pool fishery; hence the follower firm chooses the first best Pareto efficient
total fishing effort.
' This concavity condition only requires that the parameter values be such that (8W/özJ>O for
a positive solution z, because always (ô2WIôr) <0 in this case.
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Table 5.4: Duopoly Equilibria
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With n> 1 the second best planner would not be able to achieve the first best
solution by simply setting ZL=O, because the remaining oligopoly firms will achieve
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this case the welfare planner will face a trade off
between (i) choosing a higher ZL>0 in order to preempt and to reduce follower
firms' fishing efforts with lower harvesting productivity, and (ii) the resulting
congestion effects which will be triggered by the choice of a higher ZL >O. The
planner's ZL decision has to optimally balance both effects. In section 5.H we explore
these ideas.
In this section we maintain the assumptions such that k = n =1. Let us now
focus on the case when d< 1. In this setting, it is not clear a priori whether or not
the second best planner can still achieve the first best solution. If he aims to fully
avoid the congestion externality effect, by setting ZL=O, he has to accept that the
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lower productivity firm will be the active harvesting unit. This implies a cost in terms
of a lower harvesting productivity from fishing effort units. Let us then study how
the second best planner chooses ZL for different values of d. We will compare the
resulting industry equilibrium with those obtained in the Stackelberg, Cournot-Nash
and first best welfare equilibria.
We explore this issue by developing a numerical simulation exercise. Looking
at equation (30), we confirm that (1/2)[a-(w/pd)] >0 is a necessary condition in
order that firm f be active (zr> 0). Let us define some arbitrary parameter values
such that this condition is valid for at least a range of the feasible d values
(0<d^ 1). Assume that a=11, j3=112 and (w/p)=P. Hence the first best industry
fishing effort solution corresponds to a value of 10 (equation 27). Given these
parameter values, equation (30) becomes:
Rft1)	 Zf = [ii3J -	 (30')
whereas equation (32) is equivalent to:
RL(d)	 Zf = (21 -1 ld) - [2..	 Z1	 (32')
We denote the former reaction function by Rf(d) and the latter by RL(d). These
two equations define the second best welfare equilibrium {zL , z} as a function
of parameter d. Figure 5. 1(a)-(b) represents this case. In what follows we first
describe the prevailing second best welfare equilibria {zL, z} for different values
of d and, second, we compare them with the other industry equilibria that were
analysed in previous sections.
Note that these parameter values satisfy the strict concavity condition that is required to fulfil
in order that (aV/az,J=O characterizes the unique optimal effort solution z1 for a decision maker that
has Stackelberg signalling attributes (with i representing either the Stackelberg private firm leader or
the second best welfare planner).
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(5.F.1) Deriving the second best welfare equilibria as a function of d.
Point A in Figure 5.1(a) represents the first best jplanning solution when d< 1 and
k= 1{zL = 10, zf=0}. Point A' represents the second best planner's choice when d= 1.
As d fails from 1, the locus Rf moves with constant slope towards the origin 0. The
locus Rf crosses point 0 when d= 1/11. This means that when d ^ 1/11 firm f is
always inactive; hence the planner, for any ZL ^ 0, behaves as a sole owner.
Therefore, for this range of d values the first best solution z'" =zL+zf= 10 is always
achieved. Even more, we can deduce that the second best planner will be able to
achieve the first best solution as long as d ^ 1/6 0.167. The logic underlying this
result is as follows.
First, note that the locus RL moves away from the origin 0 as d fails from 1:
its intercept at axis zç, as well as the absolute value of its negative slope, increases
as d becomes lower. Second, as d increases from d= 1/11 locus Rf moves away, with
constant slope, from point 0. When d =1/6, locus Rf crosses point A. This means
that, for 1/11< d ^ 1/6, the interception between both loci must occur at a point such
that ZL >O and z(0. Hence the constraint z 1 ^0, i=L,f, implies that in this range of
d values the planner must optimally choose a ZL >0 such that z=O. We can easily
check that for 1/11 <d ^ 1/6, it must be true that 0) < ZL' (d) ^ 10< ZL' '(d); where ZL'
and ZL" values denote, respectively, the points where the loci R f zf—g(zL;d)=O
and Rzf=q(z";d)=O, with the functions g(.) and q(.) given by equations (30')
and (32'), respectively. But, for 1/li <d^116, the social planner will choose none
of these two ZL values. Instead, he will choose ZL = 10.
Suppose that d=d', with 1/11 <d' <1/6, and locate in Figure 5.1(a) a point
such as ZL =Z' <10 such that R zf=g(z';d')=O.. For any ZL>Z' the follower firm
will set zf=O; hence for any ZL> z' the planner will be able to behave as the sole
owner of the common pool fishery. And we know that in this case the optimal fishing
effort policy is z= 10. Therefore, for any 0 ^d ^ 1/6 the second best planner
achieves the first best solution.
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On the other hand, when d=3/130.23 the loci Rf and RL intercept at point
C such that z=0 and ZL 13.33 (Figure 5.1(a)). For 3/13 <d <1, we can easily
check in (28') and (30') that both (second best) effort solutions z, and Zt" are
positive. A typical second best welfare equilibrium for 3/13 <d <1 is one such as
point D. As d moves away from d=3113 and gets closer to d= 1, the industry
equilibrium gets nearer of point A'. Hence, as d increases ZL falls, whereas z
increases. For the cases when 3/13 <d <1, solutions {zL, z9 are given by the
corresponding expressions in Appendix 5.2.
Finally, which are the second best welfare equilibria for 1/6 <d <3/13? In
these cases we know that the loci Rr and RL intercept at points such that ZL >O and
z1 <0. Hence, in these cases z.. must be zero. But in this range of d values, any
specific value of d implies that zf=O for two values of ZL (see Figure 5.1(a)): for
10< zL (d)< 13.33 such that RE zf=g(z",d)=0, and for 2L(d)> 13.33 such that
Rzf=q(±,d)=O. Note that in this range of d values, ZL = lO implies Zf >O (given
by the reaction function Rf). Hence in this case the second best planner cannot
achieve the first best planning solution. Which fishing effort will the planner choose,
L(1) or zL(d)?
The planner will choose ZL"(d) because, within the range 116< d <3/13, the
sign of aw/azL is negative for any ZL> zL"(d), with W given by equation (31).
Notice that, for 2L ^ZL >ZL", ÔW/äzL must be evaluated subject to the fact that z=0
and [ôzf/äzJ =0. Doing so, we find that any zL> 10 implies 8W/8ZL <O. Therefore,
in this range of d values the best that the planner can do is to set zL=zL"(d).
Figure 5.1(b) shows the resulting fishing effort optimal choices, as a function
of d values, for the second best planner and the follower firm. The industry curve
shows the aggregate fishing effort z=z+z. In order to obtain comparative
results, let us now solve the simulation exercise for the private Stackelberg and
Cournot-Nash equilibria.
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(5.F.2) Private Stackelberg duopoly equilibria.
Figure 5.2(a)-(b) shows the corresponding Stackelberg equilibria as a function of d.
R(d) is the same function as that in the second best welfare problem, that is,
z1=(1 1-(l/d))-zLI2. We obtain RL by imposing on equation (9) the set of
assumptions that we use in this section (k=n=w/p=1, =0.5, a=11). Hence RL
zf=20-(3/2)zL. This equation characterizes the Stackelberg leader's optimal effort
policy conditional on the value of the follower's fishing effort. Due to the same logic
that was analysed in the previous case of a welfare planner with Stackelberg
leadership attributes, the (private) Stackelberg equilibria {zLS, 2s} are as follows (see
Figure 5.2(a)):
For 0< d ^ 1/6, z=O and zLS = 10 (point A); hence in this range of d values
the (private) Stackelberg duopoly achieves the first best welfare solution. At d=3/13,
Rf and RL intercept at point C (zLS= 13.33; z=0). For d >3/13, the Stackelberg
equilibria move upwards and along curve RL. For 3/13 <d< 1, a typical equilibrium
point is one like D. When d= 1, the Stackelberg equilibrium locates at point E
(zLS=2z). For 1/6< d' <3/13, the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by
Rf(z=O;d;zS), with 10<ZLS < 13.33 (point B).
Figure 5.2(b) represents the resulting fishing effort solutions (for the
Stackelberg leader, the follower firm, and the industry equilibrium) as functions of
parameter d.
(5.F.3) Cournot-Nash duopoly equilibria.
Consider the case when both firms behave as Coumot-Nash players. L denotes the
higher productivity firm (d =1), whereas f denotes the lower productivity type (d ^ 1).
Each firm i's (i=f,L) optimal fishing effort is characterized by equation (6) subject
to (4) and the parametric assumptions in this section. From this we can deduce the
reaction function of each firm, R and RL. Hence, the Cournot-Nash equilibria are
Replace f by i in (6) in order to obtain 7j for i=L.
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given by the equations Rf(d)E z,= (11- (l/d))- zL/2, and RL Ezf=20- 2ZL. Figure 5.3
(a)-(b) represent them.
The equilibrium points {zLN, 2NJ are as follows (see Figure 5.3(a)). Note that
for d =1/6, locus Rf crosses point A (z =0; zL = 10) which implies the first best
planning solution when k=1 and d< 1. For 1/6<d^1, Z/4 and ZL are both positive
with the equilibrium points moving along curve R L, going from A towards E as d
increases (zEN getting higher and zj becoming lower). Point E is the symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium (d=1), with the representative firm i's optimal fishing
effort z1 = 20/3. When d = 1/11, locus Rf crosses the origin 0; hence, for d ^ 1/11,
firm f becomes inactive and therefore firm L is the sole owner of the common pool
fishing grounds. Hence, for d ^ 1/11 the Cournot-Nash equilibria will coincide with
the first best planning solution, with z/=0 and ZLN =10. Finally, when 1/11 <d< 1/6
locus Rf crosses the ZL axis between points 0 and A. As analysed previously, this
implies that z/=0. In this range of d values, 7N=0 requires that ZL >O. Given the
fact that z=0 and az/azL =0 in this range of d values, we hence deduce that the
optimal firm L's effort policy is to set ZL = lO. Figure 5.3(b) represents the fishing
effort solutions as a function of d.
(5.F.4) Comparative analysis.
Let us now combine the results obtained in the previous analysis and study the
implications in terms of overfishing outcomes for the different duopoly equilibria that
we have considered.
Figure 5.4(a) represents the total fishing effort solutions for the private
Stackelberg case, for the second best welfare exercise (denoted by welfare 2B), and
for the Cournot-Nash duopoly fishery. Figures 5.4(b)-(c) represent, for these three
cases, the corresponding fishing effort solutions for the leading firm L and for the
follower (lower productivity type) firm f. Recall that with k =1 and d ^ 1, the first
best welfare solution for total fishing effort is equal to 10.
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In Figure 5.4(a) we observe that for 0< d ^ 1/6 in the three cases of duopoly
equilibria the first best welfare solution is achieved. This occurs because within this
range of d values the harvesting productivity of firm f's fishing efforts is sufficiently
lower versus firm L's harvesting productivity such that it is optimal for f to be
inactive. Hence firm L can behave as a sole owner and, therefore, she chooses the
first best total fishing effort.
Let us now focus on the relative fishing effort solutions between the private
Stackelberg and (second best) welfare duopoly equilibria. For 1/6<d^3/13, z' still
coincides with the Stackelberg total effort zS; but both are now higher than 10
because within this range of d values the Stackelberg leading firm needs to increase
ZL in order to maintain z1=0. For the second best planner this is a Pareto efficient
fishing policy because by doing so he is avoiding congestion problems by stopping
the fishing activity of firm f which still has a relatively low harvesting productivity.
However, insofar as d>3/13 0.23, implying that z begins to be positive
while firm f is competing with a firm L which has Stackelberg leadership attributes,
we start to observe a positive difference between the private Stackelberg total fishing
effort zS and the second best welfare total effort solution z. As d gets higher, the
overfishing gap (zSz) >0 increases. This occurs because the private Stackelberg
leader's fishing effort decreases at a lower rate, versus the reduction of ZL with the
second best welfare planner, as d gets higher. Consistently, as d increases the
follower firm increases her effort z at a lower rate in the private Stackelberg duopoly
fishery, versus the second best welfare case. The strategic preemption of the private
Stackelberg leader, in terms of reducing the rival firm's fishing effort, is clearly
higher versus the social planner's effort choices. This is so because the second best
social planner internalizes, while the private leader does not, the marginal social
benefits of increasing the share of firm f's fishing effort zf in total effort z as firm
f becomes more productive. When both firms' harvesting productivity becomes
equivalent (d= 1), the second best welfare planner chooses to keep firm f as the
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active harvesting unit, because by stopping fishing efforts from firm L he can avoid
the congestion externality problem without incurring in fishing effort's marginal
productivity losses. With d=1, firm f becomes the sole owner of the fishery and the
first best total effort (z = z"" =10) is achieved.
In the case of the Cournot-Nash duopoly we confirm our previous result
(proposition 3) in terms of a consistent lower total fishing effort, for all d greater
than 1/6, versus the case of the private Stackelberg fishery. For d> 1/6, Zf starts to
be positive in the Cournot-Nash duopoly and flrm f's fishing effort becomes
consistently higher in the Cournot-Nash case than in the private Stackelberg fishery;
while the opposite occurs with the fishing effort from the leading firm L. This is a
result of the strategic preemption ability that the leading firm L has when she is
endowed with Stackelberg leadership attributes.
An interesting result is obtained when we compare the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium with the second best welfare solution. We can see in Figure 5.4(a) that
z>zN for 1/6<d<0.61, whereas z">z' for O.61<d^1. Only the latter range
of d values is consistent with the overfishing outcome that we stated in proposition
3. Why in the range 1/6 <d <0.61 the Cournot-Nash fishery implies a higher
industry fishing effort than the optimal total effort for the second best planner?
Note that for 1/6 <d <0.61, ZL> zL and hence z <z/. This implies that,
in this range of relatively low d values, the planner prefers higher fishing efforts
from the more productive firm L than the effort levels that firm L chooses if she has
no Stackelberg signalling abilities. The resulting higher total fishing effort in the
second best welfare exercise must be the result of net (social) marginal productivity
gains arising from a higher share of firm L in the industry's total fishing effort.
As d increases, however, the social productivity gains, arising from a higher
share of ZL in total fishing effort z (versus the corresponding share in the Cournot-
Nash case), become smaller because firm f's productivity gets closer to firm L's
fishing effort productivity. Simultaneously, as d increases (and so the optimal Zf) the
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congestion problems that arise from not reducing ZL more quickly become a more
binding technological constraint for each firm's harvesting productivity. Hence, the
social planner will prefer a quicker reduction of ZL versus the choice of the Cournot-
Nash firm L. In fact, as d approaches the value of 1, the planner prefers to stop his
own harvesting (setting zL =0) so as to maximize the total (optimal) production that
can be obtained by a sole owner who faces no congestion problems. The Cournot-
Nash firm L, however, does not internalize the higher congestion externality that her
higher effort zL" (versus ZL) produces. This is the reason why in the range of
0.61 <d ^ 1 the Cournot-Nash fishery will imply overfishing versus the effort choices
of the second best welfare planner.
Finally, we can easily observe in the graphics referred to above how the use
of first best optimality yardsticks can sometimes distort the evaluation of the
magnitude of overfishing results in common pool oligopoly fisheries. We have seen
that this type of distortion can, on occasions, even imply a change in the sign of the
over(under)production result; for example, in our simulations, for the range
1/6<d <0.61, when we compare the Cournot-Nash solution with the second best
welfare benchmark.
(5.G) Duopoly equilibria with k ^ 1.
This section explores the robustness of the overfishing ranking in Proposition 3
(which considers k= 1) with regard to changes in the relative technological size of the
congestion externality effect. We will obtain a generalization of the previously
derived overfishing ranking, fork values between 0 and 1. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume: (i) a duopoly fishery (n= 1) and (ii) no productivity differences (d=1)
between firm Land firm f. We will only consider k values such that 0^k^1. There
are two reasons for the latter choice.
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First, we want to exclude the case when the first best welfare solution implies
full specialization. In section (5.E) we saw that if k> 1 the first best welfare planner
chooses a corner solution (zL=z' and zf=O; or ZL=O and zf=zWl). By contrast, with
k <1 and d =1 we saw that the first best planner's optimal choice implies
zL=z(=zI2. This will be the case in this section and, hence, we will calculate the
first best total effort z' for k values between 0 and 1.
Second, we want to be sure that the strict concavity condition for the
optimization problem of a Stackelberg leading firm is fulfilled. The fulfillment of this
concavity condition ensures that the Stackelberg leader's choice for her optimal
fishing effort policy will represent a unique maximum solution. Within the range
o ^ k ^ 1, the previous concavity condition is invariably true. This applies to the
case of the private Stackelberg duopoly as well as to the optimization problem of the
second best welfare planner.
We develop a numerical simulation analysis maintaining the parameter values
such that a = 11, = 1/2 and (w/p) = 1. Appendix 5.3 describes the derivation of the
Stackelberg, Cournot-Nash, first best welfare, and second best welfare duopoly
solutions as functions of parameter k. Figure 5.5(a) represents the solutions for the
industry's total fishing effort, as a function of k, in these four concepts of duopoly
equilibria. Figure 5.5 (b)-(c) represent the corresponding effort solutions for the
leader (firm L) and the follower (firm f).
In Figure 5.5(a) we observe that when 7=0, and hence k=0, the four duopoly
equilibria imply the same total effort solution, call it z, equal to a value of 20; with
each duopolist using the same effort level z1 =z12=lO. In this case, the absence of
congestion effects implies that the duopoly equilibria always coincide with the first
best planning solution. Why is this so? With no technical externalities, the
In section 5.E we saw that the fulfillment of this concavity condition requires that 2-k^nk(k-1).
With n= 1, this inequality implies that k^ 1.41. We simplify by taking the value ofk=1 as the upper
linth.
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oligopolistic fishing firms always face complete markets in the fishery under analysis.
In this case a leading firm with Stackelberg attributes cannot strategically preempt her
rivals' fishing efforts by changing her own effort zL; and CournotNash conjectures
now imply that the decision maker internalizes all the relevant productivity effects as
she chooses her optimal fishing effort. Therefore, the resulting market equilibria are
Pareto efficient.
When k= 1, and d=n= 1, Figure 5.5(a) confirms the results that we have
already analysed in the previous sections. The first best and second best welfare
solutions for total effort coincide, because in this case the second best planner stops
his own harvesting, making firm f the sole owner and, hence, a Pareto efficient
decision maker in this fishery. The Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash effort curves,
when k= 1, represent the overfishing ranking already proved.
For 0< k <1 we obtain a consistent and robust overfishing ranking with
respect to the results obtained, when k=d = 1, in sections (5.E) and (5.F). In this
range of k values, the resulting robust overfishing ranking implies that
z"" <z < z1 ' < zs, maintaining the same notation of previous sections27 (Figure
5.5(a)).
In the four equilibria under analysis, the resulting industry's optimal total
effort monotonically decreases as the technological size of the congestion externality
effect increases, relative to . However, the overfishing in the Stackelberg and
Coumot-Nash settings unambiguously increases as the value of k gets higher in our
simulation exercises. The latter result is equally valid if we compare the private
oligopoly equilibria's total effort with the first best welfare yardstick ?', as when
we consider the second best benchmark z'.
In terms of the leading firm L's optimal fishing effort (see Figure 5.5(b)), the
four equilibrium solutions imply, for 0< k ^ 1, that ZLS > zLN > ZLWl > ZL (the
v The numerical simulation exercise implies unambiguous results in terms of this overfishing
ranking, foreachkvaluesuch thatO<k<1.
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numerical simulation results are unambiguous with respect to this ordering). Finally,
with respect to the representative type f firm's optimal fishing effort (see Figure
5.5(c)), the four equilibria imply, for 0< k <1, that z, > z/4 > 2S> z. Again the
numerical simulation results are unambiguous in terms of this ordering. Let us briefly
explore the logic underlying these results.
In the cases of the first best welfare and Coumot-Nash solutions, the
monotonic reduction in the industry's optimal total fishing effort simply reflects the
declining marginal productivity of the representative fishing firm i (recall that d = 1
in this section) as the value of the congestion parameter 'y increases. Figures 5.5(b)-
(c) represent the declining optimal effort of the representative duopolist firm i, in the
first best welfare and Cournot-Nash cases, as k increases. Notice, however, that in
the first best welfare case the resulting representative firm i's effort solution implies
a consistently lower optimal fishing effort than in the Cournot-Nash duopoly, for all
0< k ^ 1. This occurs because the welfare planner fully internalizes the increasing
congestion problem as k>0 becomes higher, whereas the Cournot-Nash firm only
does it partially. If we consider the private Stackelberg duopoly solution for 0< k ^ 1,
we obtain firms' effort rankings which are consistent with the results that were
analysed in sections (5.D), (5.E), and (5.F) for the case of k= 1; that is,
z> ;N> z' and ;W1 ^ z < zN (when 0< k ^ 1).
In the cases of the second best welfare problem and the private Stackelberg
fishery, the leading firm L faces an additional effect to the declining harvesting
productivity effect, as the congestion parameter increases: the leader's harvesting
preemption ability, ceteris paribus, increases; that is, invariably a I 0L /7> (see
equation (7)). In the case of the second best welfare problem, the planner uses his
Stackelberg leadership ability in order to counteract the congestion problems that
arise from a higher congestion parameter 'y. Notice in Figure 5.5(b) the difference
between the evolution of ZL and the optimal effort policy z for the private
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Stackelberg leader. Invariably (zLS zL ) >0 for 0 <k ^ 1, with this positive difference
widening as k increases.
As the value of y increases, and hence the value of k, the second best welfare
planner monotonically reduces his fishing effort ZL. By doing so, he helps to
counteract the increasing congestion effect from a higher k and the resulting declining
harvesting productivity of the follower firm f. As k gets nearer to k = 1, the planner
increases the rate of reduction of his own fishing effort and, by doing so, he starts
to trigger an increasing pattern in the follower's optimal fishing effort (Figure
5.5(c)). When k= 1, the planner sets ZL =O and makes the follower firm the sole
owner of the fishery.
In the case of the private Stackelberg duopoly we observe a monotonic decline
in the follower's optimal effort as k increases. This is partly due, as in the other
duopoly equilibria, to the declining harvesting productivity of the follower firm as
k increases. However, the rate of decline in z is faster in the private Stackelberg
duopoly than in the Cournot-Nash and the second best welfare cases (see Figure
5.5(c)). This effect is even more evident as k gets nearer to k= 1. The reason is that,
as k increases, the harvesting preemption effect in favour of the private leading firm
starts to increasingly compensate the declining marginal productivity effect that is
faced by the private Stackelberg leader, as 7 gets higher. The strategic preemption
We can wiite the leading firm's marginal harvesting productivity as:
ÔZL	[2J 
ZL2ZL7Zf
In this expression two factors depend on the value of : the positive factor represents the harvesting
preemption effect, whereas the negative factor represents the direct (declining) productivity effect that
stems from the congestion externality. The marginal impact of changes in A( is given by ôh.j8y=kzt
-z The latter expression helps to understand why as k increases and i decreases, increases in y will
eventually produce positive effects on the leader's marginal productivity and, hence, they will
eventually trigger an increasing pattern in the optimal level of z.
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effect starts to dominate over the declining productivity effect from k>O.59. As a
result of this, starting from this value of k we observe an increasing pattern in the
leading private firm's optimal fishing effort. The latter result implies that the follower
firm's optimal effort starts to decline faster as k increases due to the higher total
congestion effect faced by the latter firm.
In summary, in this section we have confirmed the overfishing ranking such
that z ' <z < z < zS, for k values greater than 0 and lower or equal to 1. The
overfishing in the Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash duopolies, either measured with
respect to z"" or z', unambiguously increases as the relative technological size of
the congestion externality parameter increases, that is, as k gets higher.
(5.11) An increasing number of rival firms.
This section explores the impact of a higher value of n on the fishing effort solutions
for firm L and the representative firm f (we keep symmetry among type f firms), and
the resulting industry's total fishing effort, under the different equilibrium definitions
considered in section (5. G). For simplicity we assume in this section k = 1, given the
robustness of the overfishing ranking, for 0 ^ k ^ 1, between the different oligopoly
equilibria analysed in the previous section. We again consider a numerical simulation
analysis, maintaining the same parameter values previously assumed, that is, a =11,
=1I2 and (wlp)=1.
What do we aireaiiy know in terms of total fishing effort solutions when k= 1?
First, with k=1 and 0^d^1, the first best industry's fishing effort is invariably
equal to z"1 =10 (given the parameter values above specified) for all n^1. Second,
ifk=1 and d=1, we know that zs>zt4>z for all n^ 1 (Proposition 3); and that the
positive gap (zSzN) decreases as the number of rival firms increases, for n ^2 (see
comments to Table 5.3).
The value k=O.59 corresponds to the minimum value of the equilibrium solution for z in the
Stackelberg fisheiy, which in this section is equal to z= lO(2-k)/(2-k2).
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Third, we can also prove that when k= 1 =d the second best welfare planner
invariably sets ZL =O and, hence, z=nz for all n ^ 1 (see Appendix 5.4). The
latter result generalizes the second best welfare solution previously obtained for a
duopoly fishery in section (5.F). However, we have seen in section (5.G) that the
solution ZL =0 does not generalize, when d=1 =n, for k values lower than 1. We
saw that aZj'Iak<0 in a monotonic way. This is due to the planner's aim to
counteract the higher congestion problem as k increases.
In this section we explore whether or not the solution Z L =O remains
invariant, given that k = 1, when d varies between 0 and 1 and the number of
oligopoistic firms increases. We compare the resulting ZL with the optimal fishing
effort policy for a private Stackelberg leader. Finally, we study the resulting
overfishing ranldng between the Cournot-Nash, Stackelberg and second best welfare
oligopoly equilibria.
We proceed as follows. Allowing for 0<d^ 1, we consider three arbitrary
values of n (1;3; and 10) in our numerical simulations. This allows us to analyse the
effects of a higher number of rival firms on the different oligopoly equilibria which
are specified as a function of parameter d. Appendices 5.4 to 5.6 describe the
derivation of the second best welfare, Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a
function of parameters n and d.
Figures 5.6(a) and 5.7(a) represent the resulting industry's total effort in the
three equilibria under study. We can observe that the range of d values that implies
a sole owner solution in the three equilibria, that is 0 ^ d ^ 1/6, is invariant to the
changes in the number n of rival firms. From d> 1/6, the Coumot-Nash total fishing
effort z'' monotonically increases as n gets higher (Figure 5.7(a)). In the cases of the
Stackelberg and second best welfare equilibria, the effects on the industry's total
efforts are more complex. Let us analyse them.
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(5.H.1) More rival firms and Stackelberg leadership attributes.
In the oligopoly equilibria where one firm is endowed with Stackelberg leadership
attributes (Stackelberg and second best welfare cases), increases in n widen the range
of d values where the sole owner solution prevails (such that the equilibrium value
of the representative z=0). Notice that in this range of d values the private
Stackelberg and second best welfare solutions are fully equivalent (Figures 5.6(a)-(b)-
(c)). With n=3, the upper limit for the validity of the sole owner solution is given
by d=1f3; with n= 10, the upper limit of this solution rises to d=6111. Figure 5.6(b)
shows that as n increases, the level of the leader's optimal effort z increases in this
range of d values, in order to preempt fishing effort from the follower firms. Figure
5.6(c) shows the corresponding range of d values such that the equilibrium value of
z=0. Why is this so?
For the private Stackelberg leader, a higher n implies a higher harvesting
preemption power over the group of follower firms. This simply means that the
leader can discourage fishing effort from a higher number of rivals (see comments
on equation (8), given that k= 1). By choosing a higher ZLS in this range of d values,
the Stackelberg leader is able to fully avoid the presence of congestion externality
effects and the corresponding negative effects on his own marginal harvesting
productivity.
As long as the sole owner solution prevails, the private leader and the second
best welfare planner choose identical ZL. Therefore, in the range of d values where
the sole owner solution prevails, it must be true that the full preemption of the
representative follower's fishing effort (by means of setting a higher z L (d)>0 as
n increases, such that z 1(d) =0) generates higher social benefits than the catch losses
that result from the inactivity of type f firms. These net welfare gains balance the
productivity gains that stem from the avoidance of an increasing congestion problem
as n rises, versus the catch losses from inactive firms with (relative) harvesting
productivity given by parameter d.
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However, starting from a d value such that the equilibrium value of Zf
becomes positive (with this d value such that d=d(n), d' >0), the optimal fishing
effort policies for the private Stackelberg leader and the second best welfare planner
start to diverge. As long as zf >O, we obtain that invariably zS> z', with z > W2
and, correspondingly, z,<z.
While both (private and social planner) Stackelberg leading firms reduce their
corresponding optimal ZL when zf>O and d increases, the social planner does it in a
quicker way (see Figure 5.6(b)) in order to take advantage of the increasing relative
harvesting productivity of the representative follower firm. As d increases, the
objective of avoiding congestion problems, by fully preempting the fishing efforts
from type f firms, starts to lose priority relative to the higher catch performances that
stem from allowing positive harvesting from type f firms with an increasing
productivity. The gains from the latter effect increase as the number of type f firm
increases. This explains the quicker rate of reduction in the optimal ZL as it
increases, provided that the level of d makes it socially worthwhile to allow the
representative zf to be positive.
Figure 5.6(c) represents the corresponding increasing levels of the optimal
z>0 as the values of d get higher. Notice, however, that increases in 'I
unambiguously reduce the optimal level of zf for a given value of d, both in the
Stackelberg and second best welfare cases. This result simply reflects the declining
marginal productivity of type f firms as the number of rival firms increases, due to
the increasing congestion externality problem.
Note also in Figure 5.6(b) the widening, as the value of n increases, of the
range of d values where it is optimal for the second best planner to set ZL=O. With
n=l, this shut down policy is optimal only when d= 1; when n= 10, ZL=0 is
optimal for the range 0.756 ^ d ^ 1 (see Appendix 5.4). This implies that, as n gets
higher, it becomes optimal for the second best welfare planner to fully sacrifice the
use of his harvesting preemption ability in a wider range of d values, in order to
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allow for higher harvesting from a higher number of type f firms with a harvesting
productivity relatively close to firm L's productivity.
Finally, Figure 5.6(d) shows the evolution of the Stackelberg overfishing gap,
relative to the second best welfare yardstick30, as d and n increases. With a duopoly
fishery (n =1) we obtain a monotonic increase in the Stackelberg overfishing gap, as
d increases, as long as the sole owner solution no longer prevails. Notice that when
d= 1 the overfishing outcome implies an industry's total effort which is 50% higher
in the Stackelberg duopoly than in the second best welfare fishery.
With more follower firms, which are not under the control of the welfare
planner, the Stackelberg overfishing gap becomes smaller. With n =10, the
overfishing gap implies a Stackelberg total effort which is around 5% higher than the
optimal z'. When n =3 or n =10, the welfare planner's shut down policy (setting
ZL =0 for relatively high values of d) triggers a declining Stackelberg overfishing
gap as the values of d get nearer to d =1. This occurs because the second best
welfare solution becomes equivalent to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with n symmetric
type f firm. This equivalence implies an increasing equilibrium's total effort as d
increases in this range (Figure 5.6(a)) and a reduction of the positive difference with
respect to a higher Stackelberg total effort.
In summary, the optimal policy ZL' =0 (valid when d=k=1, Vn ^ 1) does not
remain invariant when d^ 1 and n changes. For relatively low values of d, the second
best planner chooses an initially increasing ZL>0 in order to fully avoid congestion
problems. When the representative zf becomes positive we obtain that z> z, with
S > ZL and 2S As d increases, both z and ZL decreases, but the latter
does so in a quicker way. This occurs because the social planner fully internalizes the
social gains that stem from allowing an increasing harvesting from type f firms with
The Stackelberg overfishing gap is measured as the percentual ratio (t-z)Iz". The overfishing
measured in terms of the first best welfare yardstick can easily be observed in Figure 5.6(a). Recall
that z"=lO for all d such that O<d^1 and for all n^I.
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(relative) higher productivity. In a final stage, as d gets closer to 1, the social planner
finds it optimal to shut down his own harvesting (setting z L =0). Finally, increases
in the number of rival firms tend to reduce the Stackelberg overfishing gap, when the
latter is measured with respect to the second best welfare yardstick.
(5.H.2) Cournot-Nash (under)overfishing.
In Figure 5.7(a) we can compare the Coumot-Nash industry' total effort with the first
best welfare solution. We observe an increasing Cournot-Nash overfishing as n gets
higher, provided that the sole owner solution is no longer valid. This result is close
to standard (informal) economic intuition. If we now compare the Cournot-Nash
solution with the second best welfare yardstick, the comparative results are less
directly intuitive. Let us focus on the latter comparison.
Figure 5.7(b) represents the percentual gap (zNz)/z as a function of d
values, for the three values of n considered in our numerical simulation exercise. We
can observe a range of d values, which widens as n gets higher, in which the
Cournot-Nash solution implies an und.erflshing result, relative to the second best
welfare benchmark (zN<z). In other words, the range of d values that implies
Cournot-Nash ovefishing becomes smaller as n gets higher.
In the duopoly case (n= 1), the overfishing gap implies an industry's total
effort which is approximately 33% higher, when d =1, than the optimal total effort
for the second best planner. With n=3 and d= 1, the Cournot-Nash solution implies
a total effort which is approximately 6% higher than the second best solution; with
n =10 and d =1, the overfishing percentual gap is nearly equivalent to 1 % of z.
The latter trend of a decreasing (second best) overflshing gap, as n gets
higher, implies an interesting underlying intuition. As the number of follower firms
(which are not under the control of the social planner) gets higher, we obtain an
increase in the (over)estimation of the Cournot-Nash overfishing that results from
using the first best welfare yardstick, instead of using the second best benchmark.
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With the first best yardstick, a higher n implies a higher Coumot-Nash overflshing.
With the second best benchmark, the opposite result occurs. Figures 5.7(c)-(d) help
to understand this outcome.
In Figure 5.7(c) we initially observe an increasing positive divergence between
ZL and zj as n gets higher, provided that the sole owner solution is no longer
valid. In fact, there exists an intermediate range of d values, which widens as n gets
higher, such that ZL > ZLN. Consistent with the latter, in this range of d values
2W2 < N• This is the range of d values which implies a Coumot-Nash (second best)
underfishing outcome (Figure 5.7(b)). Hence, the resulting Cournot-Nash
underfishing is due to the second best planner's desire to set a higher fishing effort
for the more productive firm L, versus ZLN, in this range of relatively low values of
the productivity parameter d. This range widens as n increases due to the triggered
higher congestion problem that the social planner aims to avoid or reduce by
increasing ZL. By contrast with the planner's optimal fishing policy, the Cournot-
Nash firm L monotonically reduces her optimal effort as d and ii increase, for all d
values such that O<d^l.
However, starting from a critical value of d (whose level depends on the value
of n in a positive way), the second best welfare planner starts to reduce his own
fishing effort as d gets higher, with the aim to allow for increasing harvesting from
the relatively more productive and more numerous type f firms. In a final stage,
which is valid for relatively high values of d, that is, relatively close to 1, the welfare
planner ends by choosing a full shut down policy for his own fishing activity
(zL =0). The range of d values in which this result is valid depends on the number
of rival firms.
In the process when the planner is reducing his own effort ZL, because d is
increasing, there arises a range of d values such that ZL < z'. Consistently, in this
range we obtain that z> z (Figure 5.7(d)). This is the range of d values that
implies the Cournot-Nash (second best) overfishing. Hence, in this case the
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overfishing outcome arises due to the planner's preference for a lower zt, versus the
Cournot-Nash ZLN, when the productivity parameter d achieves relatively high levels
(getting closer to 1). Notice, however, that the absolute values of the differences
(zL'-zj) and (2W2..2N) become smaller as n gets higher. The latter reflects the
increasing approximation of the second best welfare solution to a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium as n increases, given the (final stage) planner's choice such that ZLW2=O.
In summary, in the Cournot-Nash fishery we initially obtain a range of
intermediate d values that imply underfishing with respect to the second best welfare
yardstick. This result reflects the planner's desire to increase the harvesting of the
more productive firm L along this range of intermediate d values. However, as the
(relative) productivity parameter of the representative follower firm gets closer to 1,
the Cournot-Nash fishery implies second best overfishing. In this case, the planner
would prefer a higher fishing effort from the increasingly more productive type f
firms, versus the effort chosen by the representative Cournot-Nash firm f.
When we consider the first best welfare yardstick, we obtain (in the
Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash fisheries) that an increase in the number of rival firms
implies higher overfishing. When we consider the second best benchmark, the
opposite result is obtained. The latter reflects the second best planner's decreasing
power of control over the industry's total harvesting as more firms enter into the
common pool fishery.
Finally, Figure 5.8 represents the positive difference between the industry's
total efforts zS and ZN (as percentage of ZN), for d values between 0 and 1 and the
three values of n considered in our numerical simulation exercises. With the
exception of the (common) range of d values such that a sole owner solution prevails,
we obtain that invariably zS > ZN. Notice also that the simulation results, for
1/6<d< 1, tend to confirm the result (previously derived in section 5.D for k=d=1)




This chapter develops three main innovations with respect to the existing literature
on static oligopoly harvesting games within deterministic common pool fisheries.
First, it develops a consistent analysis of the overfishing ranking that results from
comparing Coumot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. Second, it develops an explicit
comparative analysis for a first best and a second best welfare benchmark. The latter
is defined by a social planner who has only partial control upon the industry's total
fishing effort and who is endowed with Stackeiberg leadership attributes. Third, the
commonality of fish stocks is modelled by considering an explicit parameter for a
congestion externality effect within each firm's harvesting technology.
We model congestion as a negative externality that reduces (i) each firm's
catch (for a given level of the firm's fishing effort) and also (ii) the marginal
productivity of each firm's fishing effort. The analysis considers oligopolistic firms
subject to price taldng behaviour, both in input and output markets.
The traditional modelling of congestion problems within common pool
fisheries consists in defining an aggregate (industry level) harvesting function subject
to decreasing returns in the (aggregate) use of the variable fishing input. Our model,
by contrast, individualizes an explicit congestion parameter. This allows the explicit
analysis of how different (exogenous) levels of the congestion externality affect the
resulting overfishing under different oligopoly equilibria.
Within a duopoly setting, we obtain that exogenous increases in the congestion
problem lead to higher oligopoly overfishing. This result is valid both with respect
to the first best and the second best welfare benchmarks. For a given level of
congestion, we obtain that Stackelberg leadership attributes in hands of a static profit
maximizing private firm imply higher overfishing versus the case of a Cournot-Nash
fishery. This overfishing ranking is consistent with the results obtained by previous
static oligopoly harvesting models (Comes and Sandier, 1983; Mason, Sandier and
Comes, 1988) where the modelling of a negative parameter of conjectures variations,
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within oligopoly equilibria of the latter type, intensifies the overfishing that prevails
under Nash type (zero) conjectures.
The positive overfishing gap between the Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash
fisheries, that is (zSzN) >0 with z'' > z> z, widens as the congestion problem
increases (as k gets higher). This is due to the increasing harvesting preemption
power that a Stackelberg leader obtains as the congestion problem increases. The
harvesting preemption power is due to the first mover advantage that the Stackelberg
leader has. This advantage reinforces the incentives to anticipate the harvesting of
rival firms that arise from the presence of common property fish stocks. For a range
of relatively high values of the congestion parameter (k closer to 1), a private
Stackelberg leader increases his optimal fishing effort as the congestion rises. In this
case, the effect of increasing preemption powers dominates over the effect of a
declining marginal productivity of fishing efforts that is also produced by increases
in the congestion problem. By contrast, a Cournot-Nash firm invariably reduces her
fishing effort as the congestion increases.
The higher industry's total fishing effort that results in the Stackelberg fishery,
versus the Cournot-Nash case, is a robust result with respect to parametric changes
in: (i) the number n of rival firms, (ii) the relative technological size of the
congestion externality effect (parameter k), and (iii) the proportional productivity
differential d that we model in favour of the leading firm (relative to her followers).
However, we obtain that the positive difference between the Stackelberg and
Cournot-Nash industry's total efforts, that is (zSzN) >0, tends to decrease as the
number of rival firms increases (for n ^ 2). This is due to the reduction in the
Stackelberg leader's preemption power over each individual follower firm as more
follower firms enter into the fishery. In other words, the larger the industry's size is,
in the sense of more numerous firms, the smaller the Stackelberg leader's harvesting
preemption effect on each individual follower firm.
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We also obtain a decreasing difference (zszl) >0 as the value of parameter
d (followers' relative marginal productivity) increases. The presence of follower
firms with higher harvesting productivity (relative to the leader) increases the
industry's total effort both in the Stackelberg and the Cournot-Nash fishery. But the
aggregate increase in fishing efforts is smaller in the former case, because the private
Stackelberg leader tends to choose a lower fishing effort due to the marginal
reduction in his harvesting preemption powers as his rivals become more productive.
The explicit analysis of two alternative welfare yardsticks allows us to derive
some interesting generalizations with respect to the prevailing literature on fisheries.
We obtain that a sole owner solution is not always the socially optimal fishing policy.
Full specialization in a single harvesting firm31 , subject to price taking behaviour, has
been the standard welfare benchmark within common pool fisheries economics,
starting with the classic pioneering papers of Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955), and
following later with the classic models of Clark (1980) and Levhari and Mirman
(1980). On occasions, the use of the sole owner welfare yardstick has gone beyond
methodological clarifying purposes towards its defense on policy grounds (see
Charles', 1988, survey paper).
In our discussion the sole owner solution prevails, in the four oligopoly
equilibria considered in the analysis, for a range of sufficiently high productivity
differentials in favour of one of the oligopolist firms (relatively low values of d). In
this case the leading (higher productivity) firm is able to fully preempt the harvesting
of her rivals. Clark's (1980) discussion presents a duopoly solution on the latter line
of thought. In the case of the first best welfare planner, the sole owner solution tends
to dominate over other policy options as the congestion problem becomes higher
(k^ 1) and/or the harvesting productivity of the fringe of follower firms becomes
lower.
31 In a more general sense, this implies uiufied management of total harvesting activities.
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Our definition of the first best welfare case, as it happens in its standard
treatment within the literature on fisheries economics, requires the fulfillment of three
strong assumptions: (1) that the social planner has full control on the composition and
operation of the total harvesting fleet; (2) that the social planner is as well informed
as private firms, and (3) that the planner's decision making, monitoring and enforcing
processes are all institutionally costless, in the sense that the modelling discussion
assigns no explicit additional cost to the functioning of the welfare planner, relative
to the private firms' decision making and controlling processes.
Our second best welfare exercise relaxes the previous assumption (1) and
illustrates, within a fully deterministic setting, how the explicit consideration of
limitations on the welfare planner's powers of control reduces the range of oligopoly
harvesting equilibria that can be associated with (constrained) inefficient overfishing.
Hence, the use of the second best welfare yardstick tends to reduce the magnitude of
the overfishing problem, relative to the levels defined by first best considerations.
For instance, the second best welfare solution tends to imply smaller
overfishing gaps in the Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash fisheries as the number of
follower firms increases, even though the industry's total harvesting tends to
monotonically increase with a higher n. The decreasing oligopoly overfishing gaps
reflect the lower planner's control over the industry's total harvesting as more firms
enter into the common pool fishery. The use of the first best welfare yardstick
implies the opposite result: a higher number of operational firms tends to increase the
oligopoly overfishing.
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Figure 5.1(a). Second best welfare equilibria. (k=n= 1)
Figure 5.1(b)
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Figure 5.6(a)
Industry's total effort (k=1)
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Figure 5.6(b)
Finn L's fishing effort (k=1)
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Figure 5.6(c)
Finn l's fishing effort (k=1)
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Figure 5.6(d)
Overfishing % gap (k=1)
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Figure 5.7(b)
Over(under)flslilng % gap (k=1)
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Figure 5.8
Higher Stackelberg effort (% of Nash)
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(5.J) Appendices
Appendix 5.1: Proof for Proposition 1 (for O<d^1).
Rewrite equations (15) and (18) as:
s	 1	 12n+1]	 w 11+ _n El	 1Z = .
	
a [
	 j -	 I (n^1)dJ]	
[C]	 (Al)
=	 I a 2(n+l) - w 2 Qz+d1	 A2)
n+2	 pd n+2J	 2
To prove that invariably zS > ZN, we need to show that invariably C > D. From
(A.l) we can rewrite C as:
c= (2n + 1) (ii ^2) a 2(n +1) _2w (n ^d) [(n ^1)d +	
In + 1	 (A3)
2(n+1)(n+1)	 n+2	 pd(n+2)[ (n^d) ] L2n^1]J
(i) Denote by E the term outside big brackets in (A3). We know that:
E = 2n+1 n+2 
= [(2n+1) / (n+1)]
2(n+1)	 T	 [2(n+1) / (n+2)]
and
2n^1 = 2(n+1) + _________
n+1	 n^2	 (n+1)(n+2)
Therefore, we know that E > 1 for any n >0.
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(ii) Denote the following expression by F:
1 (n+1)d + nl I n^i 1F	
L n+d ] L2n+li
If F ^ 1, then invariably C> D, given that (i) is true. If F ^ 1, then the following
relationship is also true:
F^1	 d+n'-nd	 n+1+n
d+n	 n+1
The validity of this inequality requires that nd(n+ 1) ^ n(d+n). This requires that
n2d ^ 2• Given that d ^ 1, this inequality is always true. Therefore F ^ 1 is always
































Appendix 5.3: Duopoly equilibria with d=1 and O^k^1
(5.3.a) First best welfare solution.
The planner's problem consists in maximizing the representative firm i's current
profits, that is:
max W=p (a; - ($ + y) z 2) - wz,	 (C. 1)
The first order condition (a wThz1) =0 implies:
2	
[a -wip]	 (C.2)
Hence the first best welfare total effort Z =2; =[a -wIp]/(1 +k), With
k	 .With the parametric assumptions in section (5.0), z(k =0) =20 ,whereas
z'(k=1)=10.
(5.3.b) Second best welfare solution
Now the planner's problem consists in:
mx W=p(hL +h) w(zL +z)	 (C.3)
with
hL 2L -z2 7ZLZf	 (C.4)
hf azf-Izj jZLZf
The first order condition öW/äzL =0 implies:
a 1[+4 _2zL_27[	 a] -2.= I i+frl	(C.5)
IaZLJ	
Zf+ZL—......	
aZL P [	 öZLJ









The equilibrium value of the follower's fishing effort can be obtained by
introducing (C.6) into equation (7) in section (5.C).
Note that if k=1, and d=n=1, solution (C.6) corresponds to the leader's
optimal effort summarized in Table 5.4.
(5.3.c) Stackelberg duopoly
We obtain the effort solutions z and zf' by simply introducing the parametric
assumptions d=n=1 into equations (10) and (11-12). Doing so, we obtain:
,C(2-k)	 withC_LIa-&ZL 







Given that d =1, duopolists (1=1,2) are symmetric firms. The representative firm
i's optimization problem consists in:
max V' =p(az1 -;-'yzz1)-wz, j^i
	 (C.9)
The first order condition a v 18z1 =0 implies:
z = (a -wip)-z,	 (C. 10)




Appendix 5.4: Second best welfare equilibria with k=1, O^d^ 1 and n^ 1
The planner's optimization problem is, given the presence of n symmetric type f
firms:
max W=p[ azL -z -I3zL(nz) +nd(crz1-z	 Zf(ZL + (ii - 1)z1))] -w(zL +nz,) (D.1)
subject to the fact that the representative firm f chooses in a Cournot-Nash
fashion; that is, using equation (7) and the fact that k =1, the representative
follower's optimal fishing effort is given by:
..a-wlpd_ ZL 	 (D.2)
(n+1) ni-i
and hence az; 8ZL = -1/ (n +1) . Solving for the first order condition o WI azL = 0 and
using the information in (D.2), we obtain:
	
(Ka-w/p)_n(K+d)	 with K=n(1-d)+1	 (D.3)
5(K+1)	 (K+1)
By combining (D.2) and (D.3) we can obtain the second best welfare solution
1	 with the industry fishing effort equal tojZL,ZfJ'
Let us consider the case when k=1 =d and, hence, K=1. In this case, by
combining (D.2) and (D.3) we obtain that ZL =[(a -w/p)I2}(1 -n). This implies that
ZL ^ 0 as long as ,, ^ 1 and the representative firm f is active (the latter implies that
(a - wlp) /2 >0 ) Therefore, as long as > 0 the second best welfare planner's
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optimal fishing policy will be to set ZL=O
Let us now derive the second best welfare equilibria for n=3 and n= 10,
leaving the effort solutions as a function of parameter d. We consider the parameter
values which are valid for the numerical solution exercise, that is,
a=1l, =1/2, (wip)=l.
(5.4.a) n=3




whereas the planner's optimal effort conditional on zf is given by (see equation
(D.3)):
RL(d)—=zL=43332 6 (2-d)	 (D.3')
(5-3d)	 (5-3d)1
Equations (D.2')-(D.3') allow to obtain the second best welfare equilibria as
a function of parameter d. Solving by numerical simulation the system (D.2') -
(D.3'), for 0 <d ^ 1 we verify that:
(i) for 0 <d ^ 1/6, z(d) =0 requires a zL(d) value such that 0 ^ zL(d) ^ 10. This
means that for 0< d ^ 116, the second best planner can choose the best fishing policy
which is consistent with the presence of no rivals; that is, the planner sets z =10
and, hence, the representative follows firm chooses zr = 0.
(ii) for 1/6 <d ^ 1/3, we initially obtain equilibria such that z1 ^ 0 and ZL> 0. The
result z1 <0 implies that z1=0. This also implies that in this range of d values
äzJ a; =0 . As explained in section (5.F), this means that the best policy for the
planner is to set ZL such that R1(d) zf(ZL, d) = 0 . Hence	 = 2(11 - lid) and
Zf = 0.
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(iii) for 113 <d <0.7557, the equilibrium implies that ZL' >0 and z>0. In this
=(34 -66d + 12ld)/(4 -3iJ) and Zf is given by equation (D.2').
(iv) for 0.7557^d^ 1, the equilibrium implies z1 ^0 and Zf>O. This implies thatz =0






120-llOd_5(11-9d)z	 (D.3")RL (d)	 ZL=
(6-5d)	 (6-Sd) /
Solving by numerical simulation the system (D.2")-(D.3"), for0<d^1, we
verify that:
(i) for 0<d^1/6, z=10 and z?=0 (same reasons as in thecase with n=3).
(ii) for 1/6 <d ^ 6111, the equilibria are such that zf ^ 0 and ZL> 0. This implies
that in this range of d values, z? =0 . As previously explained, this means that the
planner's optimal policy is to set z =2(11 - lid). (set zf = 0 in equation (112"))
(iii) for 6/11< d <0.754, the equilibrium implies that z> 0 and z?> 0 . In
'' case, ZL 20(l lld+5.5d)/(1l 10d) and z is given by p.2").
(iv) for 0.754 ^ d ^ 1, the equilibrium implies ZL ^ 0 and z> 0. As in the case
with n=3, this result implies that in this range of d values z =0 and
Zf -2(l -1/lld).
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Appendix 5.5: Cournot-Nash equilibria with k1, O<d^1 and n1.
In this case the representative firm f's equilibrium value of z conditional on ZL is
given by equation (D.2). Firm L also behaves in a Cournot-Nash fashion. Hence, her
optimal effort ZL, conditional on the value of Z, is equal to:
	
z= a-(wlp)_flZ,r	 (E.1)L	 2fl	 2
By combining (D.2) and (E. 1) we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium {z,
zL } with zN=(zj+nz/4). Let us derive the corresponding equilibria, as a function
of d, for n=3 and n=10 (with a=11, =0.5 and w/p=1).
(5.5.a) n=3.
In this case R(d) is given by equation (D.2'), whereas RL(d) implies ZL= 10- 3/2zf.
Solving this system by numerical simulation, for 0< d ^ 1, we verify that:
(i) for 0 <d ^ 1/6, the higher productivity firm L can behave as a sole owner;
hence, she chooses ZLN = 10, whereas z/4 =0. (same reasoning as in previous cases).
(ii) for 116 <d ^ 1, both ZL and z are positive in equilibrium (note that
Rf(l/6)=zf(zL= 10) =0), with zLN(d) = 14/5 + 61(5d) and zt1(d) is given by (D.2').
(5.5.b) n=1O.
In this case Rf(d) is given by equation (D.2"), whereas RL(d) implies ZL= lO-5z.
Solving this system by numerical simulation, for 0 <d ^ 1, we verify that:
(i) for 0<d^ 1/6, we again obtain ZLN =l0 and z/4=0.
(ii) for 116< d ^ 1, again both ZL and z are positive in equilibrium, with
zL =10/(6d) and z/4(d) is given by (D.2").
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Appendix 5.6: Stackelberg equilibria with k=1, O<d^1 and n^1.
The representative firm fs optimal effort Zf conditional on the observed value of ZL
is given by (D2). The leader's equilibrium effort ZL conditional on the value of zf
is obtained by combining equations (7) and (9), the latter implying:
(n + 1) _______
= (n +2) 
[Cr -(wlp) -	 (F. 1)
Let us derive the Stackelberg equilibria for n=3 and n= 10, for values of d
such that 0 <d ^ 1, assuming that a = 11, =0.5 and wlp =1.
(5.6.a) n=3
Again R(d) is given by (D.2'), whereas (F. 1) in this case implies ZL = l6-(l2IS)Zf.
Solving this system by numerical simulation, for 0< d ^ 1, we verify that:
(i) for 0< d ^ 1/6, we again obtain z LS = 10 and 1fS=() (same reasoning as before).
(ii) for 1/6< d ^ 1/3, the equilibrium implies that z1^ 0 and ZL >0. The result
zf<O implies z=0. As explained in section (5.F), this implies that in this range of
d values the best policy for the Stackelberg leader is to set ZL such that
Rf(d)Ezf(zL,d) =O. Hence zLS =2(l1(1/d)) and z=0.
(iii) for 1/3<d^1, both ZL and z1 are positive in equilibrium, with zLS=7+(3/d)
and z(d) is given by (D.2').
(5.6.b) n=1O.
R1(d) is given by (D.2"), whereas equation (F. 1) now implies ZL= 110/6- (55/6)z.
Solving this system by numerical simulation, we verify that:
(i) for 0< d ^ 1/6, we again obtain ZLS = 10 and zrS=0.
(ii) for 1/6< d ^ 6/11, the equilibrium implies that z ^ 0 and ZL >0. The result
z1 <0 implies z1=0. Hence, in this range of d values the best policy for the
Stackelberg leader is to set ZL such that Rf(d)zf(zL,d)=0. Hence zLS=2(11_(lId))
and ZfS=0.
(iii) for 6/11< d ^ 1, both ZL and zf are positive in equilibrium, with zL = 10/d and
s(d) is given by (D.2") and, hence, equal to zf.=2(1-6/(lld)).
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CHAPTER 6
OVERFISHING IN A DYNAMIC SErIING
(6.A) Introduction.
In this chapter we focus our attention on the effect that finns' current harvesting has
on the law of motion for fish stocks. The common property of fish stocks implies that
firms' current harvesting generates a dynamic or stock externality. This corresponds
to the impact that rival firms' current harvesting has on future fish stock and, through
that, on other decision makers' future payoffs. This will be the source of overfishing
outcomes in this chapter. The magnitude of the overfishing result will depend on the
specific equilibrium concept that is considered for the oligopoly harvesting game. We
compare the overfishing ranking between Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash solutions.
First best and second best welfare benchmarks are used to assess overfishing.
This chapter models the overfishing problem as the result of endogenous
differences between the marginal social scarcity value of the common pooi fish stock
and the marginal value assigned to it by non-cooperative oligopolistic firms. We
discuss the meaning of myopic decision rules, making a distinction between the
concepts of static profit optimizing rules and Pareto inefficient harvesting myopia.
In the literature on fishery models, the distinction is not always clear.
In each of the harvesting equilibria studied, we examine the impact of
increasing the number of rival firms upon the fishing incentives faced by the different
types of oligopolistic harvesting firms. The formal analysis of this issue is a
contribution to the literature on dynamic oligopolistic harvesting gaines. Previous
dynamic models have basically studied duopoly harvesting competition games (Clark,
1980; Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Dockner et a!., 1989).
For the case of a common pool fish stock harvested by N> 1 dynamic profit
optimizing Cournot-Nash firms, we show that an increasing number of rival firms
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amplifies the overfishing problem only for a limited range of number of firms. This
result appears counter intuitive when contrasted with the trai:Iitional open access result
that stems from popular static discussions of overfishing (Gordon, 1954; Dasgupta
and Heal, 1979; Comes, Mason and Sandier, 1986).
In our dynamic deterministic setting, firms face two effects which help
dynamic profit optimizing firms to increasingly internalize the higher scarcity of the
common pool stock as more firms enter the fishery: on the one hand, declining
biological growth returns for relatively overdepleted stock levels, due to our use of
a strictly concave biological growth function. This effect arises from the function
which introduces dynamics into our discussion. On the other hand, an increasingly
lower marginal productivity of fishing efforts as the fish stock falls due to a larger
number of firms. This effect results from our use of a harvesting technology subject
to positive but declining marginal productivity of fish stock levels. This effect is
normally absent from fishery models due to the commonly used Schaefer harvesting
technology which is linear in stock levels.
We also examine the overfishing consequences of increasing the number of
rival firms in a multi-firm harvesting model where there is only one dynamic
optimizing firm competing with numerous static profit optimizing Cournot-Nash
rivals. We analyse the harvesting equilibria that result from modelling the single
dynamic optimizing agent as a: (i) profit maximizer Stackelberg leader, (ii) another
(profit optimizing) Coumot-Nash firm and (iii) a second best welfare planner who
aims at maximizing the discounted value of the industry's intertemporal profits. This
exercise aims to illustrate the possibility of a dominant firm that behaves as a
dynamic optimizing agent, despite competing with fully myopic rivals, and who may
also have Stackelberg leadership attributes. The motivation lies on the empirical
evidence described in chapters 3 and 4 suggesting the presence of industrial
concentration at important marine industrial fisheries.
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We show that in the three previous cases (i, ii, and iii) the dynamic
optimizing agent decides to leave the fishery for a sufficiently large (finite) number
of fully myopic rivals. This occurs due to the increasingly lower marginal
productivity of fishing efforts owing to depleted stock levels. Static profit optimizing
firms react more slowly to these productivity penalties and thereby contribute to the
possibility that the fish population becomes extinguished.
In our setting Stackelberg leadership does not yield any private advantage
(versus the case of passive Cournot-Nash conjectures) because static optimizing
followers' optimal efforts are independent of rivals' current fishing effort. This result
stems from the absence of congestion static externalities (via pecuniary or
technological effects) in our harvesting model and also from the static profit
optimizing character of followers' decision making. The presence of a second best
welfare planner improves only transitorily the overfishing problem, relative to the
Stackelberg equilibrium: the second best welfare planner, with limited control on the
industry's total harvesting fleet, also decides to leave the fishery for a sufficiently
large number of static profit optimizing non-cooperative firms.
We complement the analysis with a final exercise where we allow for the
possibility that the single dynamic optimizing Stackelberg leader has productivity
advantages over the static profit optimizing followers. The main result is that the
leading firm behaves as a counteracting factor in fishing effort patterns induced by
productivity changes among the followers: if followers' productivity increases, the
leading firm reduces his fishing effort and vice versa.
This chapter is organized as follows. Sections (6.B) and (6.C) discuss and
review background material. Section (6.B) discusses four important building blocks
in a dynamic model for a common property and multi-firm fishery. Section (6.C)
reviews four models that have some similarities to our discussion in this chapter. We
do so in order to highlight the contribution of our analysis.
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Sections (6.D) and (6.E) describe and develop our basic modelling
framework. Section (6.D) defines the basic setting for analysis. Section (6.E)
develops our first best optimality benchmark in which the welfare planner controls
all firms. Section (6.F) solves for the case of a fishery with N identical dynamic
profit optimizing Cournot-Nash harvesting firms. Subsection (6.F.1) discusses the
concept of myopic harvesting, while subsection (6.F.2) examines the effect of an
increasing number of rival firms on the degree of inefficient Nash myopia.
Sections (6.G) and (6.H) examine an oligopolistic fishery with a single
dynamic profit optimizing Stackelberg leader and n ^ 1 fully myopic Nash followers.
This Stackelberg equilibrium is compared with: a Cournot-Nash fishery where all
firms behave as fully myopic agents (section 6.G. 1); a Cournot-Nash fishery which
also has a single dynamic profit optimizing (Nash) firm (section 6.G.3); a Coumot-
Nash fishery where all firms are dynamic profit optimizing agents (section 6.G.2);
and finally, with a fishery where the single dynamic optimizing agent is a second best
welfare planner that controls only one firm, among other n ^ 1 non-cooperative Nash
harvesters, and aims to maximize the industry's total discounted intertemporal profits
(section 6.G.4). Section (6.H) generalizes to a Stackelberg leader with productivity
advantages over its followers. Section (6.!) offers concluding remarks. The
appendices in section (6.J) contain some technical material.
(6.B) Basic building blocks.
This section describes four key features in the dynamic modelling of an oligopolistic
harvesting industry that exploits a common pooi fish stock. We compare our
assumptions about them with those in previous models in the literature on dynamic
harvesting fisheries.
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(6.B.1) Strategic (oligopolistic) interactions.
During the 1960s and 1970s, models of overfishing gradually developed dynamic
aspects. Crutchfield and Zeliner (1962) and Plourde (1970) were pioneering papers.
Refinements on cost and production structures followed. In this vintage we find Smith
(1968, 1970), Quirk and Smith (1970) and Brown (1974).
The idea that open access, common property and decentralized harvesting with
static optimizing (myopic) agents would overexploit fish stocks was common to all
of them. The asswnp ion that fishermen will not consider the resource dynamics as
a binding constraint is crucial in their proofs. None of these models offer an
endogenous explanation for myopic harvesting. This feature will be modelled in this
chapter.
In the above papers strategic considerations were neither discussed nor
mentioned as factors affecting harvesting actions. In this chapter, by contrast, we
consider strategic interactions, in the sense of oligopolistic harvesting competition,
to be at the centre of the commonality problem. As in the rest of the literature, we
take it for granted that cooperative harvesting strategies are not feasible because of
high monitoring costs.
As in chapter 5, we restrict the analysis to a closed entry fishery. The number
of firms is given exogenously. This approach follows Clark's (1980) pioneer work
on a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash duopolistic harvesting game. Levhari and
Mirman's (1980) classic paper follows a similar development, though also developing
a brief section on a Stackelberg duopoly solution.
In these two seminal papers each duopolist considers the resource dynamics
as a binding constraint. However, none of these models offer an endogenous
modelling of the scarcity values assigned by dynamic profit maximizing harvesting
firms to the remaining fish stock. This chapter, by contrast, obtains analytical
solutions for these scarcity values, under Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
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Comparing the oligopoly solutions with an explicit welfare benchmark, we obtain an
endogenous explanation for harvesting myopia.
By considering the case of multi-firm harvesting fisheries subject to closed
entry, we are also able to analyse how an increasing number of rival firms affects the
fishing incentives of different types of harvesting firms (with different strategic
conjectures or static versus dynamic optimizing harvesting rules). Sections (6.F.2)
and (6.G) examine this issue.
(6.B.2) Sources of oligopollstic interaction.
In models discussing extraction problems for common pool resources, it is frequent
to find strategic interactions that stem from the combined effect of (i) pecuniary
externalities arising from firms endowed with price setting powers' and (ii)
technological externalities arising from the commonality feature. In fishery models,
Dockner et al. (1989), Kamien, Levhari and Mirman (1985), Mason, Sander and
Comes (1988) and Comes, Mason and Sandier (1986) are some examples that
combine both effects, the former two within a dynamic setting and the latter two
within static frameworks (see Table 6.1).
This chapter focuses on strategic interactions generated by the commonality
issue. We assume that harvesters are price takers in input and output markets. Think,
for instance, of an exporting fishing industry that takes demand prices as given and
likewise assume that harvesting firms face a horizontal supply curve of fishing effort
units.
Commonality of fish stocks accounts for the fact that interactions among firms
lead to technological externalities. The most common externality in fishery models
'In fact, conventional oligopoly models focus on pecuniary externalities.
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is a stock or dynwnic externality2: the impact that rivals' current harvesting has on
the future fish stock and, through that, on the decision maker's future payoffs. This
chapter focuses on firms' oligopolistic interactions that stem from the technological
externality associated with the so-called stock externality effect.
(6.B.3) Closed-loop versus open-loop extraction strategies.
The outcomes from strategic interactions are directly dependent on the strategy spaces
of the players. These include, for instance, players' information endowments,
possibilities for commitment, and number of interactions. In the case of dynamic
problems, an important dimension of the strategy space is the relation between choice
(control) and state variables.
Closed-loop strategies refer to cases where the decision maker has access to
information on current and past states. Therefore, control variables can be a function
of state variables. When there is information only on the current state, the strategy
is called aftedback rule. Open-loop strategies only consider information on the initial
states. Consequently, they are chosen as functions of time and independently from
additional state information (Basar and Olsder, 1982).
In strategic settings, closed-loop and open-loop strategies do not only differ
in terms of information structures. They also imply different assumptions on the
players' ability to make credible commitments on strategy time paths. A closed-loop
is a decision rule strategy: the decision maker chooses a rule relating the control to
the state variables. Its credibility depends on whether or not it is a self-enforcing
rule. By contrast, an open-loop strategy presupposes that a credible commitment is
possible over the entire planning horizon (Reinganum and Stokey, 1985).
2 A few fishery models, e.g., Smith (1968) and Brown (1974), include congestion (static)
externalities within dynamic frameworks, although none of these models consider congestion problems
within strategic (oligopolistic) settings. The usual characterization of congestion problems assumes
decreasing returns for fishing effort at the industry level (Table 6.1). A similar procedure, although
within pure static grounds, is resorted to in Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and the sequence of their own
papers which Mason, Sandier and Comes (1988) refer to.
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Models discussing strategic extraction of exhaustible common pools have
shown the importance of open-loop versus closed-loop strategies. These models
display a tendency to overextraction when closed-loop strategies are considered, if
non-cooperative solutions are contrasted with welfare yardsticks such as those
mentioned in chapters 4 and 5. Eswaran and Lewis (1984) is a Coumot-Nash
example. Within the framework of fishery models, (Cournot-Nash) closed-loop
strategies leading to overfishing are considered in Levhari and Mirman (1980), Clark
(1980) and Clemhout and Wan (1985b, 1986).
Conversely, Kemp and Long (1980), Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975) and
Chiarella et al. (1984) are models where open-loop (Nash) extraction strategies can
lead to Pareto efficient outcomes. It has been argued that this result arises, partly,
from the implicit commitment abilities that players enjoy in open-loop strategies
(Eswaran and Lewis, 1984; Mohr, 1988; Reinganum and Stokey, 1985; Thomas,
1992).
Mohr (1988) and Thomas (1992) further extend this line of thought. Mohr
relaxes assumptions in previous models where the duration of the game was
exogenous by resorting to a free-end-point problem and proves an overextraction
outcome when Nash open-loop strategies prevail. He argues this is equivalent to
weakening the players' ability to commit. On the other hand, Thomas further expands
the players' strategy space, thereby enabling them to obtain ex-post cooperative
outcomes by allowing for extraction strategies with full memory over past actions.
Full memory makes punishment strategies feasible (credible) under certain conditions
and hence it acts as a substitute to open-loop commitments in the promotion of more
(ex post) cooperative outcomes.
The second intuition as to why closed-loop strategies tend to produce less
cooperative outcomes derives from the strategic preemptive incentives that state-
dependent extraction strategies bring to bear (Eswaran and Lewis, 1984). An increase
in firm i's extraction can preempt state-dependent rivals' extraction, for example, if
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i enjoys cost advantages or moves first. Even simultaneous symmetric Nash players
have incentives to preempt each other, when they exploit a common pool, given their
conjectures on rivals' passive reactions.
Our models in this chapter consider closed-loop strategies. They will be self
enforcing and dynamically consistent rules for Cournot-Nash players as well as for
the Stackelberg leader. This differs from the open-loop strategies that the leader and
followers follow in Dockner et al. (1989) and Plourde and Yeung (1989). Open-loop
strategies impose strong assumptions on players' ability to make commitments. For
fishery industries, frequently subject to random supply shocks, such a presumption
can lead to misleading conclusions.
(6.B.4) Harvesting technology.
When fishery models consider an explicit harvesting function, they usually assume
linearity with respect to fishing effort (variable input) and fish stocks (Clark, 1980;
Dockner et al., 1989; Plourde and Yeung, 1989; see Table 6.1). This corresponds
to the so-called Schaefer technology in fisheries economics; that is, h1(t) =kz(t)x(t),
with h1(t) denoting firm i's harvest rate in period t, z her fishing effort, x the
common pool fish stock, and k a positive constant. Fishing efforts and fish stock
levels have positive and constant marginal harvesting productivities.One reason for
the popularity of this functional form is that it simplifies the mathematical modelling,
especially of dynamic arguments.
In this chapter we will consider a harvesting function with positive but
decreasing marginal productivities for individual fishing effort z and fish stock
levels. In the case of fishing effort the decreasing marginal productivity feature seems
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a plausible assumption. Its empirical validity can presumably be expected to increase,
the higher the scale of harvesting operations3.
Decreasing marginal harvesting returns for the fish stock can be a more
controversial assumption in terms of its empirical validity. To justify its use on these
grounds, we would need to argue for the existence of some indivisible factor that
negatively affects the marginal harvesting contribution of the fish stock as its level
increases. A possible example is as follows. Suppose there occurs an exogenous
increase in the availability of a given fish population. Imagine that this population
distributes itseft in geographically dispersed and highly mobile fish patches. Suppose
that the population growth implies, given food distribution patterns, that more dense
fish patches tend to move to more distant and unknown sea grounds. In this example,
it is reasonable to expect that the more abundant fish population will imply higher
catches for a given level of the variable input fishing effort (i.e., number of fishing
days). Nonetheless, as the closest fish patches become depleted, it is plausible to
expect that the positive harvesting productivity of additional (more distant) fish
patches will start to decline, given the fixed searching capacity (for locating fish
patches) which is attached to each fishing boat (i.e., engine power, radar, crew
captain's idiosyncratic fishing knowledge). We could interpret the declining
productivity of the incremental (more distant) fish patches, ceteris paribus, as
equivalent to an aggregate (though dispersed) fish stock with positive but declining
marginal harvesting productivity.
The empirical relevance of an assumption is a possible, though not the only,
criterion to evaluate its usefulness. In the model in this chapter, two other criteria
have guided our choice of the assumption of declining marginal harvesting
3 As the scale of harvesting increases, it is plausible to expect that indivisibilities in the harvesting
operation will start to negatively affect the marginal productivity of the variable input fishing effort.
For instance, think of the crew captain's fishing ability, which is usually a non-easily reproducible
idiosyncratic knowledge, as a possible source of an (implicit) indivisible factor within the harvesting
technology.
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productivity for the fish stock. First, a tractability argument: this assumption,
together with a declining marginal productivity for fishing effort, allows us to obtain
analytical solutions for our differential oligopoly harvesting games.
Second, a theoretical inquiry. The modelling of a decreasing marginal
productivity for the fish stock will allow us to study oligopolistic overfishing
incentives when individual firms face increasing marginal productivity losses as they
(together) increase the harvesting competition aimed at appropriating the common
pool resource's Ricardian rents. As the fish population decreases due to an increasing
aggregate harvesting, each firm's marginal productivity of effort falls at an increasing
rate. The latter effect is absent when the Schaefer harvesting technology is used.
Table 6.1 summarizes some key features of the most important fishery models
which have been mentioned in this section. The next section analyses four of these
models in greater depth, explaining how our model differs.
(6.C) A brief survey.
This section reviews four fishery models (Clark, 1980; Levhari and Mirman, 1980;
Dockner et a!., 1989; Plourde and Yeung, 1989) with some similarities to our
modeffing in this chapter. We do so in order to highlight the contribution of our
analysis. The four models share some important common features:
(A. 1) The focus is on dynamic and deterministic oligopoly harvesting models.
(A.2) They consider a common property and single fish stock fishery, subject to
decentralized multi-firm harvesting. The number of harvesting firms is at least
equal to two (N^2).
(A.3) The fishery operates under closed entry. Accordingly, the number of
harvesting firms N is an exogenous variable.
(A.4) Cooperative private harvesting arrangements are excluded by assumption.
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harvesting strategies aimed at intenzalizing the dynamic externality. It is
assumed that any attempt to coordinate individual harvesting decisions will
imply higher coordination and enforcement costs than the expected benefits.
(A.5) A harvesting function h=h(z,x) with h linear in z and x; where h denotes the
harvest level, z a homogeneous variable input, and x the fish stock level.
Input z represents the choice variable. Call it fishing effort. Think of input z
as a variable that combines other inputs (for example, capital, labour, and
services) in fixed proportions.
(A.6) Total harvesting costs are linear in the harvest rate. This occurs due to the
combined effect of (i) firms' price taking behaviour in the market for input
z, and (ii) the constant marginal productivity of z due to assumption (A.5).
(A.7) Suppose that any physical capital input is peifectly malleable. This means that
it can adapt, without positive adjustment costs, to any desired level. This is
consistent with the modelling of the composite input z as the only choice
variable.
(A.8) A strictly concave biological growth function for fish stock x. This
assumption is necessary to avoid multiple equilibria and related instability
problems (see chapter 2).
Our modelling in this chapter shares these features, with the exception of the
linearity assumption in (A.5). Instead we differ by assuming (i) a harvesting function
that is strictly concave in z and x. Other sources of divergence with previous models
are related to the assumptions on (ii) whether or not harvesting firms are endowed
with price setting powers, and (iii) whether harvesting strategies are characterized as
open-loop or closed-loop policies. Table 6.1 summarizes these and other key
assumptions in the main previous fishery models which are related to our discussion
in this chapter. Our dynamic model considers oligopolistic firms subject to price
taking behaviour and closed loop fishing effort strategies.
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Let us review the overfishing outcomes that result from the above mentioned
four models in their treatment of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg dynamic oligopoly
harvesting fisheries.
(6.C.1) Cournot-Nash overfishing outcomes.
Clark (1980) studies a Cournot-Nash duopolisac fishery with features (A.1)-(A.8).
He assumes price taking harvesting firms and focuses on steady state solutions. Each
duopolist's fishing effort decision corresponds to a closed-loop policy: each current
effort decision is a function of current fish stock levels. Given the use of a firm's
objective functional (the profit function) that is linear in the control variable, the
effort solutions correspond to bang-bang controls'. The optimaiity benchmark is a
sole owner's harvesting policy. Asymmetric firms, in terms of harvesting efficiency,
are considered. The higher efficiency firm is defmed as having a lower open access
equilibrium stock level at which the firm's profit becomes zero. A firm can be more
efficient than her rival due to a lower cost parameter or because of a higher
harvesting productivity coefficient.
The asymmetric efficiency case is used to examine the possibility of
convergence to a sole owner's harvesting solution. This occurs when the higher
efficiency firm drives the fishery to a sufficiently low stock solution such that it
implies a non-positive profit margin for her rival. This will occur when one of the
duopolists enjoys a sufficiently higher harvesting efficiency, in the sense defined
above, as opposed to her rival. The model does not consider the possibility of re-
entry competition, despite the fact that a sole owner firm will tend to choose a higher
stock level equilibrium than the stock level that is required to drive her rival away.
4 A bang-bang solution implies that the control variable (fishing effort) can only takes its maximum
(z=zJ or its minimum value (z=O) when the fish stock differs from its steady state level. When the
latter prevails, the fishing effort rate is such that the aggregate harvesting is equal to the natural
biological growth dxldt= G(x).
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The key element for the duopoly overfishing result is the assumption of Nash
conjectures. A Cournot-Nash firm only considers the marginal effects, on the fish
stock, arising from changes in her own harvesting level. Rivals' harvesting is taken
as given. As long as the natural resource has a zero market price (given
commonality), each Nash firm will not consider the effect that marginal changes in
her rival's catch has over the social scarcity value of the common pool fish stock.
Consequently, each firm will tend to undervalue the shadow price of fish stocks.
Hence, the common pool stock will be driven to an inefficiently low level.
Plourde and Yeung (1989) is another overfishing model that focuses on a
closed entry, deterministic and dynamic Cournot-Nash multi-firm fishery. This model
generalizes the overfishing proof for the case of N >2, assuming features (A. 1)-
(A.8). It differs from Clark (1980) in its use of a logarithmic objective function,
representing utility streams derived from the harvesting rate h. Harvesting technology
h is linear in fishing effort and in fish stock, with fishing effort as the control
variable. By using a Gompertz growth function5 and a logarithmic transformation of
the original state variable (fish stock), the authors obtain fishing effort solutions
which are open-loop controls: effort solutions become independent of fish stock
levels.
Despite the formal generalizations with respect to Clark's basic setting, the
key message remains intact in Plourde and Yeung's (1989) results: Coumot-Nash
conjectures lead to a multi-firm overfishing outcome. Although this model obtains an
explicit solution for the Cournot-Nash firms' valuation of the common pool fish
stock, it does not analyse whether or not static optimizing (myopic) behaviour is the
limit case of this multi-firm fishery as the number of flrms increases. Our modelling
in sections (6.F) and (6.H), by contrast, offers an explicit analysis of the latter issue.
This analysis considers Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg multi-firm fisheries.
5 The Gompertz growth function corresponds to: (t)x(t)[aIn{x(t)}]
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(6.C.2) Introducing Stackelberg leadership.
Dockner et al. (1989) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) also consider deterministic and
dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibria, but in addition analyse the case of a dynamic
Stackelberg equilibrium. Both models focus on a duopoly harvesting sector.
Dockner et a!. (1989) work with a harvesting fishery that faces a unit
elasticity inverse demand function p(H) = 1/H, where the total harvest rate is
H=(h1 +h2)6. As a result, the duopoly firms face harvesting interdependencies that
originate from two different sources:
(1) from the technological effect of (i) fish stock commonality, (ii) stock
dependence of the firm i's harvesting function h 1 =z1x, with z1 denoting i's
fishing effort and x for fish stock levels, and (iii) the impact of each firm's
current harvesting over the future levels of the fish stock x; and
(2) from the market harvesting interaction that arises from the effect of harvesting
output on price, given the assumption of p'(H) <0.
The model allows the duopoists (i =1,2) to have different constant unit costs
of fishing effort w1, with firm i's total harvesting cost equal to C=w 1z. This model
also considers a Gompertz growth function for the stock x, as in Plourde and Yeung
(1989), and solves for an infinite horizon problem. Given the particular demand and
harvesting functions considered, the fishing effort solutions become open-loop
strategies. This implies that the dynamic optimization problem is solved by
maximizing the current profit function in each time period, as f the decision maker
were a static optimizing agent7. This means that, in this infinite horizon problem, the
only relevant source of strategic interaction becomes the market interaction that arises
from the effect of harvesting output on price (Dockner et aL, p.5).
6 Note that the total revenue of the two firms (pH) is constant given the unit elastic demand
function.
7 FUiU i's per period profit is (px-c)z. The inverse demand function implies p=x'(z 1 +zj'. Hence
the per period profits become independent of x.
253
The steady state solutions from Dockner et al. (1989) can be summarized as
follows. Denote industry's total fishing effort by Ze, with the superscript e=S,N
denoting equilibrium type (Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash equilibria, respectively);
flC denotes total profits in the industry with equilibrium type e (e=S,N); whereas U
corresponds to player j's profits, with j =L,f for leader and follower, respectively.
The industry's total profit is the sum of both firms' individual profits. Similarly, c
denotes firm j's constant per unit cost of fishing effort. The steady state solutions are:
(A) if wL >wf, then Z5 <Z' and Us>flN; with (nJs>.(n1)N and ()S>(fl)N
(B) if WL < Wf , then Zs > ZN and 11S> 11N, g with ()s> (111)N
The welfare maximization solution is not derived to compare with the
oligopoly equilibria9. Hence, it is not possible to make welfare prescriptions that refer
to oveifishing outcomes. However, some lessons result from comparing the Cournot-
Nash and Stackelberg solutions:
(i) In both equilibria the firm with cost advantages achieves the higher stationary
catch rate. This is independent of whether that firm has Stackelberg leadership.
Hence, if the Stackelberg leader has cost disadvantages with respect to the follower
(wL > w1), the leading firm will choose a lower fishing effort than the follower's one.
(ii) if the firm endowed with Stackelberg leadership has cost advantages over the
follower, she will choose a higher fishing effort than in the case she used Cournot-
Nash conjectures. If the Stackelberg leader has cost disadvantages, by contrast, she
will choose a lower fishing effort than in the case she used Cournot-Nash conjectures.
According to the results in (A) and (B), in Dockner et al. (1989) the presence
of Stackelberg leadership implies higher industry's stationary fishing efforts (versus
the Cournot-Nash case) only if the leading firm has cost advantages over the
follower, If not, the leading firm will reduce her fishing effort in order to allow for
'This requires equality of the discount rates of the duopolists.
9 Note that since p=p(H), p'(H)(O, welfare measures must include a consumers' surplus term
as well as the firms' profits.
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a higher demand price. The resulting aggregate fishing effort will be lower than in
the corresponding Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Let us now consider the fourth and last model under review. Levhari and
Mirman (1980), hereinafter LM, is a dynamic and deterministic duopoly harvesting
game, where each player maximizes a per period payoff that is logarithmic in his
catches. Players can only differ due to asymmetric discount rates, apart from their
different roles as leader and follower. The harvest rate h is each player i's choice
variable. The model has no explicit harvesting function. Similarly, there is no explicit
harvesting cost function, although it is possible to deduce an implicit harvesting cost
function which is linear in the harvest rate'°. The model excludes firms with price
setting powers, in contrast with Dockner Ct al. (1989).
The strategic interaction between harvesting firms arises from the common
property of the fish stock x. For each time period, each player's harvest is equal to
the available fish stock net of his rival's catches and the remaining stock that is left
for future fish growth. The remaining end of period fish stock, weighted by a
percentage share parameter, is also an argument within each player's logarithmic
payoff function. As a result of the particular explicit functions that this model uses,
the stationary harvesting solutions always correspond to closed-loop strategies; where
the fish stock x corresponds to the state variable and the harvest rate to the control
variable.
By using an identical notation to that of our previous discussions, we can
summarize the stationary solutions from LM's model as follows'1:
'°In LM's model there is no explicit market for catches. In the reduced form of this model, each
agent 1' utility function is logarithmic in his own harvest rate b 4. A possible stmctural model can be
follows. Suppose firm i's profit is fl= phç c(hj and utility is u=u(I1j. If c(h)=kh then u 1 =u((p-
k)h). Given a logarithmic utility function, we have u((p-c)h)= ln(h) + In(p-c). But ln(p-c) is a
constant; hence the latter expression will have no effect on optimal h behaviour. Hence LM's reduced
form remains valid.
"We concentrate on the case of duopolists with identical discount rates.
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(a) H > HN > Hs; with an ambiguous result for the leader's catches, as this result
depends on the parameters of the model; and
(b) x'> xN > xS; with x denoting the steady state fish stock,
where J" denotes the outcome for the joint optimization (of both players' utility)
case. This corresponds to the welfare benchmark used by LM (1980).
The results in (b) show an overfishing outcome for both Stackelberg and
Cournot-Nash solutions, but with a bigger departure from efficiency for the
Stackelberg case. The stationary aggregate harvest ranking, that is shown in (a), is
a consequence of the overfishing solutions for the steady state fish stocks. What
explains the higher overfishing result for the Stackelberg equilibrium?
The key element is the leader's first mover advantage, without cost
disadvantages versus rivals and withoia demand price penalties (given the implicit
firms' price taking behaviour12), that allows him to anticipate (or preempt) harvesting
from his rival. The leader does not face higher marginal harvesting costs as he
increases his catches. He only observes a decreasing marginal increase in his total
payoff, given the logarithmic feature of the payoff function. As a result of this
incentive structure, a Stackelberg leader will decide to catch more than a Cournot-
Nash player in each period. If he does not do so, the follower will increase his own
current harvests.
Then, what stops the leader from endlessly increasing his current harvesting?
First, the strict concavity in catches of his payoff function.' 3 Second, his lower
payoffs as the remaining end of period fish stock decreases. An important parameter
in this latter effect is the percentage share that the leader enjoys over the total
remaining fish stock. In LM's model, this parameter is equated to a half. A higher
'2 In LM's model there is no explicit market for fish. Since each firm's utility function depends
only on its own catch, firms are either consuming the catch or selling it in a market at a given puce.
' So that the leader would prefer a constant harvest to a declining harvest, with the same total
catch over time.
256
share in final stocks could compel him to be a more conservationist player. But the
key point in this model is that if one player does not currently harvest the available
fish stock, the rival player will costlessly do so. If we assign a higher (parametrized)
share in final fish stocks to one of the players, he has incentives, ceteris paribus, to
invest more in them. But the opposite effect will result for the other player: he will
want to increase his current harvests. Therefore, each player will engage in a current
harvesting competition with the rival firm.
The key incentive issue in this model is that an unilateral increase in current
harvesting by one of the players, for a given share of final fish stocks, also involves
incentives for the rival to increase his own current harvesting. Because the leader
makes use of his first mover advantage in anticipating harvesting, reducing the
remaining fish stock, and because symmetric harvesting costs do not increase as the
fish stock falls, the leader's higher current harvest will also induce the follower to
catch more during that period. Accordingly, we obtain the higher Stackelberg
overfishing outcome versus the case of a fully Cournot-Nash fishery.
In the sections that follow we develop our own model with different
equilibrium concepts. In each case we obtain explicit solutions for the oligopolistic
firms' valuation of the common pooi fish stock and we derive formal proofs of
oligopoly overfishing. In the case of a dynamic Cournot-Nash multi firm fishery, we
discuss whether individual harvesting myopia (i.e., static profit optimizing behaviour)
is the limit case of this type of fishery as the number of firms increases.
When we discuss a hierarchical Stackelberg multi firm fishery, we focus on
the case of a single dynamic optimizing agent who competes in harvesting with n> 1
static optimizing rivals. In this setting the main motivation is to examine how the
dynamic optimizing firm's harvesting incentives are affected by the entry of an
increasing number of rival firms into the common pool fishery. The resulting
industry s harvesting is then compared with first best and second best welfare
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benchmarks, and with three different defmitions of a Cournot-Nash multi-firm
harvesting fishery.
(6.D) The basic setting for analysis.
In this section we describe the main assumptions that we use in the analysis that
follows. In order to avoid instability issues that can arise from non-concavities in the
growth function for the single species fish stock (see chapter 2), we will assume a
strictly concave logistic law of natural growth:
G(x)=x =ax (1- .)
	
(D.l)
where i = dx/dt
x: fish stock
a: instantaneous growth rate, a>O
K: Nature's carrying capacity, K>0; i.e., the dynamic system's long run
equilibrium if harvesting is zero.
All variables in our model are defined for a given time index t (i.e., x=x(t)).
In order to simplify notation we omit t. Additionally, we will choose units so that
K=1.
We consider a Cobb-Douglas harvesting technology and follow the
speciaii.zation proposed by Leonard and Van Long (1992, p.295) that allows us to
obtain an analytical solution 14; that is:
=
	 (D.2)
where h is firm i's harvesting and z1 is firm i's fishing effort.
Constant returns to scale are necessary in order to obtain an analytical solution. Numerical
analysis could be used to generalize for other parametric combinations such that a +9= 1.
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We might also want to consider a static or congestion externality. One
possibility is to include rivals' fishing effort with negative impact on h 1 . However,
this introduces static as well as dynamic strategic considerations and makes the
analysis overly complex. We do not consider this option, given our desire to
emphasize the dynamic part of the strategic interaction.
We also make the following assumptions:
(a. 1) The price p of a unit harvested from x is constant over time and independent
of industry harvesting. We therefore choose monetary units so that p=l and
h1 measures value of harvests.
(a.2) There are no fixed costs. Consequently, total harvesting cost C= w, where
w is the constant average and marginal cost of fishing effort.
(a.3) There are no storage possibilities. Accordingly, current sales and profits only
depend on current harvesting.
(a.4) All prices are constant and known with certainty.
Initially we consider the case of identical firms. At a later stage (section 6.H),
we relax this symmetry condition. The total number of firms is given and equal to
N, where n =N-1 is the number of followers in the Stackelberg case.
Notation Summary
x	 single species fish stock level.
zj	firm i's fishing effort.
z..1	 total fishing effort from i's rival firms.
p	 selling price for harvest output.
w	 per unit cost of fishing effort.
h.	firm i's harvest level.
N	 total (exogenous) number of firms.
n	 number of followers in Stackelberg case.
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a	 instantaneous growth rate of x, a>0.
r	 discount rate.
X=X. welfare planner's (shadow) scarcity value for x.
XE	equilibrium scarcity value of x in a Cournot-Nash setting.
X	 equilibrium scarcity value of x in a Stackelberg setting.
(6.E) A first best welfare benchmark.
In this section we define and solve for a first best optimality benchmark. In the next
sections we compare this solution with non-cooperative Cournot-Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria. By doing so, we analyse overfishing propositions.
Suppose a social planner whose objective is to maximize the discounted value
of the intertemporal flow of the natural resource's rents. The resource's rents are
equivalent to the sum of the individual firms' profits. Imposing the symmetry
condition across the N firms and, hence, writing z= z ,Vi with i =1,.. ,N, to denote
the fishing effort of the representative firm, the planner's problem consists in
choosing z such that:
Max V= e N(z I2X - wz)dt
	 (E.1)
where 0< r <1 is the time (constant) discount rate, and the dynamic constraint is
given by:
x = ax(1-x) - N(z lnlxm)
	
(E.2)
with z^0, x>0 and x(0)=x0>0.
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Given the strict concavity of each firm's profit function implied by the
decreasing marginal productivity of z, the optimal z will be a strictly positive
interior solution'5.
To solve problem (E. 1)-(E.2) we maximize the following Hamiltonian
function H at each time period t:
Ma H= e N(z h/2xU2 -	 + O(ax(1 -x) - Nz x 1/2)
	
(E.3)
where ( is the present valued shadow price of a marginal unit of investment in
capital stock x.
The first order conditions for the solution are given by:
aH/az^o, z*^0 and [8H/az]z*=0	 (E.4)








Let us redefine this problem in order to get a time autonomous dynamic
system that can be analyzed using phase diagram techniques. This allows a qualitative
characterization of the optimal solution. We do so by defining the current valued
Hainiltonian H°:
HC = N(z"2x"2 - wz) + X(ax(l-x)- Nz"2x"2)
	 (E.3')




'5 Due to the decreasing returns in fishing effort, the marginal productivity of z will tend to infinite
as z-.O; therefore, the optimal level of z will be strictly positive.
16 (E.7) requires that at the terminal date T, the capital stock x is either exhausted or, being
x(T)>O, its marginal present value be equal to zero. This means that when the optimizing period
approaches T-oo, no additional value (gains) remains from using capital stock x.
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The first order conditions from (E.4) to (E.7) remain valid for the new
Hamiltonian Hc, although (E.6) is now replaced by:
X =rX -._. =X[r-a(1 -2x)] -	 "2x ht2( 1 -X)N
ox	 2
(E.6')
The existence of at least one maximum is guaranteed if the Hamiltonian
function is jointly concave in x and z. Joint concavity requires that [H7 H-
HXIH.J ^0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives (see Chiang, 1992, ch. 4.2).
The parametric configuration of our model satisfies this concavity condition, although
we cannot ensure strict joint concavity ([.] >0) to fulfil the sufficient condition for
a unique maximum. However, we deal with this issue by specializing our analysis on
the uniquely convergent positive steady state equilibrium that in this model
corresponds with the stable branch of a saddle point. We prove this in Appendix 6.1.
First order condition (E.4) gives the optimal value of z as a function of x and
X; that is:
[.(1_X)(z 1 y12x 12 - w]z = 0
	 (E.9)
This implies that if X^ 1, then z=0. Given that the market value for a
harvest unit is 1 (p= 1), this condition simply says that if the planner assigns a higher
value to an additional unit of x, then the optimal policy is to stop the harvesting of
x completely.
if 0^X< 1, then (E.9) implies:
z • = ILl2(1_x)2X
L2WJ
(E.9')
Replacing z(x,A) into (E.5), we obtain:
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G(,X) t = ax(1-x) -A(l--X)x , A=_!_
2w
(E.10)
A similar process using (E.6') implies:
S(x,X)	 = X(r- a(1 - 2x)) - (1 -X)2
	
(E.11)
(E.1l) implies that if X^ 1, hence z= 0, then the locus k=0 in (x,X) space
(see Fig. 6.1) describes a vertical line at x=(1/2)[1- (na)]. Equations (E.1O) -(E.11)
describe the dynamics of our system in terms of the capital stock x and its shaLlow
price X. From (E.9') we can obtain the optimal time path for z.
Let us concentrate on the long run behaviour of our system. The steady state




Using (E.10) and the result that z=0 if X^ 1, locus i=0 is defined by two
different regions: If X^ 1 then locus x=0 defines a vertical line at x=1.'8 If 0<X< 1
and 0< x <1, this locus defines a positively sloped linear function between X and x,
with slope alA and (1- a/A) intercept at X-axis.
When X^ 1 locus X=0 is defmed by a vertical line at x=(112)[1-(nla)]; if
0<X<1, (E.11) implies:
17 We exclude the feasible steady state solution implying f=O because it cannot be the optimal
solution to the planner's problem. We have seen that the planner's optimal z should be strictly
positive. But this requires that f>O, hence h>O, in order to be consistent.
'8 Notice that x = 1 = K is the largest possible steady state stock, corresponding to zero harvesting.
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x = B1 -X)2 + 1 -fr/a) , B=._L
8aw
(all')
In the space (X,x), this locus starts at {l,(l/2)[l-(r/a)]} and then X decreases
as x increases; as X-'O, (all') implies x-oo.
The phase diagram in Figure 6.1 summarizes this information. The steady
state equilibrium (x,X), with 0< { 1-(r/a))/2 < xs <1 and 0< X <119, is a saddle
point20 (see Appendix 6.1). This means that, for each stock level x, there exists a
unique trajectory that converges to the steady State equilibrium. Given any initial
stock level x0, the planner chooses the optimal fishing effort z >0 such that the
resulting shadow value X of the remaining stock falls on the convergent trajectory to
the steady state. The fulfillment of the Transversality condition (E.7) ensures that the
shadow price X will be on the convergent trajectory to the stationary equilibrium
(Chiang, 1992, p.124). This trajectory corresponds to the optimal path.
The convergent trajectory corresponds to the stable arm (curve 11.") of the
saddle point. This phase trajectory necessarily passes through regions I and ifi with
negative slope (Appendix 6.1). In fact, from (E. lO)-(E. 11) we can verify that S, >0,
S>0, G>0 and G<0, in the vicinity of the steady state equilibrium E. This
information allows us to draw arrows of motion like those depicted at regions I-IV.
In order to achieve the unique convergent positive steady State equilibrium
(point E) the planner must choose an optimal effort level z such that allows him to
locate the dynamic system (E. l0)-(E.1l) on the stable arm TT'. For instance, if
initial conditions are such that x0 < x, the planner must choose an initial z such that
'9 Notice that we restrict our analysis to strictly positive values for x,X'. Hence, we will assume
that invariably r<a. The concavity condition does not rule out negative solutions for x and X, though
no economic interpretation can be given to such a case.
a Using a harvesting technology linear mx and defining a law of motion for fishing effort (dzldt)
that is proportional to current profits (with an entry equation, for example), we can obtain a steady
state solution with limit-cycle characteristics (see Leonard and Van Long, 1992, p.105).
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the resulting X = X0 locates itself on a point such as A in Figure 6.1. Once located
on the stable arm, the dynamic forces of system (E. 1O)-(E. 11) will drive it towards
point E.
The aLljustment process between points A and E will imply a recovery of fish
stock x and, as a consequence of that, a reduction of its scarcity value X. Given the
optimal fishing rule in (E.9'), the planner will therefore be able to choose in the
steady state equilibrium a higher level of optimal fishing effort (versus its level in
point A). The resulting higher long run equilibrium for the harvest rate h represents
the benefit stemming from the initial restrictions on f that allow for the recovery of











(6J) A Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
In this section we first solve for a dynamic (profit) optimizing multi firm Cournot-
Nash fishery and we develop a formal proof of Cournot-Nash overfishing. Second,
we briefly discuss the meaning of myopic decision rules, making a distinction
between static (profit) optimizing rules and Pareto inefficient harvesting myopia. We
then explore the effect of an increasing number of firms, with access to the common
pool fish stock, upon the magnitude of the Cournot-Nash overfishing. We obtain a
non-monotonic relationship between these variables.
Envision a fishery with N non-cooperative harvesting finns. Assume that these
firms are .rynvnetric Cournot-Nash players, implying that the representative firm i
makes a decision on z1 subject to the conjecture that (a) [azjazjc=0 where z.1 is the
fishing effort of firm i's rivals, and (b) all firms move simultaneously (deciding on
,N).
The optimizing problem for the representative firm i is:
Max; V= e (z"2x - wz,)dt
	 (F.1)
subject to:
= ax(1-x) - y2zjI/2xu2
	
(F.2)
and z ^ 0, x >0, x(0) =xo, w >0, 0 <r <1, where discount rate r, price p and cost
w are the same as in the welfare case.
The relevant current valued Hamiltonian is:
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H =	 wz, + X1 [ax(l-x)-	 ,12X1r2]
	
(F.3)
where j: 1,..,i,.. ,N and X is firm i's shadow value for marginal investments at x.
Note that Cournot-Nash firms are not assumed ex aue to behave as myopic profit
optimizing agents, because they impose (F.2) on themselves as a constraint.
Since the Coumot-Nash firms are identical the first order conditions for the
representative firm i are:
ozi
	 = [ZX 1 '2(l -X1) - w]z =0
	
(F.4)
x = ax(l-x) - N;112x'
	
(F.5)
= X(r- a(1 -2x)) -	 "2x '(l -2VX1)
	
(F.6)
lirn[X1(t)e Jx(t) = 0
	
(F.7)
Note that (F.7) is fulfilled, if r>0, for any bounded X 1.(t) >0.
We can easily verify a clear similarity, for a given value of z, between the
structure of the equations that describe the first order conditions (F.4)-(F.5) for the
representative Nash firm, and the corresponding first order conditions for the welfare
case (E.4)-(E.5). However, if we compare (F.6) with the corresponding first order
condition for the welfare planner (E.6'), we could anticipate that for a given value
of z a Nash firm will assign a lower marginal value to the stock x vis-a-vis the value
assigned by the planner. This derives from the fact that oH/ax is lower for the
representative Nash firm than in the case of the planner 21 . And it is precisely this
21 Because the total gain to all firms from an increase in x is greater than for one firm.
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partial derivative that measures the value assigned to an additional unit of investment
in capital stock x, where this capital value includes both current and future net
benefits.
The previous outcome anticipates the origin of the incentives for overfishing
in the case of Coumot-Nash firms. The lower capital value assigned to x should
imply a lower X1 when compared to its equivalent in the welfare case. This should
bring about heavier harvesting in earlier periods, thereby implying a lower x in the
long-run. The reason underlying this result is the common property of x. If, to the
contrary, it were feasible to assign efficient prices to x (either via market forces or
regulation), then each firm i's fishing decision would include the economic costs of
using additional units of a non-free good such as x. These are the intuitions. Let us
now proceed with the conditions that prove them to be valid.





Substituting this into (F.5) and (F.6), we obtain:
G(x,X	 x = ax(l-x) -A(l-X)x , A =
	 (P.8)
and
S(x,X)	 = X.(r- a(1 -2x)) - 4(l -X)(l - NX)
	
(P.9)
Equations (F.8)-(F.9) describe the dynamics of the Cournot-Nash system. By
setting both equations equal to zero we can determine the steady state Nash
equilibrium. In this Cournot-Nash setting, denote the equillbriwn solution for the
representative firm's valuation X by X. We can see that the isocline x=O is identical
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in both the Nash and the welfare cases (see (E.1O)). For the isocline X=O, (F.9)
implies:
x =	
+ 1-(r/a)	 B=_2__	 (F.9')
2	 '	 Saw
As in the welfare case, if X,^ 1 the locus X=O defmes a vertical line at
x=(1/2)[1-(r/a)]. For O<X,< 1, the difference between the Nash and the welfare
cases becomes evident. As we anticipated, this is related to the (capital) value
assigned to x. The slope of this locus, for both the Nash and the welfare cases, is





Welfare (m"):	 - lyE 1 -11
8aw	 >1
Cournot-Nash (me):	 - (.! - N)	 (N
We define m1[aX/ax]>..0, with i=w,n for the welfare planner and the
representative Cournot-Nash firm, respectively. We see that always my <0 for
o<x< 1. To the contrary, sign[nf]=-sign[{lI(X,)2}-N]. Given N^2, as X1,
approaches 1, locus X =0 will show a positive slope. This slope becomes steeper as
X falls, eventually becoming a negatively sloped curve that asymptotically
approaches the x-axis.
The corresponding Cournot-Nash steady state equilibrium	 is shown in
Figure 6.2. Again the steady state equilibrium corresponds to a saddle point
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(Appendix 6.2). The fulfillment of the Transversality Condition (F.7) ensures that the
system will move along the convergent trajectory TF'.
Figure 6.3 shows both the Nash and the first best welfare steady state
equilibria, denoted by N and W, respectively. If X<(1/VN), note that m'<O such
that m' > I mw I , (see Table 6.2). Consistently with the drawing at Figure 6.3, we
can propose (for a formal proof see Appendix 6.3):
Proposition 1:
In our model, the steady state values for fish stock (x) and its shadow price (?)
imply that (x),< (x) due to (X<(X, where subscripts n and w denote the







[I 14^I° l+4Rw2+±]- 3N	 - 3N	 3N
(F.11)
with R= r+a and 0^ X <1. Note that a sufficient condition for Proposition 1 to
be valid is (4Rw)/(3N) >0.
We can easily verify that solutions (F. 10) and (F. 11) become identical for
N=1. This simply reflects the equivalence between sole ownership and Pareto
efficiency when firms, that exploit a common poo1 resource, have price taking
behaviour. Therefore, Proposition 1 states Coumot-Nash overfishing for a total
number of firms N^2.
We now state a distinction between static harvesting rules and inefficient
Cournot-Nash harvesting, and afterwards we study how the latter outcome is affected


















(6.F.1) Myopic harvesting rules and inefficient overfishing.
At the heart of the traditional overfishing argument lies the intuitive idea that
numerous and small non-cooperative harvesting firms will tend to ignore the effect
of their actions on future fish stock because each bears only a small proportion of the
cost of a smaller stock. As the number of firms increases, the intuitive proposition
argues that the undervaluation of the social scarcity value will tend to increase
(Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Clark, 1980; Plourde and Yeung, 1989). We now
formally analyse this proposition within our current multi-firm harvesting model. This
makes it necessary to study solutions (F. 10) and (F. 11) in greater depth.
The implicit prices (F. 10) and (F. 11) show the steady state scarcity value that
the corresponding optimizing agent assigns to the marginal unit of investment at x.
If these shadow prices were equal to zero, this would imply that the optimizing
decision maker acts as if resource x were freely available. In other words, the
intertemporal resource constraint would no longer be perceived as binding.
Accordingly, fishing effort would be chosen as if the decision context was static. In
the literature, this type of result is called a myopic decision rule (Kurz, 1987).
Given our concern with overfishing, we want to define a harvesting myopia
concept that considers an explicit measure of Pareto inefficiency:
Definition: We define Pareto inefficient (harvesting) myopia (PIM) as a fishing effort
decision rule that undervalues the social scarcity value of x. Within the frame of our
setting, the social scarcity value of x is given by the welfare solution X..
Therefore, we will have Nash-PIM if (X.-X 11 )>0 as in Proposition i. In
order to avoid confusions, when we have an inefficient static harvesting rule where
A=0 but X>0, we will call this fishy myopic harvesting.
Notice that, for son particular modelling settings, X,=O=X could be possible. In this case
we would have static optimizing behaviour but not inefficient harvesting myopia.
274
(6.F.2) Nash-PIM and an increasing number of firms.
We now study the effect of increasing the number N of firms on the Nash-PIM
outcome derived in proposition 1, that is (X,-X,) >0.
We know that X. = A, for N = 1. We can also prove that both X, and X,
monotonically increase as N becomes higher (see Appendices 6.4 and 6.5). At first
sight this result might appear counter intuitive: traditional arguments (Gordon, 1954)
would presumably have predicted that Ac-'0 as N-,00. What is then the intuition
behind our result?
In our model, increases in the number of firms necessarily imply, ceteris
paribus, that less x will be available because the industry's aggregate current harvest
increases. And falls in x reduce, at an increasing rate, each firm's marginal
productivity of effort. Hence, given the deterministic setting of this chapter, any
dynamic profit optimizing agent should assign a higher scarcity value to the marginal
unit of investment at x. The above argument represents the economic meaning that
both (axIaN) and (ÔX.JÔN) be invariably positive. We do not know other dynamic
fishery models in which a result of this type have been formally derived.
If we consider the limit of the stationary solutions X and X, for N-.00, we
obtain that in both cases the limit value is equal to 1 (Appendix 6.6). Given (E.9) and
(F.4'), we know that a unitary value for the scarcity value X implies an optimal
policy of full closure for fishing (z1 =0) in the welfare and Cournot-Nash cases.
Hence, for N-oo, it is unprofitable to continue with the commercial harvesting of
x23.
Dockner et a!. (1989) develop a similar limit result to our case. They briefly
explore a dynamic Cournot-Nash multi-firm fishery with identical price making firms.
If > 1 then ;=O (see condition F.4). By setting equation (F.8)=O we also know that in any
stationary equilibrium is must be true that f= 1-(1-X)(N/2w). Hence, if X^ 1 then in the steady state
f^1 for N-oo. This implies the locally stable steady state x=1 (see equation D.1). Hence, the fish
stock will not be harvested unless some parametric change (for example, a fall in N) transforms
harvesting into a profitable activity.
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A pecuniary externality, stemming from the effect of each firm's harvesting on
demand price, is the center of firms' strategic interactions. Dynamic (fish stock)
interactions become neutralized by the particular functional forms which are modelled
(section 6.C.2). A negative relationship between the representative firm's stationary
fishing effort and the total number N of firms is obtained. This results from a
negative relationship between number of firms and equilibrium price. In the limit
case N-.00, the market price is below the minimum average variable cost and hence
the representative Nash firm shuts down (z=O).
The roots behind the presumption that the Nash value X,'-O, when the number
of firms is sufficiently large, can probably be traced back to popular static
discussions of overflshing. A clear example is Comes, Mason and Sandier (1986)'.
Key features of this Coumot-Nash multi-firm fishery model, with static profit
optimizing firms, are shown in Table 6.1. Firms' interactions stem from a pecuniary
externality effect (given firms' price making behaviour) and also from a technological
congestion externality: each firm's catch is a proportional function (according with
the share in industry's fishing effort) of the aggregate harvest which is a strictly
concave function of aggregate fishing effort. Given the particular functional forms
in use, the authors obtain that as the total number of firms gets larger each firm
increasingly ignores the externality effects. When N-oo, the model shows the
appealing result that each firm will equate the value of her average product to the
marginal cost of fishing effort. Hence profits are driven to zero and the traditional
free access (full rent dissipation) solution prevails.
In our dynanic Cournot-Nash model we do not obtain that X.-•O as N-'oo.
However, this result does not exclude the option that overfishing increases as N gets
larger. The latter would require that (X,-X,) >0 increases with a larger N. Hence,
' See also the discussion in Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch.3, pp.55-61).
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we now ask: what happens with the difference Am (X-X) > (P as the (finite) number
N> 1 of firms increases? We study the qualitative behaviour of this effect by doing
a numerical simulation exercise. Define parameter b 4(r+a)w>O. If b increases,
we expect that the scarcity value of the fish stock x should decrease (see F. 10-F. 11).
This can occur either due to a higher discount rate r, a higher rate a of biological
growth, or a more expensive per unit cost w of fishing effort. Therefore, for higher
b values we should expect that both X and X0 become lower. But the effect on A >0
is not obvious on an a priori basis.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 plot the values of the stationary solutions X and X (using
equations F. 10 and F. 11) for an increasing number N of firms and for four increasing
b values. Each plotting specifies the corresponding simulation value of parameter
b. Our exercise conflnns a number of interesting results:
(i) For a given value of parameter b, we can observe the convergent processes, as
N increases, of both solutions X..,, and X1, towards the limit value of 1 (for N-.00).
(ii) The difference Am (X,-X) remains positive for different values of N, with the
exceptions of N=1 and N-oo.
(iii) As the value of parameter b increases, we observe a consistent reduction in the
steady state solutions for the scarcity value of marginal fish stock units, in each of
the two equilibrium concepts that we are comparing (welfare and Coumot-Nash
cases).
Given Proposition 1, >O insofar as (4Rw)/3N>O, with R=(r+a)>O and w>0.
The simulated b values have no empirical support. We are only interested in studying the
qualitative impact of increasing values of b on the solutions X and X. For b=4(r+a)w, we only know
that O^r^1, a>O is the rate of biological growth, and where the unit measure of the per unit cost
w>Odependsontheunitmeasureoffishingeffort;.Firmiwillbeactiveaslcngasherprofit
(pz'2x"2 -wz)>O. Given that p=l, the positive profit condition implies that w<[x/zJ. In steady
state conditions, O<x^l; hence, w>O will be greater or lower than 1 depending on whether
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(iv) As the value of parameter b increases, we tend to observe wider positive gaps
between the steady state solutions X and X, for a given value of N. Figure 6.6 plots
this result.
An interesting result is that higher values of b imply consistently higher
positive differences A (X-X) for given values of N> 1. Let us examine the
intuition behind this result: higher values of b imply that each Coumot-Nash firm
assigns a lower scarcity value to stock x. For instance, a higher discount rate r makes
future catches less valuable and hence reduces the incentives to invest in x. On the
other hand, a higher growth rate a increases the future availability of x. Lower
scarcity values of x increase, ceteris paribus, the representative firm's fishing effort
(see equation F.4'). And higher values of the representative z imply that the use of
passive Nash conjectures produces a bigger undeitstimation of the marginal changes
in the industry's aggregate harvest2 . Hence, the higher the level of the representative
effort 7j, the bigger will be the overfishing stemming from the value gap A >0.
A second interesting result is the effect of increasing the number N of firms
on the value gap A>0: for an initial range of relatively low N values, we obtain
increasing positive values for the difference as N gets larger (figure 6.6).
Nonetheless, each b value implies a maximum positive difference A=A, after
which increases in the number N of firms monotoracally reduce the source (A> 0)
of the Cournot-Nash overfishing result. As N-.00, the difference A-'O. Therefore,
we obtain that (aA/aN) >0 only for a limited (initial) range of N> 1 values. Once the
maximum positive value of is achieved, for a given b, higher values of N imply
a monotonic convergence of both scarcity values X and X to the value of 1. This
convergence implies a decreasing difference A >0. This result appears counter
intuitive. Which factors lie at its roots?
Write the industry's harvest as H=x(z+n2), with denoting the fishing effort of the
representative rival firm j (existing n identical rival firms). If firm i uses Nash conjectures she
estimates that 8H/8=(1I2)(xIz)'. A social planner would additionally consider the changes in the
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In our model an exogenous increase in N implies a higher industry's current
aggregate harvest. This reduces the end of period fish stock. The latter has two
channels of direct influence on the value of X.
First, lower levels of x imply, ceteris paribus, increasing reductions in each
firm's marginal productivity of fishing effort. This is due to the assumption of a
decreasing marginal harvesting productivity for additional fish stock units. Hence,
increasing industry's aggregate harvests (due to a larger N) imply increasingly lower
marginal profits for the representative firm. In other words, each firm's increasingly
the higher scarcity value of x as N gets larger. This implies a reduction
in z. This effect reduces each Nash firm's unde,valuation of marginal changes in the
industry's aggregate harvest as each firm decides on her optimal fishing effort. The
latter argument helps to understand the convergent process between X and X, as
N-.00.
But Figure 6.6 also shows an initial range of N values such that increases in
N imply, ceteris paribus, a higher difference >0. To understand this we must look
at the second channel of influence that stems from exogenous reductions in x: the
function of biological growth G(x).
Given that dx/dt=G(x)=ax(l-x), we know that (3(x) achieves its unique
maximum value at x =1/2. If 0< x <1/2, the fish population has an increasing rate
of growth 0(x) >0: in this range stock x has increasing marginal biological returns;
if x = 1/2, the fish stock has constant marginal biological returns; if 1/2< x <1, x has
decreasing marginal biological returns.
If the exogenous reduction of x (due to a higher N) occurs at x0 <1/2, which
is more probable the higher the value of N is, the resulting rate of growth G(x) will
become lower. This reinforces the higher scarcity of x which results from the first
channel of influence (productivity effect) described above. This result is consistent
This effect is weakened by the use of harvesting technologies with constant returns in the use
of the stock x, i.e., the Sdzaefer harvesting function.
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with the endogenous monotonic reduction, for relatively high values of N, in the per
unit overfishing gap >0 as N increases.
However, when X ) > 1/2 (which is more probable the lower the value of N is)
the exogenous reduction of x, due to a larger N, will imply higher biological returns
via a higher 0(x) >0. Hence, the marginal changes in G(x) will imply the opposite
scarcity effect to that triggered via changes in the marginal productivity of fishing
efforts. The marginal increase in G(x) will reduce the perceived scarcity of stock x.
This will increase, ceterisparibus, each firm's fishing effort. And this will contribute
to increase the underestimation of marginal changes in the aggregate harvest when
firms use passive Nash conjectures. Given this effect, the (per unit) source of
Coumot-Nash overfishing (the value gap >0) can increase with a larger N, for
relatively low values of N (or x0 > 1/2).
In sum, in our dynamic model the net effect of an increasing number of firms,
on the per unit source of Cournot-Nash overfishing (> 0), depends on the prevailing
type of biological returns (increasing/decreasing in x) and also on the magnitude of
the productivity penalties which may stem from falls in the fish stock x. Falls in x
are a direct consequence of an increasing number of firms given the triggered higher
aggregate harvest.
Let us now turn our attention to the case a dynamic harvesting fishery subject
to a leader/followers competition setting.
(6.G) A Stackelberg multi-firm fishery.
Very few papers have previously considered formal comparisons between Cournot-
Nash and Stackelberg multi-firm common pool fisheries. The two dynamic models
reviewed in section (6.C.2), Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Dockner et al. (1989),
examined only duopoly cases. And in the case of Dockner et al. (1989) the duopoly
interaction centers on a static congestion (pecuniary) effect via the inverse demand
function.
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In sections (6.G) and (6.H) we compare the stationary harvesting equilibria
which result from different definitions of dynamic Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash
multi-firm fisheries. While maintaining the basic setting of section (6.D), we now
additionally consider a Stackelberg equilibrium where a dynamic profit optimizing
leading firm faces n identical Cournot-Nash followers that behave as static optimizing
agents. The latter assumption is used as a simplifying device. In our discussion (with
no congestion effects and finns' price taking behaviour) the oligopoly interactions
exclusively arise from the dynamic externality that commonality of fish stocks brings
about.
We examine the differences that a dynamic profit optimizing Stackelberg
leader introduces with respect to multi-firm harvesting competition based on passive
Nash conjectures. We contribute to the fisheries literature by formally analysing the
changes in harvesting incentives, of dynamic optimizing firms using Cournot-Nash
versus Stackelberg leadership conjectures, that result from increases in the number
of rival firms.
This section is organized as follows. We first compare the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the first best welfare solution of section (6.E) and with the dynamic
Cournot-Nash multi-firm fishery of section (6.F). This analysis aims to establish
unambiguous comparative results with respect to these previous cases. Then we
compare the dynamic Stackelberg multi-firm fishery with three alternative
benchmarks: First, with afislly myopic Coumot-Nash multi-firm fishery. Second,
with a Cournot-Nash multi-firm fishery in which there is only one firm which
behaves as a dynamic profit optimizing agent. This exercise aims to isolate the pure
differential effect of Stackelberg leadership, versus the use of passive Nash
conjectures, upon the stationary harvesting equilibrium. Finally, we compare the
Stackelberg equilibrium with a second best welfare benchmark in which a price
taking and dynamic optimizing planner, surrounded by n static optimizing Cournot-






profits in the common pool fishery. This social planner cannot achieve the first best
welfare solution because he can only control the fishing effort from one firm while
the remaining n firms keep harvesting in a non-cooperative way. The latter exercise
aims to illustrate the consequences, on the assessment of overfishing, arising from
fishing regulators with only partial control over the fishing efforts of the industry's
harvesting fleet.
(6.G.1) The Stackelberg and FMNIE fisheries.
Imagine we have a dominant firm in our fishery. Assume that this implies
Stackelberg leadership attributes; that is, the leader (denoted by I) has the ability to
credibly commit to a given effort strategy z. This signal is observed by the
followers. The leader also knows the followers' reaction functions. Suppose that all
N firms have identical harvesting productivity.
Suppose the representative Nash follower, T, is a static profit maximizing
agent Q f=O) and hence disregards the effect of current harvesting on future fish
stock. In this case, the follower's optimal effort will be (using (F.4')):
If all firms, including the leader, followed the effort policy (G. 1), the







For convenience, let us call this case a "fidly myopic Nash equilibriwn"
(FMNE). We will later consider this case as a benchmark to compare with the
Stackelberg fishery defined above.
Notice that in the dynamic Cournot-Nash multi-firm fishery of section (6.F)





Hence, the stationary stock solution in an FMNE fishery will be lower than
in the corresponding dynamic Cournot-Nash profit optimizing multi-firm case as long
as the representative firm's marginal scarcity value X be greater than zero. A
sufficient condition for the latter is 413N> 0 (see equation (F. 11)).
- The Stackelberg leader's problem.
The dynamic profit optimizing leader's problem consists in:
Max; Vt = e zx"2 - wz1)dt
	 (0.3)
subject to
Note that in this case, f>O requires that N<2aw. Hence, for relatively high values of N,
relatively low rates a of biological growth and/or relatively low per unit cost w of fishing effort, this






= ax(1-x) - z,"2x"2 -
	 (0.4)
where z is given by (0.1) and ;^0, x^O, x(0)=x0 >O, w>O, O<r<1; where
discount rate r, price p and cost w are the same as in the welfare case.
Note that the leader can only (indirectly) affect followers' effort decision via
changes in x. If the leader increases his effort, and hence his harvesting, the
corresponding reduction in x will discourage followers' fishing effort. We call this
process a preemptive strategic incentive. By using this procedure, "1 can increase
his market share though at the cost of an overall fall in x and, therefore, in each firm
effort's marginal productivity.
The corresponding current valued Hamiltonian H, is (using also (0.1)):
1t21t2H, = ;1txh/2_ wz, + X, [ax(1-x)- z, x — .— ]	 (0.5)
The first order condition ÔH/äZ, =0 implies the following optimal effort for
the leader:
As before, X, ^ 1 implies z,=0. By using the remaining first order conditions
we can find the loci i=0 and X=0:
G(x,X,)	 = x 
[ai -x) — (1 ->,) +n ]
2w
which in steady state (i =0) implies the following locus:





For positive parameter values this locus always has a positive slope, and this
slope is N times higher than in the welfare case. By comparing this locus with its
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equivalent in the welfare case, we can derive an interesting result. Rewriting (E. 10'),





Note that the steady state equilibria for the Stackelberg and the welfare cases
have to fulfil (G.8) and (G.9), respectively30. By direct inspection of these equations
we can propose:
Lemm' 1:
For positive steady state values of X, if X,,-X,) >0 then necessarily x,, > x, where
x denotes the steady state equilibriwn value of x in the Stackelbergfisheiy.
Given this result, we can focus the overfishing proof on the relative values for
X, and X. Given fully myopic Nash followers (X f=O), the stationary solution for
will correspond to the steady state solution for the scarcity value of x in the
Stackelberg fishery as a whole. Denote the latter equilibrium value by X8.
Again from first order conditions we find that locus , in this Stackelberg
fishery, is given by:
S(x,X1)X= x F +!L _a(l_2x)] - (1—X)2
4wL 2w
which in steady state implies the following locus:
Notice that (G.8) and (G.9) cross the x axis at the same point.
(G. 10)
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As in the welfare case, this locus always has a negative slope 110< X, < 1.
However, in the Stackelberg case the absolute value of this slope is N times higher
than in the welfare case.




2 3	 3N	 t3N 3J	 3N2
whereas the welfare solution is (rewriting (F. 10)):
= 1 2 - 4	 + 114Rw	 12+
	 (G.13)
fl3N 3J 3
withR= (r+a), 0^ X'<1.











Direct inspection of (G. 14) shows that D <0 is a necessary condition for
2Rw
N
X.> X, given that invariably N^2 in the oligopoly case. Appendix 6.7 shows that
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D <0 is also a sufficient condition in order to attain this result. This allows us to
propose:
Proposition 2:
A StackeTherg fishery, with fisHy myopic Ncish followers (X—O), will tend to
undervalue the true long-run scarcity value of its fish stock, that is X,> X, f the
following condition holds:
2Rw > N= ni-i , R = ri-a	 (G.15)
if this holds, then Lemma 1 ensures that the Stackelberg fishery will also
maintain an inefficiently low level offish stock in the long run; that is, x> x.
The intuition underlying condition (G. 15) is as follows. Consider the case of
higher r, a, or w. A higher value in any of these parameters would reduce the
scarcity value of x. Therefore, we should expect that X., becomes lower. The same
should occur with X. But in the latter case the fall will be greater. This is due to the
lower marginal cost of current harvesting implied by a lower X value; therefore, to
preempt rivals' current harvesting becomes more attractive (less costly) for each non-
cooperative firm. This additional private gain from current harvesting will imply a
lower private valuation for the scarcity X value than the expected fall in the shadow
value X. Therefore, strategic preemptive incentives lead the Stackelberg fishery to
inefficient overfishing in the long-run.
Will the overfishing be greater with or without the non-fully myopic
Stackelberg leader?
It must be borne in mind that a fully myopic Nash equilibrium (FMNE), with
all N firms harvesting in fully myopic fashion, implies the long-run fish stock given
by (G.2). On comparing this stock to the corresponding Stackelberg steady state value
generated at locus i=0 in (G.8), we can see that as long as X,>O the Stackelberg
fishery will maintain a higher x. Therefore:
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Proposition 3.
The introduction cia non-fisily myopic Stackelberg leader will necessarily reduce the
level of overfishing compared with an FMNE multi-finn fishety.
(6.G.2) The dynamic optimizing Cournot-Nash fishery as a benchmark.
How much of the Stackelberg overfishing improvement (versus the FMNE case)
stated in Proposition 3 is due to the dynamic optimizing behaviour of the leading firm
and how much due to the strategic preemptive power of the Stackelberg leader? To
explore this issue we first compare the previous Stackelberg equilibrium with the
dynamic optimizing Cournot Nash fishery of section (6.F). Afterwards, we compare
the Stackelberg solution with a Coumot-Nash multi-firm fishery in which only one
firm is a dynamic profit optimizing agent. Finally, we consider as a benchmark a
second best welfare solution such that a dynamic optimizing social planner has
control over only one firm's fishing effort, with all the remaining n firms being
Cournot-Nash static optimizing agents.
With the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery of section (6.F) as a yardstick for
comparison, we will show that our Stackelberg fishery, with only one dynamic
optimizing firm (the leader), invariably implies lower stationary values for the fish
stock x, for any N> 1. When the benchmark is a Coumot-Nash fishery with only one
firm behaving as a dynamic profit optimizer, we will obtain an identical stationary
solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, in terms of the second best welfare
yardstick, our Stackelberg fishery will invariably imply overfishing for any N> 1.
Let us start by comparing the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery of section (6.F)
with the previous Stackelberg solution. Looking at the equations that describe the
corresponding locus i=0 in each case, and using a similar logic to Lemma 1, we can
deduce that as long as X ^ X the resulting stationary solutions will be such that
x>x. If, on the contrary, X<X, the ranking between the stationary solutions x
and x is not obvious on a an priori basis. Let us perform a numerical simulation to
clarify this issue.
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We can obtain numerical solutions for both stationary equilibria as functions
of parameters N and b4(r+a)w>O31 . Let us consider the arbitrary fixed values of
w=O.8, a=4 and make parameter b to vary as a function of r, with r={O; 1/2; 1}.
Higher values of r represent, ceteris paribus, an exogenous lower scarcity value of
the marginal unit of investment at x.
Simulation results, as functions of N and r values, are shown in Figures 6.7
and 6.8. From the former we can deduce that the function X5 =X(N) is strictly
convex in N. Given the concave behaviour of function X=X(N) we see that, for the
simulated parameter values, the functions cross each other33. While the solution X
monotonically converges to the value of 1 as N-.00, the solution X5 exceeds 1 for a
finite N. The latter value of N decreases as the exogenous scarcity of x increases (for
instance, due to a lower discount rate). Recall that with X ^ 1, the Stackelberg
leader's optimal policy is to stop fishing (equation G.6).
Hence, for X5 ^ 1 the Stackelberg fishery transforms itself into a Cournot
Nash fishery with n fully myopic firms. The resulting stationary fish stock solutions
are shown in Figure 6.8.
We can observe that, for any N> 1, invariably x,> x. Hence, we can deduce
that N dynamic optimizing Cournot Nash harvesters generate less overfishing than
the case of a dynamic optimizing Stackelberg leader who is surrounded by (N-i)
static optimizing Cournot-Nash followers. In the latter case, as the number of fully
myopic followers starts to increase, the Stackelberg leader will inevitably leave the
31 Soutions A and X are given by (F. 11) and (G. 12), respectively. We then use the corresponding
loci i=O to obtain and x.
Notice that with these parameter values we are assuming b values between 13 and 16.
Therefore, the solution for X1 must be similar to those shown in Figure 6.5.
A lower value for a and/or w implies that both curves move upwards (in a Northwest direction).
With this type of parametric changes we can obtain that invariably X5 >),, for any given value of
N> 1. For example, this occurs for a=2, w= 1/2 and r= 112. However, the convex behaviour of
?=X(N) and the concave behaviour of )=X(N) remain unchanged.
292
fishery (X^ 1). Subsequently, the fish population will be extinguished for a finite
number N of flrmsM. Higher time discounting accelerates this process35 . What is the
intuition behind this result?
In the Stackelberg fishery studied, only one firm (the leader) considers the
fish stock's net growth. In the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery of section (6.F), all N
firms make effort decisions in this way. Therefore, as the number of rival firms
increases, the Stackelberg leader internalizes a higher increase in rivals' total current
harvesting than the increase perceived by any individual firm in the dynamic
Cournot-Nash case. This occurs because a dynamic profit optimizing firm will
choose, ceteris paribus, a lower current fishing effort than a fully myopic harvester,
for a given level of intertemporal availability of x. This is the reason why, for given
values of a, w and r, X increases faster than X does, as N gets higher. The same
reason explains why in the Stackelberg fishery x becomes extinguished for a finite
N, while in the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery x monotonically decreases but remains
positive for finite N values36.
The dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery of section (6.F) has the disadvantage, as
a benchmark for our Stackelberg multi-firm fishery, that it assumes that all N firms
are dynamic profit optimizing agents. To isolate the net effect stemming from the
feature of Stackelberg leadership, let us now compare the Stackelberg fishery with
Recall than in the resulting FMNEfishery the fish stock is extinguished if N>2aw (see equation
(G.2)). Once the dynamic optimizing leader decides to leave the fisheiy, the condition for extinction
is fulfiled with N=n+1=7 (with a=4 and w=O.8).
The simulation results with r=O do not change the qualitative pattern of influence of increases
in r upon the stationary solutions for x.
36 Vhat about the possibility of extinction in the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery of section (6.F)?
Consider equation (G.2): the stationary stock x will be positive as long as (1-X11)<(2aw)IN. The
simulation results in Figure 6.8 show that in this type of fishery the stock x monotonically decreases
as N gets bigger. But X increases with higher N and this reduces the representative firm's fishing
effoit When N-.oe, )-.1 and ;'-'O. However, taking the limit of the condition above for N-co,
we can deduce that x=O in this limit case.
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a case where all N firms use passive Cournot-Nash conjectures, but there is one firm
which is a dynamic profit optimizing agent (as in our Stackelberg fishery).
(6.G.3) A Cournot-Nash fishery with only one dyrnimic optimi7ing harvester.
Denote the single Cournot-Nash dynamic profit optimizer as firm 1. The remaining
n static optimizing Cournot Nash firms will choose the representative fishing effort
given by equation (0.1). Firm 1 will maximize, in each time period, the following
Hamiltonian function:
H1 =(1 -X1)z1x iri_	 + X1(ax(1 -x) -nz1x 1/2)	 (G. 16)
with X1 denoting firm l's internalized scarcity value for x. Using aH1Iaz1 =0, we
obtain that firm l's optimal fishing effort is given by an effort rule identical to
equation (G.6).
Following identical steps as in previous sections to derive the loci i =0 and






Notice that this is a function identical to the corresponding locus x=0 in the
Stackelberg fishery (equation G.8). Similarly, by setting = [rX 1-aH1 /ax] =0, where
H1 considers the optimal effort policies z1' and z,, we obtain that:
S(x,X1) X=X1 1r+_f!_-a(1 _2x)] - (1 -X)2
2w	 4w
(G.18)
We again obtain an equation identical to the corresponding locus in the
Stackelberg fishery (equation G. 10). Therefore, the corresponding stationary
equilibrium of the current Cournot-Nash fishery will be identical to the steady state
solution in the Stackelberg fishery.
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The latter result implies that in the basic dynamic model of this chapter
(section 6.D) it makes no difference if a single dynamic profit optimizing firm, who
competes in harvesting with n Coumot-Nash static profit optimizing rival firms, has
Stackelberg leadership attributes or not. Hence, the improvement in the overfishing
problem that Proposition 3 refers to is erciusively due to the introduction of a
harvester who internalizes the intertemporal availability of x as a binding constraint
in his profit optimization problem. Which is the intuition behind this result?
The key point is that in our dynamic model, without technological congestion
effects and with price taking firms, the static optimizing harvesters use fishing effort
decision rules which are independent of rivals' effort (equation G. 1). This means that
a harvester who has a first mover advantage, as the case of the Stackelberg leader,
cannot directly affect his rivals' actions. Because there is no congestion (via
pecuniary or technological effects) the Coumot-Nash static optimizing firms' fishing
effort depends only on the stock and is not directly affected by any other firm's
effort. In the duopoly Stackelberg fishery of Dockner et al. (1989) the leader directly
affects the follower's fishing effort via the induced effect on the demand price of
harvests. In the duopoly Stackelberg case of Levhari and Mirman (1980), the
Stackelberg leader directly affects the follower's actions because both players are
dynamic profit optimizing agents with objective functions depending on the current
fish stock level.
Hence, in our Stackelberg model the leadership attribute merely implies that
the leading firm recognizes the stock constraint (G.4). This is the reason why in the
Cournot-Nash fishery of this subsection the stationary equilibrium is equivalent to the
Stackelberg solution.
Our Stackelberg leader's single channel of influence on followers' actions is
the effect of his own harvesting upon x. He knows that followers pursue closed-loop
fishing effort policies. Therefore, the leader will try to harvest x as fast as he can,
provided that it is profitable for him to do so. In this cost/benefit analysis, the
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dynamic optimizing leader internalizes that a higher current fishing effort implies,
ceteris paribus, a lower x in the next period. And he knows that this implies a
harvesting productivity penalty on his own future fishing efforts.
In the current subsection, the single dynamic profit optimizing Cournot-Nash
firm has an identical incentive structure to the Stackelberg leader's one. This
Cournot-Nash firm makes the conjecture that his rivals' fishing effort remains
unchanged when he marginally varies his own effort. And this is what precisely
occurs, as the Stackelberg leader knows. The dynamic optimizing Cournot-Nash firm
also knows, as the Stackelberg leader does, that his rivals take effort decisions based
on equation (G. 1). Therefore, he will also want to harvest x as quick as he can in a
profitable way. His cost/benefit analysis will also internalize the intertemporal
availability of x as a binding constraint.
To close this analysis, let us finally consider how a (second best) welfare
planner would decide his harvesting strategy provided that: (i) he can only control
the fishing effort of one harvesting firm, and (ii) all the remaining n harvesters are
again Cournot-Nash static profit optimizing players.
(6.G.4) A second best welfare case.
Denote this case by W2. The planner's objective is identical to function V in (E. 1).
The difference is that he can only control one harvesting firm, call it firm 1, while
remaining n firms are Cournot-Nash static profit optimizing agents, each of them
with a representative fishing effort zj given by equation (G. 1). The difference in this
section compared with the previous oligopoly equilibria is given by the planner's aim
which consists in maximizing the discounted value of the industry's aggregate
intertemporal profits, subject to the restricted instruments (relative to the first best
welfare case) under his control.
At each time period, the planner maximizes (by choosing z1) the following
current valued Hamiltoman function:
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H,, =(1-X,x(z1 112+ nz1112)- w(z1 +nz)+ X.ax(1-x)	 (G.19)
with X denoting the shadow price assigned by the planner to the marginal unit of
investment at x.
Using aH/az1 =0, the planner's optimal effort policy is given by a function
identical to equation (6.6). This means that if X ^ 1, then the planner's optimal
effort policy is to set z1 =0. In this case, the common pool fishery becomes a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium with n static optimizing firms. In this FMNE case, x
becomes extinguished when n > 2aw (see equation 0.2). Let us explore whether or
not the second best welfare planner decides to stop firm l's harvesting, for a finite
number N of finns.
As previously explained, we first obtain loci i=0 and X=0 and by combining
them we then derive the stationary equilibrium W2 {x, X}. Locus x=0 is now
given by a function identical to equation (G. 8); whereas locus = [rX-aH/ax] =0
corresponds to:
1 (1 Xy,,)(NXp,) + l-(rla)	 (G.20)X=.;;	
X2	 2
Notice that for A^ 1, this locus corresponds to a vertical line x=[l-(rla)]12
in the space (X,x). As X-'O, (G.20) implies x-.00 (see Figure 6.10).
By combining equations X=0 and A=0 we obtain the stationary solution for
the planner's scarcity value X:
x =! N-4'+	 [N_1)] 
2]	 (6.21)
3	 J3
Comparing this solution with the dynamic optimizing Cournot-Nash fishery's
stationary solution for the scarcity value of x (given by equation (F. 11)), we have
X=NX. Looking at solution X (equation (0.12) we can also verify that X>X,
297
for any N> 1. Given the convex behaviour of X = X(N), the previous result means
that X=X(N) will also be a convex function. A numerical simulation exercise
confirms this result. Figure 6.9 fflustrates.
The latter result means that the second best welfare planner internalizes,
relative to the dynamic optimizing Stackelberg leader, more of the increasing scarcity
of population x as N becomes higher (due to the industry's higher total current
harvesting). Therefore, the planner reduces firm l's fishing effort faster than the
reductions in the Stackelberg leader's own fishing effort as N increases. Figure 6.9
shows that the welfare planner decides to stop his own fishing (when X ^ 1) for a
lower N than the number of firms that triggers the shut down of the private leader's
harvesting actions. Which are the consequences in terms of the stationary solutions
for x?
First, given that the locus i=O is the same in the Stackelberg and W2
solutions, we can deduce that if X> X, then necessarily x> x (see equations
G.8-G.17), as long as x>O. Notice that both X and eventually becomes
greater than one, for a finite N. Hence, in both cases the single dynamic optimizing
decision maker eventually stops his own harvesting, leaving behind him a FMNE
fishery which extinguishes the population x if the number n of fully myopic
harvesters is such that n > 2aw (see equation G.2).
The simulation results plotted in Figure 6.8 confirm these deductions. Figure
6.8 plots the stationary solutions xD (dynamic Cournot-Nash case), x and x as
functions of the total number N of firms and for two discount rates r={l/2;l}. We
observe the expected Stackelberg overfishing with respect to the second best welfare
benchmark for N> 1, until x becomes extinguished for a fmite N.
Before the planner decides to set z1 =O, Figure 6.8 shows a full equivalence
between the stationary solutions x and x. We can confirm the generality of this
This simulation assumes identical parameter values to those in section (6.G.2); that is, w=O.8,










result by looking at the corresponding loci x=0 in both equilibrium concepts. In the
case of the W2 solution, we can write this locus as (see equation G.8):
while in the case of the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery this locus corresponds to
(rewriting the equivalence to equation (E. 10') for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium):
From (G.22)-(G.23) we infer that the stationary solutions have ;=x as long
as X=NX. And this was precisely the relationship deduced above?8. However, this
is only valid as long as X<1. Otherwise, given that X<l for finite N, we have
x> x, because when X ^ 1, x begins to be determined by an FMNE fishery.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the latter argument for N values such that z 1 =0 (or X ^ 1).
As a summary of our findings, figure 6.10 plots all the different stationary
equilibria studied in sections (6.E) to (6.G.4). The plotted curves have been obtained
from a numerical simulation exercise, for the following parameter values: N=4;
r= 1/2; a=4 and w= 1. These parameter values ensure that the corresponding
stationary solutions for x are positive in all cases studied, while the different
stationary solutions for X remain within the interval (0,1). The first best and second
best welfare solutions are denoted by W and W2 respectively; the dynamic Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is denoted by N; the Stackelberg case by S and the fully myopic
Nash equilibrium by M.
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(6.11) A dynamic profit optimizing Stackelberg leader with productivity
advantages.
In this section we examine the implications of the single dynamic profit optimizing
Stackelberg leader being more productive than the followers. On the one hand, this
productivity advantage makes more plausible that the dynamic optimizer be the
Stackelberg leader. On the other hand, its allows us to examine how the leader's
harvesting incentives change with variations in his relative productivity advantage.
As expected, an increase in the leader's productivity advantage will imply a higher
optimal effort for him. However, if the followers' productivity increases the leader
will not engage in a harvesting war; instead, he will adjust his own harvesting
downwards. The reason behind this result is the dynamic optimizing behaviour of the
leading finn.
For the sake of simplicity, we compare in this section the resulting
Stackelberg equilibrium with the case of an FMNE fishery. We recalculate the
corresponding first best welfare stationary solution in order to discuss overfishing
results.
Let us suppose the harvesting technology of firm i is now given by:
h1 =
	 (H.l)
where 0 ^ d1 ^ 1.
Define d, =1 for the leader and d ^ I for follower f's technology; therefore,
a lower df implies a greater leader's productivity advantage over the followers. Let
us retain the assumption that the n follower firms are identical: d1=d denotes the
representative follower's scaling productivity.
(6.11.1) A more general first best welfare solution.
In order to deal with efficiency considerations, we need to recalculate our welfare
benchmark. In fact, under the new conditions the social planner must choose optimal
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e	 1/2 + 7,jl/21!2 - w[z1 +	 (H.2)
subject to
= ax(l-x) - z'2x"2 - n(dz,Y2x 1'2)
	 cH.3)
with x >0 and non-negative fishing efforts. The signs and values of the parameters
remain unchanged.
Accordingly, the corresponding current valued Hamiltonian H is:
H = x"2[z 1 "2 + iu!z72 ]- z1 +nz. +	 (ax(l-x)- x 1 [z	 + ndZ)'2}) (H.4)




Leader's effort (z)	 4w2	 (H.5)
d2(1-Xx
Follower's effort ()	 4w2	 (H.6)
(1-X,)'x,
Total optimal effort (z)	 4w2	 + nd)
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By using these results and the remaining first order conditions (see previous
sections), we obtain the two loci that define the steady state equilibrium. In fact, A=0
is described by:
= 1	 , M=(1+nd2)
2aw
whereas X=0 is given by:




(H.8) and (H.9) imply the following steady state optimal solution for the
shadow price of x:
x=	 24Rw+114Rw22+4
W	 2 3	 3M J1 3M 3	 3
(H.10)
where M is given in (H.8) and R=(r+a). Note that the welfare solution (G.13) is a
special case of (H.10)
We can obtain from (H. 10) that (8X)I(8d) >0 (see Appendix 6.8); that is, the
more productive the n smaller follower firms, the higher the shadow price for x must
be. The reason for this is the increasing demand on x generated by firms with higher
productivity. The impact on f is not obvious on an a priori basis (see equation
(H.8)); however, it can be proved that the long-run equilibrium for x becomes





(6.H.2) An FMNE fishery.
Let us now consider a non-cooperative FMNE with all N firms behaving in a fully
myopic Cournot-Nash fashion. Hence the representative firm i has an equilibrium
scarcity value for x such that X1 =0. Bear in mind that this section assumes the
existence of one firm with higher productivity than her rivals. Denote this firm by
I and her fully myopic Coumot-Nash equilibrium fishing effort by z 1 . Similarly,
denote the representative Cournot-Nash firm of the remaining n symmetric rival firms
by "f", each with a scaling productivity parameter df=d^ 1.
The FMNE assumption implies the following optimal effort level for both firm
I and the representative firm f:
(H.12)
*_ xze - -
4w2
Given this, the resulting steady state equilibrium f for the FMNE case is:
= 1-	 , with M=l ^nd 2	 (H. 13)
Notice that f >0 if and only if M <2aw. Therefore, a stationary equilibrium
such that x-'0 could occur the lower the rate a of biological growth and/or the per
unit cost w of fishing effort are, and/or the higher the number and productivity of the
firms with access to the fish stock become.
(6.H.3) The Stackelberg fishery.
Let us now introduce a dynamic profit optimizing Stackelberg leader. Let us
retain the assumption that the follower firms are identical and fully myopic in their
harvesting behaviour. In this case, the leader's optimization problem is to maximize
at each time period the following Hamiltonian:





H, = (1-X,)z,x- , + X, [ax(1-x)- 
2w
	 (H.14)
that considers the followers' effort policy given by (H. 11), and from which the leader
decides his optimal effort which once again corresponds to (G.6).
The remaining first order conditions imply the locus i =0 that is given by the
following equation:
Comparing (H.15) and (H.8), we see that Lemma 1 is still valid in this more
general framework. Therefore, we concentrate our attention on the solutions for X.
The locus X=0 in the Stackelberg fishery is now given by:
=	
(1- X S 
)2 + .. j1- 





Using (H. 15) and (H. 16) we obtain the Stackelberg value for marginal
investment in x:
.	 ._M 2 4Rw
Xs -X,
(H.17)
with M= (1+ nd2) and R= (r+a).
Figure 6.11 shows two steady state solutions for the Stackelberg fishery. We
can see that x, increases if the followers' productivity falls. It is possible to show
that 8x/ôd <0. Similarly, using (H. 17) it is possible to prove that invariably
8X,/ôd >0. Given both results, we also know that az,/ad <0 (see equation 0.6).
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Figure 6.12 shows the steady state equilibria for the first best welfare
benchmark: as the followers' productivity falls from d=l and the steady state
solution moves from W0 to W 1 , X,," will also fall. In other words, we have that
ax,,7Iad>o.
These results imply:
(a) As the followers' productivity changes, the Stackelberg leader will adjust his
scarcity value of x in the same direction as the welfare planner does. For
example, if the followers' productivity increases the leader will realize the
stronger demand pressures on x and, hence, he will adjust the steady state
value of X," upwards.
(b) In the Stackelberg fishery, the dynamic optimizing leader's effort policy will
run counter to the changes in the followers' fishing efforts that arise from
changes in their productivities. If the followers' productivity decreases (and
hence their optimal efforts), the leader will increase his own fishing effort
and, as a direct effect, his share in the common pool resource. However, if
the followers' productivity increases the leader will not engage in a
"harvesting war"; instead, he will adjust his own harvesting downwards.
The source of the latter result is the positive value of Xe". This means that the
leader assigns a positive value to marginal investments in x; in other words, future
catches have a positive value within the frame of current decisions on fishing effort.
Therefore, if the rivals' productivity falls, the leader will take advantage of this in
terms of current harvesting, but also considering the future additional harvesting that
he can obtain in the next time periods. If the rivals' productivity increases the leader
will realize the stronger current and future demand on x; consequently, if no
additional strategy space is considered, he will restrain from adopting more
aggressive fishing responses.
What are the implications if we compare the Stackelberg fishery with the
particular case of a Cournot-Nash fishery leading to an FMNE? We can easily show
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the general conclusion that a Stackelberg leader will tend to partially compensate for
the fishing patterns generated by changes in fully myopic Nash followers'
productivity.
If followers increase their productivity, x will fall in the FMNE and in the
Stackelberg fishery; however, in the latter case the fall will be smaller because the
leader will adjust his optimal fishing effort downwards and hence alleviate the
increasing demand on x. If followers' productivity falls, x' will be lower in the
Stackelberg case than it would have been if everyone were to behave as a fully
myopic Cournot-Nash firm: the leader will take advantage of the followers' lower
productivity by increasing his own fishing effort. However, the stronger preemptive
incentive in favour of the leader will not fully neutralize the general trend towards
a higher x that is generated by less productive followers. These arguments allow us
to propose:
Proposition 4:
A dynamic profit optimizing Stackelberg leader will behave as a counteracting factor
in fishing effort patterm induced by productivity changes among fidly myopic Nash
followers: higher (lower) harvesting ability displayed by followers will prompt the
leader to a lower (higher) fishing effort strategy. However, in the long run it will
dominate the direction of the changes brought about by the followers' new
productivity.
Does the inefficient overfishing in the Stackelberg industry increase or
decrease as the followers' productivity falls?
We know that both ? and X always fall as d decreases. We can also
ascertain in (H.lO) and (H.17) that X=X, if d=0, which is another way of
referring to a single owner case. Given the price structure of our model, sole
ownership coincides with Pareto efficiency and hence the equality that we obtain
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Therefore, as d falls from 1 to 0 it must be true that X, fails faster than X,.
This implies that as followers' productivity falls, the gap between both values is
monotonically reduced. Given the validity of Lemma 1, the same must be true for
the gap between x. and x. This enables us to propose:
Proposition 5:
As followers' productivity falls, an initial situation of Stackelberg overfishing (that is,
proposition 2 hola) will be monotonically reduced, disappearing in the limit as d
approaches zero.
As d-'O, the follower firms become unimportant relative to the leading firm.
Therefore, the maximization of the leader's discounted profits leads to the
maximization of the welfare function.
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(6.1) Final remarks.
This chapter has focused on analysing overfishing in a dynamic setting by comparing
welfare (first best and second best cases), Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg steady state
solutions, for a differential multi-firm harvesting game under deterministic and non-
cooperative oligopoly settings.
Our main conthbutions in this chapter to the economic analysis of multi-firm
and common pool fisheries are:
(1) We develop an endogenous explanation of the incentives to overexploit a
common pool resource, in cases when harvesters are dynamic profit optimizing
agents. We formally model overfishing as the result of value gaps between the
marginal social scarcity of fish stocks and the marginal value assigned to it by non-
cooperative harvesting firms. This methodology allows us to distinguish between the
concepts of static profit optimizing rules and inefficient harvesting myopia. Our first
best welfare solution follows the standard definition in fishery economics. Our second
best welfare solution illustrates the case of a welfare planner with limited control on
the fishing efforts of the industry's harvesting fleet.
Our formal solutions for the scarcity values assigned to the fish stock have
some similarities with value solutions obtained in Plourde and Yeung (1989),
although they compare a dynamic multi-firm Coumot-Nash fishery only with a first
best welfare case. We additionally consider a Stackelberg fishery and a second best
welfare solution. We do not know other previous dynamic oligopoly fishery models
with formal solutions for the marginal scarcity values assigned to the common pool
fish stock. Clark (1980), Levhari and Mirman (1980), and Dockner et a!. (1989), all
of them considering dynamic duopolistic harvesting fisheries, do not formally analyse
the marginal valuation of the remaining fish stock at the end of each time period.
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(2) We also examine the consequences on overfishing from increasing the number
of firms with access to the common pool natural resource. The formal analysis of this
issue, within a dynamic oligopolistic harvesting setting, is a contribution to the
literature on common pool fisheries.
To our knowledge, only Dockner et al. (1989) have a brief analysis of this
type for the case of a dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery (section 6.F.2). This model,
although with different assumptions to our discussions, derives similar steady state
results to ours: as the number N of firms increases, the representative firm's
stationary fishing effort falls; and when N-'oo, harvesting becomes unprofitable: the
representative firm shuts down. In Dockner et al.'s model this result stems from a
decreasing demand price (as N increases) which in the limit case (N-boo) falls below
the minimum average variable cost.
In our discussion, without pecuniary externalities and with closed-loop effort
solutions, we also obtain decreasing individual fishing efforts as N increases, and a
full closure stationary solution for N-oo. This result stems fzom an increasingly
lower marginal productivity of the representative finn's fishing effort and also from
declining biological growth returns (section 6.F.2). A larger number of firms
increases aggregate harvesting in the contemporaneous period. The resulting lower
end of period fish stock triggers a declining marginal productivity of fishing efforts.
The assumption of a declining marginal productivity of fish stock helps each firm to
increasingly internalize (by reducing her fishing effort) the higher scarcity of the
common pool stock as the number N of firms increases. The internalization effect
would clearly be smaller with harvesting functions which are linear in the fish stock
(i.e., the commonly used Schaefer production function in fishery models).
These authors center firms' strategic interactions on pecuniasy (demand price) externality effects
and obtain open-loop fishing effort solutions (see section 6.C.2).
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(2.a) We show an (at first sight) counter intuitive result in a Cournot-Nash fishery
where all firms behave as dynamic profit optimizing agents: an increasing number
of rivals implies increasing overfishing only for a limited (initial) range of nwnber of
finns. This appears counter intuitive when it is compared with the limit result (for
N-.) traditionally derived within static discussions of overfishing: the open access
solution of full rent dissipation (see Gordon, 1955; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, ch.3;
Comes, Mason and Sandier, 1986, just to quote a few examples). In all these cases
the full rent dissipation solution results from an (implicit) increasing underestimation
of the higher scarcity value of the common pool resource as the number of firms
increases. A key feature in this result is the assumption of individual harvesting
functions which are proportional to the aggregate harvest, according to each firm's
effort share in the industry's total fishing effort. As N increases, the individual share,
of identical firms, in the aggregate fishing effort monotonically falls and hence each
firm becomes less affected by the congestion problem modelled within the aggregate
harvest function (e.g., see Table 6.1). This result reduces the individual incentives
to internalize the increasing scarcity (higher congestion) of the fish population as N
gets larger.
In our model, by contrast, dynamic profit optimizing firms have increasing
incentives to internalize the higher scarcity value of the fish stock as N increases
because lower fish stock levels imply: (i) increasing penalties on each firm's marginal
productivity of fishing effort, and (ii) declining biological returns for relatively
overdepleted stock levels (in our model, X 3 < 1/2). The effect in (i) stems from the
declining marginal harvesting productivity of fish stock, while the effect in (ii) is a
consequence of the strictly concave growth function G(x) that we consider in our
dynamic setting.
The effect in (i) needs not be present in real world industrial marine fisheries.
The case of often collapsed pelagic fishing grounds is an example: in these cases the
marginal harvesting productivity of fishing efforts can even increase when the fish
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population achieves relatively low levels (see chapter 2). On the other hand, the
effect in (ii) can be absent if the biology of fish populations shows depensatory
growth effects4° at relatively low stock levels (chapter 2).
Our previous remarks highlight the importance, when it is the case of
assessing the sources and magnitude of overfishing problems, of the type of
dependence of harvesting returns on fish stock levels and the changes in marginal
biological growth returns as fish populations become increasingly depleted.
(2.b) Section (6.G) examined the consequences of increasing the number of rival
firms on the harvesting incentives of a single dynamic profit optimizing firm which
competes with n ^ 1 fishy myopic Cournot-Nash harvesters. We compared the
harvesting equilibria that result from modelling the single dynamic optimizing agent
as a: (i) Stackelberg leader (call it case S), (ii) another Cournot-Nash firm (case N'),
or (iii) a second best welfare planner (case W2). We compared these cases with a
benchmark in which all harvesters are static profit optimizing Cournot-Nash agents
(case M). We aimed to explore the overfishing consequences of introducing into a
multi-firm static optimizing fishery a dominant firm which is a dynamic profit
optimizing agent and may also have Stackelberg leadership attributes. This exercise
was motivated by the empirical evidence described in chapters 3 and 4, suggesting
the presence of industrial concentration in important marine industrial fisheries.
We obtained the following ranking of stationary fish stock solutions:
X 1 > XN ^ x> XN =XS ^ X. This ranking includes the first best welfare solution
(case Wi) of section (6.E), and the Cournot-Nash fishery (case N) of section (6.F),
with all Nfirms being dynamic profit optimizing agents. The ranking above implies:
° In this case, lower population levels can imply increases in the marginal biological returns for
relatively low x levels. This feature would retard the downward adjustment phase in fishing efforts and
would contiibute to magnify the overfishing problem.
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(b. 1) Our Stackelberg fishery implies lower overfishing than the case of a fishy
myopic Cournot-Nash fishery (case M) as long as the leading firm remains active in
the fishery. For a sufficiently large (finite) number of rival firms, however, the
dynamic optimizing leader decides to leave the fishery. Then the fishery becomes
identical to a fully myopic Cournot-Nash fishery.
(b.2) The Stackelberg equilibrium is identical to the Cournot-Nash fishery with only
one dynamic optimizing firm (case N). This occurs because the Stackelberg leader
cannot directly affect the static optimizing followers' fishing efforts. In our model,
without technological congestion and with price taking firms, the static optimizing
followers use fishing effort decision rules which are independent of rivals' actions.
Hence, in our Stackelberg model the leadership attribute merely implies that the
leader recognizes the fish stock constraint.
(b.3) The second best welfare case, where the planner controls only the fishing
effort of one harvester among other n ^ 1 firms, implies a higher stationary fish stock
than the Stackelberg equilibrium. The planner internalizes, relative to the Stackelberg
leader, more of the increasing scarcity of the fish population as the number of firms
increases. The planner also decides, as the Stackelberg leader does, to leave the
fishery for a sufficiently large (finite) number of non-cooperative rival harverters.
Insofar as the planner is active, he manages to achieves a stationary stock solution
identical to the case of the dynamic Cournot-Nash fishery of section (6.F).
(b.4) All previous cases imply overfishing when compared with the case of a first
best welfare planner with full control over the fishing efforts of the industry's
harvesting fleet.
Our analysis in section (6.G) is a complement to a few previous studies which
have formally compared the stationary equilibria for duopoly harvesting games under
Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg settings. To our knowledge, two papers have
previously considered analyses of this type, by examining the case when both
duopolists are dynamic profit optimizing agents. For instance, Levhari and Mirman
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(1980) derived, in a fishery with identical cost firms, stationary solutions such that
x 1 > XN> x8 and H 1 > HN > H, with H denoting the industry's stationary aggregate
harvest, Wi the first best welfare case, N the Cournot-Nash fishery, and S the
leader/follower case. In this model the duopolists' strategic interaction is centered on
the contribution of the common pool fish stock to each player's logarithmic utility
function. In this setting, with both agents being dynamic optimizers, the Stackelberg
fishery harvests more aggressively the common pool fish stock than the
corresponding Cournot-Nash duopoly.
In Dockner et al. 's (1989) duopoly fishery firms' strategic interaction is
centered on a static pecuniary (demand price) effect. When the Stackelberg leader has
cost advantages over the followers, the resulting static solutions for the industry's
aggregate fishing efforts are: Z5 > ZN, with N and S denoting the Cournot-Nash and
Stackelberg cases. Hence, in the static solution framework of Dockner et al. (1989)
the Stackelberg fishery also harvests more aggressively the common pool fish stock
(vs. the Cournot-Nash case) if the leader has cost advantages. The opposite effort
ranking results when the Stackelberg leader has cost disadvantages versus the
follower. In the latter case, the leader reduces his own fishing effort in order to allow
for a higher demand price.
(3) In section (6.H) we examined the case of a single dynamic optimizing
Stackelberg leader with productivity advantages over n ^ 1 fully myopic Nash
followers. An interesting result is that the dynamic optimizing Stackelberg leader
behaves as a counteracting factor in fishing effort patterns induced by productivity
changes among the fully myopic Nash followers. For instance, if followers' relative
productivity increases the Stackelberg leader will reduce his fishing effort, and vice
versa. An implication of this is that the dynamic optimizing leader will not engage
in harvesting wars if his rivals become more productive.
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(6.J) APPENDICES.
(6.1) Convergence to steady state equilibrium: welfare case.
The dynamic system is given by G(x,X) and S(x,X) in (E. 10)-(E. 11). Linearizing this
system around the steady state equilibrium (x,X 1 ) implies:
itl	 1G G l 	 I_.•l
I x] = lsx sj	 [x_x*J	
(1.1)
where:




S = r-a + 2af + A(1-X) >0 because X< 1 and x> (1/2)[1- (na)]
Given this, the Jacobian matrix J has a negative determinant, I J I =G1S .
-SG <0. We know that I J I = r1r2, where; are eigenvalues of J, such that the
temporal solutions (trajectories) 0(t)= (x(t)-x,X(t)-X')' correspond to:
0(t) = c1v1exp{r1t} + c2v2exp{r2t}
	
(1.2)
with c1 constants and v, the corresponding eigenvectors.
Since J <0, we know that r 1 ,r2 are both real and have opposite signs (say
r1 >0, r2 <0). Recall that r, are real and different if i> 0, where != (tr(J)) 2 -4131
and tr(J)= r1 + r2.
Therefore, given I J I <0 we know that the steady state equilibrium is a
saddle point with one convergent (phase) trajectory or stable arm (more details in
Beavis and Dobbs, 1990, ch.5.5).
We also know that tr(J)= G,, + S	 tr(J)=r>0. This implies that
r1 > r2 . Therefore, unless initial conditions rule out the possibility that c 1 >0 (see
equation 1.2), system (E. 1O)-(E. 11) will not converge to the steady state equilibrium
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(x,X') as t-oo. In other words, convergence to the steady state calls for c 1 =0. This
imposes a necessary constraint on the initial conditions of the system. The fulfillment
of this constraint on initial conditions is tantamount to the imposition of a
transversality condition (Chiang, 1992, p.124)
(6.2) Convergence to steady state equilibrium: Cournot-Nash case.
The dynamic system is given by (F.8)-(F.9). Linearizing this system around steady
state equilibrium x,X (both >0), implies:
= G G x -x	 G G
x	 ss	 x-x •	 sxsxss
where:
G1 = [a(1-f) - A(1Xu)] - af = -af<0 (A= N/(2w))
G = Af>0
S,, = 2aX>0
S = r-a + 2ax + [1/(4w)][1- N)t + N(1-X)]
= [1/(4w)][(1/XD - NX1
S >(<) 0 if X<(>) 1/VN
Therefore:
(1) ii X< 1/VN, S>0 - I J I = GS - os <o
Consequently, (x,X') is a saddle point.
(2) if X> 1/V'N, S<0, then sign(I J I) is given by:
I J I = -[(af)/(4w)][(1/X) + 3NX 1] <0 V x,X >0
Accordingly, steady state (x',X 1) is invariably a saddle point.
Convergence to the steady state equilibrium is guaranteed if the absolute value
of the negative eigenvalue (call it r 1) is greater than that of the positive root (r 2). Bear
in mind that tr(J)= G + S,, = r1 + r2.
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In case (2), tr(J) <0; therefore, independently from initial conditions, our
system will hit the stable arm of the saddle point and it will converge to steady state
as t-,00.
In case (1), sign[tr(i)] is ambiguous. In fact, tr(J)=[r - nI(4w)]. Hence,
tr(J) > (<)0 if r> (<)n/(4w). If tr(J) <0, convergence to the steady state is
guaranteed, independently from initial conditions. If tr(J) >0, we need to impose a
constraint on the initial conditions of the system such that the corresponding
transversality condition is fulfilled (equation (F.7)).
(6.3) Proof for Proposition 1.
We concentrate on a positive steady state solution (x',)C). Nash-Cournot and welfare
solutions satisfy locus ± =0. This locus implies that if (X)'> (X', then (X)V> (x7.
Steady state solutions (F. 10) and (F. 11) imply:








Q = J2 +	 >0
J = 1- 1141w
Since F and Q are positive, it must be true that (X)'> (Xy if (4Rw)I(3N) >0.
As long as this condition holds, then it is also true that (x)' > (xy'.
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(6.4) Proof for 8L,/dN> 0
Rewrite equation (F. 10) as follows:
= !(p + (P2 + 4/3)1/2)	 (4.1)
With P [213-(4Rw)/3N]. Note that 8PIN = (4Rw)/(3N2) >0, given that
R=(r+a) >0 and w >0. From (4.1) we obtain that:
_____= 	 [i + P (P2 + 4/3)-1/2J
oN 20N
	 (4.2)
We do not know the sign of P a priori. If P ^ 0 then OX/ON>0 given that
OP/ON>0. If P <0, we can write (using equation (4.2)):
Sign [.] =sign [i - (d P I 2)1/2) (P2 + 4/3)1/2]	 (43)
= sign [i - (1^ 4/(3p2))i/2]
Because invariably P2 >0, from (4.3) we can deduce that if P<0 then
(OX.JON) >0. Therefore, independently of P ^ 0 or P <0, invariably (3X/aN) >0,
VN^1.
(6.5) Proof for (AJdN) >0.
Rewrite equation (F. 11) as follows:




with J [1-(1+4Rw)/3N]. Taking the partial derivative of(5.1) with respect to N,
we obtain that sign [OX.JoNJ is equivalent to:
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sign	 (i^ 
*2 + 4/(3pjy1t2) - ii	 + 4/(3?))-1]	 (5.2)
aN	 13N2J
Our proof requires that the expression in (5.2) be positive. Multiplying the
expression in (5.2) by (J2 +4/(3N)) 112 >0 and then dividing the result by
8J/aN=[( 1 +4Rw)I(3N2)] >0, we obtain that (5.2) is positive if:
(j2 + 41(3N)ynl > 	 2	 -	 (5.3)
3N(l -J)
where (1 +4Rw) = 3N(l-J). Now multiply (5.3) by (J2 +4I(3N)) 1 ; hence (5.3)
becomes:
J2 +4/(3N)> C(J2 +41(3N))"2	(5.4)
with C	 [2/(3N(l -J)) - ii.
We do not know the sign of C a priori. If C ^ 0 then (5.4) is invariably true.
Now, if C>0, then (5.3) must be fulfilled in order to obtain (aXIaN)>0. Squaring
both sides of the inequality in (5.3), cancelling the symmetric term P on both sides
and then dividing the result by (41(3N)), we obtain:
3N(1-P)2 > 1- 3NP + 3NP2	(5.5)
Solving for the square term on the left hand side of (5.5), we obtain that the
fulfillment of (5.3) implies:
3N(1-P) >1	 (5.6)
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But 3N(1-P) =1 +4Rw. Hence (5.6) is equivalent to the condition
4Rw=4(r+a)w>O. Therefore, as long as 4Rw>O we invariably obtain that
ava >0.
Appendix (6.6):
(I) Consider the limit behaviour of X (given by F. 10) when N-ioo. This implies:
=	 (2/3) - (TIN) + [(2/3 - TIN)2 + 4,3r)
with T=4Rw/3>O.
Given that Lim TIN =(), we can easily verify that Lim X = 1.
N-.
(II) Consider now the limit behaviour of X when N-' 0O
By direct inspection of (P.11) we can verify that Lirn X = 1.
Appendix (6.7): Proposition 2.
To obtain X> X', it must be true that:
D[1J + 1i2) +--- > f
D2+i.1 t N J	 3N2	 3N2
with D <0 as a necessary condition, D given in (G.14).
Given D<0, taking ()2 on (7.1) does not change the sign of inequality.










Since D <0, this condition requires the expression between large brackets to
be positive. Direct inspection shows that the value of the expression under the square
root is invariably greater than I DIN . Then the expression between the large
brackets is always positive. Therefore, D <0 is also a sufficient condition to obtain
xw.>xs*.
Appendix (6.8):
lax 1Define T	 >0. Hence sign 
L-] 
is equal to:
sign[_T ôd 8daM -' +--.
1t21
I [TM-I _1 2 ^ 41 I3J	 •]J
(8.1)
with M=(l + nd2). Hence aMVad= -(1 + nd)2(2nd)<0.
Therefore -T(aM 1/ad) >0. We can write equation (8.1) as:
- T aM sin[l_ (7M' - 2/3)
- 2/3)2 + 4/3]'
Denote U =	 - 2/3). If U <0, then necessarily ÔXWI8d >0. If U >0,
r ax 1
sign L-i = sign [i - [1 + 4/(3(J2)]h12]
Given that invariably U2 > 0, the sign of expression in (8.3) is invariably positive.





We need to prove that axIad <0, with f given by (H. 8). Deriving the latter with
respect to d, we obtain that 8x/3d <0 requires: Cl [(aM/ad)(1-X)- M(oX/ad)] >0,
with8M/äd>0, M=(1+nd2)>0, (1 -Xj>Oand ax/ad>c). Using (H.10), weknow
that:	 =	 mi-2 . [i + P(P2 
+ 4/3)1r2]
ad	 2
with T (413)Rw >0 and P (2/3 - TM') (>)(<)0.
Hence Cl >0 requires:
(1 -Xe) - mci (i + P(P2 + 4/3)1/2)> 0
Using (H.10), (1-Xe) = (1 -P/2) - (1/2)(P2 + 4/3)12• Rearranging terms in equation
(9.2), we obtain that Cl >0 requires (replacing TM- 1 = (2/3 -P) in (9.2)):
(4/3)(P2 + 4/3)1/2 >(213)P + 4/3
	
(9.3)
Multiplying equation (9.3) by (3/2) and then squaring both sides of the inequality, we
obtain:
3P2 - 4P + 4/3 >0
	 (9.4)
We do not know the sign of P a priori. If P^O, (9.4) is invariably true, hence
Cl >0 and therefore of/ad <0. Solving for the equation (3P2-.4P+4/3) =0, we obtain
the unique solution P=213. Therefore, if P<213 the inequality in (9.4) is fulfilled.
Now, if P >0 then necessarily P <213 given that TM4 >0 (see definitions in (9.1)).
Therefore, independently of whether P ^ 0 or P >0, we invariably obtain that Cl >0
and hence OxIOd<0, with f given by (H.8).
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